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Summary 
 
 
Small business is important to U.S. economy. However, they are difficult to 
obtain external finance. Since 1990s, deregulations happened in the U.S. banking 
market and affected small business finance greatly. Relationship banking is an 
effective lending technology for small business finance. Therefore, this thesis aims to 
investigate the nature of relationship banking and its impacts by using the data from 
U.S. Survey of Small Business Finances 1993, 1998 and 2003. The survey is led by 
U.S. Federal Reserve Board and it is representative and comprehensive for U.S. small 
business finance. 
The thesis contains three pieces of empirical research on small business:  
1. Investigation on the impacts of relationship banking and banking market 
concentration on capital structure.  
Findings: relationship banking has favourable impacts on the availability of 
external finance for small firms.  
2. Examination on the primary banking relationship switching behaviour and its 
impacts on loan terms.  
Findings: such switching behaviour decreases loan approval rate, increases 
borrowing cost and lengthens loan maturity.  
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3. Investigation on the determinants of communication in person approach with 
primary banks and its impacts on small business finance.  
Findings: ‘soft information’ transmission strengthens the banking relationship, 
reduces the borrowing costs and improves the availability of finance.  
 The contributions to the existing knowledge regarding small business 
include:  
1. First to investigate the reverse financial life cycle effect of relationship 
banking on small business’ capital structure;  
2. First to examine the impacts of “switching behaviour” on certain terms of loan 
deals; 
3. Frist to capture the beneficial effects of soft information communication on 
banking relationships, borrowing costs and discouraged borrowing. 
This thesis sheds lights on policy agenda/debate as follows:  
1. Government would be wise not to increase banking market competition.  
2. Encouragement from the policy aspects on the innovative information 
technologies making soft information transmission computerized is 
meaningful. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Small business plays important role as the engine of the economy (Spence and 
Rutherfoord, 2003; Way, 2002). It is widely accepted that the definition of small 
business is in the light of total number of employees. There are two commonly seen 
criteria for the cut-off point of the total number of employees: the European Union’s 
version affirms account small businesses as the firms with fewer than 250 employees 
(Dora et al, 2013); Some other countries such as U.S. affirm the definition of Small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for the firms with 500 employees or fewer 
(Schlosser, 2015)2.  
In 1970s and 1980s, after the end of Breton Woods Agreement and the 
recession, with a significant increase of the market internationalization, there has 
been a revival among the small businesses in the United States. Deregulations also 
gave rise to such a revival, e.g. in 1983, Congress enacted a law regarding the 
reducing of barrier for the exports; And Regulatory Flexibility Act was passed in 
1980 to mitigate the regulatory burden suffered by the small businesses (Blackford, 
2003). Therefore, by the beginning of 1990s, small businesses played an important 
role to drive the whole economy. The weights of small business economy kept 
increasing in the economy of United States (Blackford, 2003). Small businesses have 
                                                 
2 The thesis uses the US version of the definition of small business (SMEs). In some empirical 
analysis, scholars also adopt total assets as a proxy of firm size (García-Posada, M. and Mora-
Sanguinetti, J. S., 2013; Büti, 2015) 
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contributed around 50 per cent of the non-agricultural GDP in the U.S. (Kobe, 2007), 
over 99.60 per cent of the total number of firms, over 48 per cent of total employment 
and over 40 per cent of total annual payroll in the U.S. from 1992 to 2013 (SUSB, 
2016) as shown in Figure 1-1.  
 
Figure 1-1 National Statistics for Small Business in U.S. from 1992 to 2013 
 
In 1990s, the economy in the U.S. developed quickly. However, the expansion 
of the small business economy slowed down a little bit comparing with 1980s, but 
still kept increasing. One of the major reason, was that the restructure among the 
large firms works efficiently due to the market internationalization and development 
of the technology in the US (Blackford, 2003). From 1992 to 2005, as shown in the 
Figure 1-1, the proportion of the number of small businesses in the total number of all 
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of the firms remained the same level. The total employment and annual payroll 
among small businesses, kept a similar weight in that of all of the U.S. firms.  
Running small businesses, the business owners face difficulties when raising 
external finance from stock market because of the high fixed transaction costs and a 
problem of asymmetric information. For example, The Survey of Small Business 
Finances 1993 (SSBF93) shows that in 1993, in U.S., 6.7% of the small businesses 
view ‘credit availability’ as the most important issue the business is suffering from; 
and another 4.7% of the small businesses view ‘High Interest Rate’ as the most 
important issue the business is suffering from. In the Survey of Small Business 
Finances 1998 (SSBF98), in U.S., 7.1% of the small businesses treat ‘Financing and 
Interest Rates’ as the most important concern; And in the Survey of Small Business 
Finances 2003 (SSBF03), in U.S., 5.0% of the small businesses suffer from 
‘Financing and Interest Rates’ issues (SSBF, 1993, 1998 and 2003). According to 
National Small Business Association (NSBA) data since 1993, 43% of the small 
businesses reported that, within the most recent 4 years prior to the survey, they have 
experienced financial difficulties which mean they need finance but they could not 
find any willing sources of finance. Such difficulties led to 32% of the small firms to 
lay off employees, 20% of the small firms to reduce employee benefits (NSBA, 
2012). 
Small businesses rely heavily on loans (Ang, 1991; Han and Zhang, 2012) and 
commercial banks play a key role in providing loans to the small business borrowers 
(Han et al, 2009) and other financial services to small business customers (Mach and 
Wolken, 2006). It means, when talking about small business finance, it is inevitable 
to consider the banking environment for the small businesses. 
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Indeed, apart from the deregulation in the small business sector, in 1990s and 
early 21st century, there was also a dramatic change (deregulation) of the banking 
market in the United States and it is empirically proved that such a change 
significantly affected small business finance (Rice and Strathan, 2010). United States 
suffered from the geographical restrictions on bank expansion since 19th century. 
Before 1994, interstate branching is strictly restricted in most the states in the United 
States. Therefore, banks outside the state are difficult to be involved in the 
competition in the local banking market in the state. In 1994, the Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was enacted and it permits unrestricted 
interstate banking which was effective in 1995 and interstate branching which was 
effective in 1997. There are very strong implications for the effectiveness of IBBEA 
as since then, the local banking market in each individual state, has changed 
enormously because of the increase of the competition among the banks. Some of the 
financial institutions may enter another state by mergers and acquisitions as well 
(Rice and Strahan, 2010). 
The enactment of Gramm－Leach－Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999 is another 
milestone of the deregulation of the banking market in United States in 1990s. GLBA 
eliminates the separation between investment banks and commercial banks and in this 
way, commercial banks obtain stronger market power. To some extent, GLBA 
facilitates bank market consolidation (Zhao and He, 2014). The beneficial effect of 
GLBA on small business finance has been empirically captured (Davidson and 
Simpson, 2016). 
Based on the dramatic deregulation in small business sector and the bank 
market, as well as the difficulties small businesses suffered from for external finance, 
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it is meaningful to find out how this change affects small business finance and how 
small business could ameliorate the situation for their external finance. In particular, 
it is valuable to find out in what way small businesses could borrow from the banks 
more easily and cheaper. 
When providing finance to small firms, lenders, such as banks, suffer from a 
problem of asymmetric information due to the high fixed costs to collect private 
information from small business borrowers on fewer repeated transactions and less 
reliable signals (Ang, 1991). The problem of asymmetric information would cause 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Bebczuk, 2003; Cataldo, 2003; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Because of the information problem, banks may be 
exposed to a greater default risk if they mistakenly issue loans to low-quality 
borrowers. Hence, banks would charge higher interest rates on the loans issued to 
small firms which averagely have a higher default rate than large businesses and 
high-quality borrowers may be ‘penalised’ by being declined and/or being charged 
higher rates on the loans. Therefore, both under-investment and over-investment may 
happen in a capital market with serious information problems (Sharpe, 1990). 
Information problem may also cause moral hazard where banks lack of strong 
motivations to monitor the behaviour of borrowers and it is relatively costly to do so 
(Darrough and Stoughton, 1986). 
It has been found that relationship banking plays a key role in the alleviation 
of asymmetric information problem, where relationship banking could be understood 
as “the provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that: i. invests in 
obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature; and ii. 
evaluates the profitability of these investments through multiple interactions with the 
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same customer over time and/or across products” (Boot, 2000; p. 10). Via 
relationship banking, banks could collect ‘soft’ information and use it to evaluate the 
creditability of borrowers (Berger and Udell, 2002) and it works in a different way 
from ‘arm’s length contract’ which is ‘hard’ information oriented, such as credit 
scoring and financial statement-based lending.  
Existing literature has provided ample evidence on the favourable effects of 
relationship banking. For example, it has been found that a longer relationship with 
banks could improve the availability of external finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), 
short term loans (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008) and possibility to have existing 
credit lines renewed (Cole, 1998). Relationship banking also reduces the cost of 
borrowing for small firms (Berger and Udell, 1995).  
There is also evidence suggesting that the effects of relationship banking on 
asymmetric information problem are affected by capital market conditions and 
inconsistent empirical results have been found across various market conditions. On 
one hand, in a concentrated capital market, banks have strong market power which 
could generate extra profits from their customers and small business borrowers may 
be charged more according to Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Hypothesis 
(Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009). However, it has also been found that the favourable 
effects of relationship banking could be strengthened in a concentrated market where 
banks have stronger motivations to collect private information from informationally 
opaque borrowers and this is referred as the Information-based Hypothesis. 
Compared with ‘hard’ information in arm’s length contracts which dominate in a 
competitive banking market, ‘soft’ information could offer more private information 
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about the creditability of borrowers to the banks in a concentrated market (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1995). 
In general, the observed empirical evidence on the impacts of relationship 
banking and banking market conditions is inconsistent, pending for further 
investigations. Therefore, this dissertation adopts the data from the Surveys of Small 
Business Finances (SSBF) conducted in 1993, 1998 and 2003 by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, to have provided quite considerable and solid empirical evidence supporting 
relationship banking theories, contributing to the existing relationship banking and 
banking market concentration theories. In the Introduction Chapter of this thesis, I 
will start the demonstration from the theoretical background and literature review. 
And then, the research aims and objectives of this thesis will be discussed. Next, the 
practical implications and contributions to the knowledge of this thesis are indicated, 
followed by the contemporary implication of this thesis. An introduction of the data 
used in this thesis will be presented and the structure of this thesis will also be 
outlined. 
 
1.1 Theoretical background and literature review 
This section covers relevant review of the recent literatures on relationship 
banking theories. It starts from the addressing of the cause why it is difficult for small 
businesses to raise external finance – asymmetric information. And then, it introduces 
a powerful lending technique specialised for small businesses to mitigate the 
asymmetric information problem, including the definition, benefits and costs of 
relationship banking. Next, it summarized the association between relationship 
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banking and loan contract terms. Afterwards, it documents 4 major hypotheses on 
banking market concentrations which might affect small business’ external finance: 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Hypothesis, Efficient-Structure Hypothesis 
(ESH), Relative Market Power (RMP) Hypothesis and Information Hypothesis, with 
the mechanisms of how these hypotheses affect small business’ external finance. At 
last, it concludes the literature review generally. 
 
1.1.1 The problem of asymmetric information  
 
Asymmetric information is one the most important issues in a borrowing-
lending contract and the problem of asymmetric information in a financial contract 
indicates that, when lender does not have sufficient necessary information about the 
borrower and the uncertainty of the project as well as the control about the borrower, 
the lender would not be able to have an acurate judgement on the borrower’s ability 
and the probability of payback (Bebczuk, 2003). The problem of asymmetric 
information may have various negative impacts on a banking relationship. First, 
asymmetric information may cause adverse selection problem before lenders 
mistakenly disburse loans to those low quality borrowers. Second, it may also cause 
moral hazard problem after lenders disburse loans where business managers may 
invest the capital into riskier projects unless there is efficient monitoring (Bebczuk, 
2003; Cataldo, 2003; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Third, it may cause conflicts 
between lenders and small businesses. Because of the problem of asymmetric 
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information, the dominant3 conflict is between external lenders and small business 
borrowers who rely heavily on external finance and the information problem has 
strong impacts on the behaviour of both banks and small business borrowers (Franks 
and Mayer, 2001; Berger and Udell, 2002; Ou and Haynes, 2006; Aktas, et al., 2011). 
In summary, risk sharing, adverse selection and moral hazard are the major results of 
asymmetric information problem between the borrowers and lenders. Risk sharing 
and moral hazard are caused by imperfect monitoring or costly observing (Baron and 
Besanko, 1987). 
The research on the economics of information could be dated back from a 
long period ago. It is widely accepted that the initial investigation on the information 
issues in economics, was carried by Arrow (1957a and 1957b): Arrow demonstrates 
that due to the existence of sequential time, computational time and cumulative time, 
we have sequential information, computational information and cumulative 
information. All of these three types of information are characterized as indivisible 
and non-monopolistic. The influence of these three types of information on the 
decision making is different and this forms the bedrock of the information economics.  
Marschak (1974) and Stigler (1961) built the milestone of the economics of 
information, where information economics was created as a subject with a focus on 
information, the value of information, and the influence of information on the pricing, 
salary and other production factors. Uncertainty plays an important role in the 
information economics, especially asymmetric information theories (Simon, 1959; 
Arrow, 1963). This is the foundation of the asymmetric information theories. 
Asymmetric information theories have been extended in a variety of aspects, among 
                                                 
3 Different from large companies, small businesses are often managed by owners and the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders does not always exist. Instead, the smaller number of 
shareholders also reduces the agency conflict (free-rider problem) between majority and minority 
shareholders. 
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which, the Principle-Agent Theory, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Signalling 
have been well discussed. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Stiglitz (1977) further 
extend this issue by developing static models of the contracting with the existence of 
asymmetric information problem. 
Principle-Agent Theory was developed by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and 
Ross (1973). Ross (1973) was the first to propose the term of ‘agent’ and ‘principal’. 
With the existence of asymmetric information problem, the principal-agent problem 
arises because the agent has more information advantages than the principal when 
contracting, and the interests of the agent and principal are not consistent. Certainly 
the agency problem could occur between firms’ owner and manager, or between the 
business borrowers and the bank lenders. Particularly for small business borrowing, 
due to the existence of the asymmetric information problem, as well as the 
inconsistent interests (small business: maximize owner’s wealth; banks: interest and 
principle repayments). Mirrlees (1974) and Holmstrom (1979) have adopted the first-
order approach to find out that the optimal contact exists with the presence of 
asymmetric information.  
Adverse selection and moral hazard are the direct consequence of the 
asymmetric information problem. Akerlof (1970) has well demonstrated the adverse 
selection problem by the case of ‘car market’. In the used car market, there are good 
cars and bad cars (lemon cars). There is a severe asymmetric information problem, so 
that the buyers know the probability to buy a lemon car but they do not know which 
car is lemon. In this way, the buyers will offer a weighted price for the car, between 
the real value of the good card and the lemon card. In this way, the good cars will quit 
from the market because they could not be paid the full value and the market would 
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be full of lemon cars. At last, the buyers will only do the purchase of the used cars at 
the price of the real value of lemon cars. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) carried out a 
classical research on adverse selection in the insurance market. Two subgroups of 
applicants are classified: high risks group and low risks group. When there is adverse 
selection in the market, there should be separating equilibrium rather than any 
pooling equilibrium. Stiglitz (1977) expended the model and apply it in the monopoly 
market and indicates that the monopoly insurance companies maximize the profits by 
the differentiation of the products. 
Moral hazard is another consequence of asymmetric information problem. 
Moral Hazard is defined as ‘the intangible loss-producing propensities of the 
individual assured’, or which ‘comprehends all of the nonphysical hazards of risk’ 
(Pauly, 1968, p. 535). Moral hazard is a kind of rational economic behaviour rather 
than moral perfidy. Taking the insurance market for example, because all of other 
purchasers have covered the excess usage from certain individuals, these individuals 
are not restrained the usage of care (Pauly, 1968). Moral hazard problem arises when 
people could affect the probability distribution of the outcome by their own private 
actions and they share the risks. Due to the existence of moral hazard problem, in a 
principal-agent relationship, optimal contracts would be second-best. The contracts 
could be enhanced by taking extra information systems or any other available 
information regarding the agent’s behaviour. It has also been observed that long-term 
relationship between the principles and agents could mitigate the uncertainty and 
therefore reduce the happening of moral hazard problem (Holmstrom, 1979).  The 
losses from inefficient incentives due to moral hazard could be reduced by the 
strategy that risk owners afford more loss by paying more coinsurance costs. The 
improvement of incentives will decrease the efficiency of risks spreading and it could 
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be enhanced by adopting more specified contracts. In this way, the moral hazard 
problem could be ameliorated (Marshall, 1976).  
Signalling theory is created by Spence (1974), by the case of signalling in the 
labour market. In the labour market, due to the existence of asymmetric information 
problem, there are some individuals in the disadvantageous position regarding the 
information. Education could be viewed as a signal and therefore, help them to 
mitigate the information disadvantage. Ross (1977) further extended Modigliani-
Miller theory (MM Theory) regarding firm’s capital structure by breaking the 
assumption that the market possesses full information: managers know more inside 
information. Knowing the existence of asymmetric information problem, the market 
would view the debt usage as a good signal of the firm and in this way, there will be a 
positive relationship between firm value and financial leverage. Riley (1979) 
theoretically supports the signalling theory suggested by Spence (1974). The major 
prediction of the model, is that education is a signal of the quality of the workers. At 
the beginning of the employment, due to the severe asymmetric information problem, 
the association between education and salary links intimately. As the employer-
employee relationship lengthens, the asymmetric information mitigates and the 
association between the education and salary weakens. 
Compared with large firms, small businesses carry three unique 
characteristics. First, the personal characteristics of small business owners could 
impose a strong influence on business performance. Second, small business failure 
rate is higher and third, the information gap between the borrowers and lenders is big 
(Han et al., 2009b).  Financial institutions issuing loans to small businesses may face 
asymmetric information of business owners’ creditworthiness, leading to credit 
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rationing. This is because higher loan interest rates may drive borrowers to invest in 
riskier projects which generate higher returns (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). On the other 
hand, facing asymmetric information, banks could offer borrowers a menu of 
contracts as a self-selection mechanism. Based on the contracting theory and self-
selection mechanism, Han et al., (2009b) propose that lenders’ decision making is 
based on the nature of the signals observed and the degree of the asymmetric 
information problem.  
By developing a longer banking relationship with small business customers, 
banks could obtain private information on the businesses and gain the information 
monopoly power over the borrowers and information advantages over the other 
financial institutions. Therefore, it is very difficult for new bank to involve in the 
external finance of small business from which the incumbent bank has acquired 
pervasive information (Dell’Ariccia, 2001). The information acquired by incumbent 
bank is the proprietary of incumbent and therefore, incumbent bank could extract 
extra rent from the borrowers because of information advantage. On the other hand, 
because of adverse selection problem, competing banks face higher screening cost to 
enter. Asymmetric information implicates information imperfection as well as the 
unobservability of ex ante borrower characters (Marquez, 2002). Competitiveness of 
lenders will lead to lower interest rate under the condition of low degree of 
asymmetric information problem (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004).   
In a lending decision-making process, lenders usually consider three types of 
information - operating environment, business information and entrepreneur 
information (Luo, 2009). Some information is ‘hard’ which could be easily measured 
by data or documents such as industrial environment, financial statements or financial 
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information of the business, and personal qualifications of the entrepreneur. Whilst, 
some information is ‘soft’ which is impossible to be quantified, such as the value of a 
social network and the entrepreneurial abilities. Soft information could only be 
obtained by lenders via long-term contacts with small business customers. To make 
successful applications, business managers would have to signal their creditability to 
the potential lenders and the signalling and decision making process generates costs 
for both sides (Luo, 2009). 
 
1.1.2 Relationship banking 
Lenders, banks for instance, face a greater degree of asymmetric information 
in financing small firms than financing large firms. This is because of the relative 
higher costs to collect private information from small business borrowers and the 
limited availability of signals of creditability from small firms (Ang, 1991; Ou and 
Haynes, 2006). As a result, lenders usually charge higher prices on loans issued to 
small businesses than large firms (Datta et al, 1999) and  both over-investment, i.e. 
moral hazard issue (Darrough and Stoughton, 1986), and under-investment, i.e. 
‘adverse selection’ (Sharpe, 1990) and Ang (1991), may happen.  To overcome the 
asymmetric information problem, different lending technologies have been adopted in 
financing small businesses, such as financial statement lending, credit scoring system, 
asset-based lending, and factoring, which are mainly based upon ‘hard’ information. 
However, it has been approved that relationship banking is an effective way to 
alleviate the degree of asymmetric information which is based on soft information 
collection (Berger and Udell, 2006). Hence, relationship banking is defined as “the 
provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that: i. invests in obtaining 
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customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature; and ii. evaluates the 
profitability of these investments through multiple interactions with the same 
customer over time and/or across products.” (Boot, 2000, p.10).  
Ample empirical evidence has suggested that relationship banking could help 
the loan officer gather more soft information from small business customers and such 
‘soft’ information is hard to obtain from ‘arm’s length contract’. The soft information 
could be drawn from the previous contacts, competitors, suppliers or the local market 
and it should shed light on the business prospects, especially the possibility of default 
and such information is more valuable than hard information for lenders and it may 
reduce the costs of private information acquisition and costs of finance (Ang, 1991; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995; Berger and Udell, 2006; Udell, 2008). Overall, 
relationship banking could alleviate the degree of asymmetric information problem 
effectively and improve the availability of finance for small firms (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994). 
In terms of the nature of the relationship, empirical research has focused upon 
(1) the duration of the relationship, (2) the concentration of banking relationships, and 
(3) the scope of the relationships, such as various services provided to small business 
customers. Therefore, a stronger banking relationship could be a longer duration, 
greater concentration, and privilege services provided to customers (Iturralde et al., 
2010). There has been ample theoretical and empirical literature demonstrating that 
borrowers could benefit from relationship banking. Diamond (1989), for example, 
considers the problem of adverse selection and models the benefits of relationship 
banking where at the beginning, banks charge the same price on loans issued to all 
borrowers with little track records and loan rates decrease over the development of a 
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more matured relationship. Boot and Thakor (1994), instead, consider the moral 
hazard problem and suggest that a longer relationship could reduce the interest rates 
charged on unsecured loans and the possibility of collateralisation.  
There are also numerous studies empirically investigating the benefits of 
relationship banking. For example, it has been reported that, via relationship banking, 
banks could obtain valuable information about the target firm’s creditworthiness via 
previous lending (Gómez-Gonzále and Reyes, 2011) and relationship banking 
reduces loan interest rates/spreads (Bharath et al., 2011; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Brick and Palia, 2007; Athavale and Edmister, 2004). Schenone (2010) finds that 
relationship banking could be strengthened during the IPO process and a stronger 
relationship reduces interest rates. It has also been found that relationship banking 
increases the availability of external finance to small businesses (Berger and Udell, 
1995; Angelini et al., 1998; Hernandez-Canovas and Martines-Solano, 2010) with a 
lower possibility of collateralisation (Bharath et al., 2011; Jimenez et al., 2006; 
Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Angelini et al., 1998) and easier application for loans 
with a short maturity (Bharath et al., 2011), for instance.  
Relationship banking has also been found to enhance the borrower’s corporate 
governance (Dass and Massa, 2011) and to lower the probability of business failure 
and credit risk (Gómez-Gonzále and Reyes, 2011). With significant advantages in 
private information collection over ‘arm’s length’ contracts, relationship banking is 
more valuable for financially constrained borrowers (Kirschenmann and Norden, 
2012; Gómez-Gonzále and Reyes, 2011). For example, Dass and Massa (2011) apply 
an instrumental variable (IV) approach in a group of sample firms from U.S. between 
1993 and 2004 and find a favourable effect of relationship banking on borrower’s 
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corporate governance which improves firm value. Drucker and Puri (2009) find that 
riskier borrowers benefit more from the relationship with lenders.  
     Apart from the favourable effects of relationship banking on small firms, it 
has also been found borrowers may be suffered from such a relationship with lenders, 
such as the holding-up problem where lenders extract rents from the borrowers with 
their monopoly position of information acquisition. Sharpe (1990) theoretically 
models the holding up problem where relationship lenders gain an information-
monopoly position compared with transactional lenders and the relationship lenders 
could extract more rents from the loans as the relationship develops. Therefore, 
relationship lenders could be classified as informed lenders compared with 
transactional lenders (Rajan, 1992) and the holding up problem by informed lenders 
could be solved by a more dispersed banking relationship. For example, firms, who 
are more concerned with the holding up problem, tend to find out a second source of 
finance (Farinha and Santos, 2002) and, with an information-monopoly position, 
lenders benefit more from a stronger relationship (Bharath et al., 2007; Degryse and 
Cayseele, 2000).  
 
1.1.3  Relationship banking and loan contract terms 
Relationship banking is beneficial for the small firms to secure better loan 
contract terms. Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995) theoretically modelled the 
association between relationship banking and loan interest rate: relationship banking 
could effectively mitigate the asymmetric information problem. It reduces the 
screening and monitoring costs for the banks, and the costs of signalling the 
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creditworthiness for the small businesses. Therefore, as banking relationship 
strengthens, the interest rates of the loans for the small firms decrease. Empirically, 
Berger and Udell (1995), Blackwell and Winters (1997), Jimenez et al (2006), 
Bharath et al (2011) give support to Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) theory. 
The strength of banking relationship, could either be measured by the length of 
banking relationship, or the total number of banking relationships. The longer the 
banking relationship is, the fewer ties of banking relationship a firm has, the stronger 
the banking relationship it is in nature (Iturralde et al, 2010; Steijvers et al, 2010). 
Certainly, some other scholars state that as the banking relationship gets stronger, the 
monopoly power of the banks increases as modelled by Sharpe (1990) and Rajan 
(1992), which is viewed as the dark side of relationship banking. 
Maturity is one of the important terms in the loan contract. Flannery (1986) 
indicates that as the quality of the borrower enhances, the debt maturity would 
increase. This is because, shorter maturity gives the banks much stronger monitoring 
power. However, it causes the increase of the liquidity risk for the firms. Therefore, 
borrowers with poor quality (lower or no credit rating) are likely to get the loans with 
shorter maturity. The only exceptional subgroup in the theory, is the subgroup of very 
good quality borrowers (high credit rating). Due to the high quality, the risks for them 
to get refinance are lower. They may prefer the loans with short maturity as in this 
way, the interest rate would be lower. Bharath et al (2011) empirically found that, for 
both of very good or very poor borrowers respectively, stronger banking relationship 
significantly reduces the maturity. On the other hand, Kirschenmann and Norden 
(2012) do not support such conclusions. They suggest due to the beneficial effects of 
relationship banking, riskier firms could obtain the loans with longer maturity. And 
they have empirically found out that there is a positive association between the risks 
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of the borrowers and the loan maturity. Indeed, the mechanism of how relationship 
banking could affect maturity is complicated as the other loan contract terms, 
especially the loan interest rate, could affect it. 
Collateral plays important role in the loan contracts. Collateral could 
effectively ameliorate the adverse selection problem in the loan markets (Bester, 
1985). Theoretically speaking, good borrowers (less risky borrowers) are glad to 
pledge as they are less likely to lose what they have pledged for collaterals. Collateral 
also helps to mitigate the moral hazard problem as it is beneficial to align the interests 
from the borrowers and the lenders. However, in the real world, collaterals may 
induce the banks to take less effort on the screening and suffer from the risks that 
they underestimate the risks for certain businesses. In fact, the collateral requirements 
could be reduced by mitigating the asymmetric information problem. There are two 
effective ways to archive this goal: either by improved screening technology, or 
strengthened borrower-lender relationship (Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). Jimenez and 
Saurina (2004) address that the causal relationship would be that relationship banking 
affects the collateral requirements. 
The association between relationship banking and collateral requirements has 
been investigated well in depth by both of theoretical modelling and empirical testing. 
One of the most influential theoretical modelling proposed by Boot and Thakor 
(1994), demonstrated that the probability of pledging collateral, falls along with the 
longevity of banking relationship. At the early stage of the banking relationship, 
especially for younger firms, the uncertainty of paying back the loans is substantial 
and the moral hazard problem is severe. Pledging collateral is effective for solving 
such a problem due to the asymmetric information concerns. As the banking 
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relationship lengthens, and over time the information is effectively transmitted to the 
lenders, such uncertainty risks decrease due to the amelioration of the asymmetric 
information problem. Therefore, the likelihood of pledging collateral for the small 
businesses, decreases along with the length of banking relationship. 
Following Boot and Thakor (1994), substantial empirical evidence has been 
found that longer banking relationship reduces the probability of pledging collaterals 
for small businesses: Based on SSBF87, Berger and Udell (1995) found that as 
banking relationship lengthens, the probability of pledging collaterals reduces for 
small businesses. In particular, such effect is significant for small businesses but does 
not work significantly well for very small businesses (assets below $500,000); 
Harhoff and Korting (1998) studied 1509 German SMEs, and found that firms with 
shorter banking relationship, or firms with more bank lenders, are more likely to be 
required to pledge collateral; Jimenez et al (2006) confirm that firstly, a longer 
banking relationship effectively reduces the probability of pledging collateral for 
long-term loans; moreover, firms with more pre-existing lenders are more likely to 
pledge collateral for long-term loans. They found that a longer banking relationship 
helps the firm to get a larger size loan. On the other hand, firms with more pre-
existing lenders usually obtain smaller loans. In summary, a stronger banking 
relationship, characterized either by a longer banking relationship, or fewer ties of 
banking relationship, increases the availability of finance by reducing the probability 
of pledging collateral or increase the amount the firm borrows. Chakraborty and Hu 
(2006) investigated SSBF93 data and found that total number of borrowing sources 
positively associates with the incidence of pledging collateral. The marginal effect is 
2.6% for every an extra tie of borrowing source. All of these empirical research, 
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confirms the beneficial effect of relationship banking and the negative effect on the 
probability of pledging collaterals of keeping multiple borrowing sources. 
In consistent with the above findings, some research supports the opposite 
conclusions – the hold-up effect of relationship may exist. A single banking 
relationship may lead to the increase of monopoly power of the bank and therefore, 
hold-up effect arises (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). Jimenez and Saurina (2004) 
investigated based on the data from Credit Register of the Bank of Spain and found 
that for the collateralized loan business borrowers, the more borrowing sources they 
use, the less likely they will suffer from loan default problem. Voordeckers and 
Steijvers (2006) use the data from an important Belgian bank during the period of 
January 2000 to February 2003 and found that if a firm has more than 2 borrowing 
sources, the probability of pledging business collaterals decreases. Similarly, 
Menkhoff et al (2006) analysed the data from 9 Thai commercial banks in 2000 and 
2001. In their research, an increase of the number of borrowing sources and non-
Housebank status give rise to the decrease of the probability of pledging collaterals. It 
is very interesting that non-Housebank status also reduces their absolute value of the 
amount of collateral whereas the number of borrowing sources plays no significant 
role in the amount of collateral.  
Overall, the puzzle of the relationship between total number of borrowing 
sources and collateral requirements, is still unsolved. Steijvers et al (2010) believe 
that it depends on whether the beneficial effect or hold-up effect of relationship 
banking is overwhelming or not. However, at least, all of these research, where 
whatever kinds of positive or negative relationship has been found, is based on the 
causal effect that the probability of pledging collaterals, could be attributed to the 
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strength of the banking relationship. There is little empirical evidence of collateral 
requirements on relationship banking found. 
In terms of collateral, last but not least, it is not an element for all of the 
lending technologies. There have been some lending technologies prevalent in the 
banking industry for small businesses, including Financial Statement Lending, Asset-
based Lending, Small Business Credit Scoring and Relationship Banking. Banks 
could adopt multiple technologies together to ensure the risk control. Collateral is a 
major element in Asset-based Lending rather than in the other three lending 
technologies. In other words, collateral is parallel and complementary technology to, 
rather than a part of relationship banking (Berger and Udell, 2002 and 2006). 
Therefore, it makes sense that the using of other types of lending technologies, 
including Asset-based Lending, where collateral is included, may weaken relationship 
banking as it is duplicate effort.  
There is substantial research confirming the beneficial effect of relationship 
banking on the availability of external finance for small businesses, e.g. Petersen and 
Rajan (1994 and 1995), Berger and Udell (1995), Jimenez and Saurina (2004), 
Chakraborty and Hu (2006), Bharath et al (2011). In particular, with stronger banking 
relationships, firms are less likely to be financially constrained for the external 
finance (Hoshi et al, 1990). It means, when borrowing, firms with stronger banking 
relationships are less likely to get the finance lower than the amount they need. In 
other words, stronger banking relationship usually ensures larger amount of loans 
(Bharath et al, 2011). Certainly, it is reasonable to expect relationship banking could 
enhance the flexibility of loan covenants. 
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In the bank lending, covenants are important in the loan contracts for the 
amelioration of the conflicts between shareholders and lenders (Smith and Warner, 
1979). Park (1994) demonstrates that covenants make the financial contracting more 
flexible and efficient. Covenants could be applied for the enhancement of monitoring 
(Rajan and Winton, 1995). Covenant is a very important component of the loan 
contract for non-pricing terms (Bae et al, 2016). Niskanen and Niskanen (2004) 
classify the covenants by positive covenants such as capital structure, minimum 
liquidity, minimum operating earnings, insurance usage, etc. and negative covenants, 
such as negative pledge, asset sales restriction, restrictions to acquisitions, etc. In 
their survey on the 840 small firms in Häme region, Finland, during the period of 
1994 to 1997, among the 149 firms using covenants, 27.52% adopt positive covenants 
and 72.48% use negative covenants. There are two commonly used covenants, 
including the Loan To Value Ratio (Lin, 2014) which indicates the amount of the 
loan in percentage of the property,  and the Debt Service Coverage Ratio, which 
indicates the net operating income to total debt service ratios (Glascock and Lu-
Andrews, 2014).  The Loan To Value Ratio and the Debt Service Coverage Ratio are 
negatively associated with each other (Glascock and Lu-Andrews, 2014).  
As indicated, relationship banking enhances the availability of the external 
finance for small business. Therefore, it is expected that stronger banking relationship 
loosen the loan covenants for the firms. In particular, when the cash flow of a firm is 
pledged to different banks, the incentives from the banks for monitoring would be 
weakened because of the free-rider problem and it is hard for the banks to implement 
monitoring. Covenants incentivizes the banks for monitoring because, a covenant 
breach gives the lender the power for renegotiation. Therefore, in the perspective of 
the borrowers, covenants are costly. 
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Scholars found the beneficial effect of relationship banking on loosening the 
loan covenants requirements. Prilmeier (2011) investigated the data from Loan 
Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database, matched with the filings from Security and 
Exchange Commission and Compustat from January 1995 to December 2008, which 
includes 7923 loan deals borrowed by 3169 firms. He finds that at the beginning of 
the banking relationship, the total number of covenants increases while afterwards, 
the total number of covenants decreases. This could be explained by the monitoring 
incentive effect as modelled by Rajan and Winton (1995), which means at the 
beginning of the banking relationship, due to the existence of asymmetric information 
problem, banks have more incentives to set more covenants for monitoring purpose. 
Afterwards, due to the accumulation of the knowledge on the firm, the covenants 
requirements loosen. Ivashina and Kovner (2011) empirically found that pre-existing 
banking relationship or a stronger banking relationship helps the firms increase the 
maximum debt to EBITDA ratio. Maximum debt to EBITDA ratio is identified as the 
most important covenant by the industry participants. And it might be renegotiated 
for the loan’s terms while total debt to cash flow ratio might be critical for the firms 
heavily leveraged. In terms of the strength of banking relationships, they measure the 
strength of banking relationship by the amount of loans or the number of loans issued 
by the same bank. Citron et al (1997) investigated the lending to Management Buyout 
firms in the UK based on the questionnaires and interviews. In particular, they chased 
the influence of relationship banking on the covenants for the Management Buyout 
firms. It shows that covenant breaches are more likely to be waived and the loans by 
default are less probably to be recalled by the lenders with a special Management 
Buyout lending unit (where the banking relationship is deemed stronger for lenders). 
Degryse et al (2014) carried out a survey for the SMEs in Wales and they found that a 
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longer banking relationship decreases the loan interest rate. Moreover, stronger 
banking relationship exclusivity reduces the probability of getting a loan contract 
with worsened covenant requirements. Such findings are consistent with the 
beneficial effect of relationship banking. However, on the other hand, they also find 
that stronger banking relationship exclusivity increases the interest rate for the loans. 
This implies that the beneficial effect and costs of relationship banking co-exist. 
Costello and Wittenbergmoerman (2011) analysed Internal Control Weakness data 
under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302. They matched the data with Loan Pricing 
Corporation DealScan database and have got 788 borrowers. It is found that an 
increase of the number of the firm’s lenders results in an increase of the number of 
financial covenants for the loan deals. This confirms the beneficial function of 
relationship banking exclusivity on the loosening of financial covenants. Fields et al 
(2012) collected the data from Investor Responsibility Research Centre Database and 
Corporate Library, matched with Loan Pricing Corporation Dealscan Databased. The 
have got 1460 loans and 1054 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2004. They found 
that an increase of the number of banking relationships results in a reduction of the 
probability of security requirements.  
On the contrary, Niskanen and Niskanen (2004) empirically found that the 
loan interest rates for the firms with covenants are lower than those without covenants. 
Moreover, firms with longer banking relationship or firms who have just changed the 
banks are more likely to use covenants, especially negative covenants. And they 
believe this is consistent with the findings by Ongena and Smith (2001) regarding the 
hold-up effect of relationship banking. However, they did not find any significant 
relationship between the number of existing borrowers and the probability of 
covenant usage. Some other scholars did not find any significant association between 
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relationship banking and loan covenants, e.g. Demiroglu and James (2010) found the 
empirical evidence based on 7237 loans from 2813 business borrowers from Loan 
Pricing Corporation’s DealScan Database during the period of 1995 to 2001 that the 
pre-existing banking relationship is not a significant determinant of loan covenants 
(current ratio, Debt to EBITDA ratio or a covenant intensity index composited by 
collateral, dividend restriction, asset sales sweep, debt issuance sweep, equity 
issuance sweep and more than two financial covenants). On the contrary, the number 
of borrowing sources, is negatively associated with the probability of taking a 
tightened debt to EBITDA ratio. It seems to support the hold-up effect of relationship 
banking which indicates that the monopoly power of the bank affects the covenant 
requirements. Freudenberg et al (2011) collected data from Security and Exchange 
Commission fillings data and have got 4996 loan agreements during the period of 
1996 to 2010. They found that if a firm has a loan and would like to borrow from 
another source of finance, the number of covenants the firm could get will decrease 
(17 covenants are considered, including Debt Service Coverage Ratio, Debt to 
Capitalization Ratio, etc.).  
In summary, although there is a variety of research focusing on the covenants 
and the determinants of covenants, there is very little pre-existing empirical research 
on the relationship between relationship banking and covenants. In terms of the 
relationship between covenants and total number of borrowing sources, based on the 
literature summarized above, it could conclude, both theoretically and empirically, 
that relationship banking (number of borrowing sources) gives rise to the covenants 
requirements (and collateral as well indeed). As the number of borrowing sources is 
viewed as a proxy of the strength of banking relationship, the predictions of its impact 
on covenants derives from either the beneficial effect (Ivashina and Kovner, 2011; 
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Citron et al, 1997; Degryse et al, 2014; Costello and Wittenbergmoerman, 2011) or 
hold-up effect (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2004; Demiroglu and James, 2010; 
Freudenberg et al, 2011) of relationship banking. Different from the duration of 
banking relationship, the number of borrowing sources also concerns with free-rider 
problem for the banks if a firm would like to submit itself to multiple creditors for 
monitoring. As such, some evidence on the inconsistence of the impacts of the length 
of banking relationship and the total number of banking relationships makes sense. 
The puzzle regarding the relationship between loan covenants and relationship 
banking is still unsolved, therefore, future research on the relationship between 
relationship banking (particularly regarding the number of lenders) and covenants are 
called for. One limitation of SSBF data is that it does not contain covenant 
information. 
 
1.1.4 Capital market conditions and relationship banking 
Recent studies have reported that the effects of relationship banking are 
strongly affected by the banking market conditions and this is because the value of 
private information may vary between a competitive banking market and a 
concentrated market. Banking market concentration is usually measured by the 
Concentration Ratio (CRn, percentages of market share of the largest n banks) or 
Herfindahl Index (HHI, sum square of market share of banks) which have been 
widely used to empirically test the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Hypothesis 
vs. Efficient-Structure Hypothesis (ESH) for the banking market (Bikker and Haaf, 
2002; Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Peria and Mody, 2004). 
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Herfindahl Index is also named Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Rhoades, 
1993). It is originally developed by Hirschman (1945) and Herfindahl (1950).  
HHI = ∑ (𝑀𝑆𝑖)2𝑛𝑖=1  
……………………………………………………Eq. (1-1) 
In Eq. (1-1), MSi indicates the market share of firm i. n indicates the total 
number of ‘n’ firms in the market. 
SCP paradigm indicates that the market structure determines the behaviour 
and performance of businesses in the market; where market structure is a function of 
supply and demand in a certain industry, conduct is a function of the cost structure, 
demanders, suppliers, barriers to entry and performance is affected by the firms’ 
conduct (Heffernan, 2005). SCP indicates that a greater market concentration (S) 
reduces the collusion cost between firms (C) and therefore firms could earn higher 
profits (P) in a more concentrated market. SCP paradigm has been widely tested 
amongst industrial organizations. In a banking market, it has been found that with a 
more concentrated banking market, banks would charge higher prices on loans and 
make more profits (Hannan, 1991; Evanoff and Fortier, 1988). Additional empirical 
evidence is available from Berger and Hanan (1989) and Molyneux and Forbes 
(1995).  
In contrast with SCP Hypothesis, Efficient-Structure Hypothesis (ESH) claims 
that efficient management and technology would increase a firm’s market share and a 
greater market share would bring higher profits. In terms of the application of ESH in 
banking industry, it predicts that banks in a more concentrated market will charge 
lower loan interest rates from the borrowers. This is because monopolistic banks 
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could generate profits from more efficient operation rather than from a higher price 
(Berger, 1995). Empirical evidence supporting ESH could be found from Fu and 
Heffernan (2009) and Goldberg and Rai (1996) for example.  
Relative Market Power (RMP) Hypothesis, instead, indicates that large banks 
with greater market power would determine the prices and banks would have higher 
profits in a concentrated market. Different from SCP, banks achieve higher profits in 
a concentrated market by charging higher prices. Small banks, however, could not 
have higher profits because of the lack of market power (Berger, 1995; Clarke and 
Cull. 2001; Garza-Garcia, 2012). 
Information Hypothesis suggests that an established banking relationship 
could effectively alleviate the problem of asymmetric information and banks would 
have stronger motivations in a more concentrated market to invest in relationship 
development. informationally opaque borrowers, such as small firms, would benefit 
from the favourable effects by being charged lower prices on loans. Information 
Hypothesis proposes a favourable effect of concentrated market where relationship 
banking could more effectively reduce the information problem than in a competitive 
market (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995). 
As a summary, both RMP and SCP suggest that in a concentrated banking 
market, the monopoly power of banks creates extra profit from their customers and 
large banks are more likely to rely on “hard information” in lending decision makings 
where relationship banking is hard to develop (Udell, 2008; Goldberg and Rai, 1996). 
Small banks, instead, prefer relationship banking and banks under competition 
pressure  focus on relationship banking (Uchida, 2011). Therefore, in a concentrated 
banking market, arm’s length transaction lending is more likely to happen and as 
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market competition becomes stronger, relationship banking is developed but with a 
reduced value-added (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Supporting empirical evidence is 
available from Hernandez-Canovas and Koeter-Kant (2010), Ongena and Smith 
(2001), and Black and Strahan (2002). 
Inconsistent with SCP, Information Hypothesis (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) 
and ESH identify the favourable effects of market concentration on relationship 
banking. With a stronger relationship, lenders could obtain more accurate information 
from borrowers and such information is more valuable in a concentrated market than 
in a competitive market. This is because in a concentrated market, it is easier for low-
quality borrowers to access loans than in a competitive market. Firms could be 
charged lower interest rates initially.  Supporting empirical evidence is available from 
Han et al., (2009a), Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), and Petersen and Rajan (1995). 
Meanwhile, studies have also reported that a lender-borrower relationship is more 
likely to develop in a moderately concentrated market and highly concentrated and 
highly competitive market conditions could harm the relationship (Anand and 
Galetovic, 2006). Additionally, it has also been reported that the effects of market 
concentration on relationship banking are affected by the index used to measure 
market conditions (Carbό-Valverde et al., 2009). For example, when using Herfindahl 
Index, the result supports Information Hypothesis; and when using Lerner Index 
(equals one minus the percentage marginal cost takes in the market price), the result 
supports Market Power Hypothesis.  Lerner Index was originally developed by 
Lerner (1934), and it is expressed as 
Lerner Index = 𝑃−𝑀𝐶
𝑃
 
……………………………………………………Eq. (1-2) 
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In Eq. (1-2), ‘P’ indicates the market price made by the firm and MC is the 
marginal cost of the firm. 
It has been found that there is a non-linear U-shaped relation between 
Herfindahl Index and the probability of developing relationship banking (Degryse 
and Ongena, 2007), such as a Hausbank relationship (Elasas, 2005). 
 
1.1.5  Summary 
In summary, information asymmetric problem is more severe for financing 
small businesses and it plays an essential role in lending decision making (Ang, 
1991). It has been widely accepted that relationship banking is an effective way to 
overcome asymmetric information problem, to improve the availability of finance and 
to reduce of the costs of finance. However, existing literature has also indicated that 
lending relationship becomes matured, because of the information advantage of the 
relationship banks, small business may suffer from hold-up problem and be charged 
higher loan prices. Relationship banking intimately associates with the loan contract 
terms for small business. Banking market structure has been found to affect small 
business financing behaviour in a favourable way according to ESH or IH but in an 
unfavourable way in line with SCP or RMP Hypothesis.  
 
1. 2    Research aims and objectives 
There are three major aims and objectives of the thesis. 
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Objective One: the thesis aims to investigate how relationship banking 
affects small firm’s capital structure and the variation of the impacts of 
relationship banking on small firm’s capital structure across various banking 
market conditions. 
Firm’s capital structure relies substantially either on the degree of asymmetric 
information between the firm and its lenders according to Pecking Order Theory 
(POT) (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) or on the bankruptcy costs according 
to Trade-off Theory (TOT) (Jalilvand and Harris, 1984). Particularly for small 
business, it is characterized as 1) there is no agency costs between business owners 
and the managers because most of the small businesses are owner-managed (Berger 
and Udell, 1998); 2) small businesses suffer from more severe asymmetric 
information problem and small businesses rely heavily on debt finance (Han and 
Zhang, 2012); 3) informal sources of finance play an important role (Berger and 
Udell, 1998); 4) debt-tax shield is less attractive due to the size of the firm (Bhaird 
and Lucey, 2010). Therefore, relationship banking could play an important role as the 
determinant of small firm’s capital structure because relationship banking effectively 
ameliorates the asymmetric information problem (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and 
reduces the business failure rates (Gómez-Gonzále and Reyes, 2011).   
The beneficial effects of relationship banking have been well investigated by 
the pre-existing research: relationship banking reduces the marginal information 
collection costs and transaction costs (Peltoniemi, 2007) and incentivizes more 
supervision from the banks (Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2006). 
Relationship banking mitigates the asymmetric information problem (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994) and reduces the risks of moral hazard problem (Hernández-Cánovas and 
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Martínez-Solano, 2006). Relationship banking could increase the availability of 
external finance and reduce the borrowing costs for small business (Boot, 2000; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994). All of these, could effectively reduce the borrowing costs 
for small businesses and therefore should affect firm’s capital structure decisions. 
Therefore, the thesis intends to check the impacts of relationship banking on 
small business’ capital structure decisions. 
The effect of relationship banking varies across different bank markets. 
Information Hypothesis (IH) believes that in the concentrated banking markets, banks 
have stronger incentive to acquire the soft information from the firm (Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006). The information regarding the firm could also be accumulated over 
time (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). That means, in a concentrated banking market, the 
asymmetric information problem could be greatly mitigated for small businesses and 
therefore the function of relationship banking is more effective in concentrated 
banking markets. In comparison, in a competitive banking market, the banks have 
much less incentive to gain the soft information about the firm (Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006). Moreover, the transactional lending is prevalent in competitive 
banking market and in this way, small businesses still suffer from severer asymmetric 
information and adverse selection problem (Berger and Udell, 1998 and 2002). The 
favourable effect of relationship banking is much discounted in a competitive banking 
market. 
As such, the thesis would like to check the variation of the impacts of 
relationship banking on small business’ capital structure across different banking 
market conditions. 
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Scholars also become more interested in the dynamic change of the financial 
needs during the business life cycle recently. At different stage of the business life 
cycle, due to the character of the firm itself, the demands for the external finance, the 
costs and availability of the borrowing vary. At the mature stage, firms could general 
retained earnings and therefore, according to POT, they could use the internal source 
of finance at the highest priority and therefore, the demand for external debt finance 
drops. It means the financial leverage should decrease along with the development of 
the business, which is viewed as reverse financial life cycle effect (Berger and Udell, 
1998; Hamilton and Fox, 1998; La Rocca et al, 2011).  On the other hand, at younger 
stage, according to signalling theory, young firms are willing to submit themselves to 
the banks for borrowing, because bank lending is viewed as a good signal of the firm. 
This incentive weakens as the firm enters into the mature stage because at mature 
stage they have already established their reputations. It is viewed as reputational 
searching effect (Diamond, 1991; La Rocca et al, 2011). It is very common to use 
firm age as a proxy of business life cycle, e.g. La Rocca et al (2011), Tian et al 
(2015), etc.  
As firm older grows, if a firm has any banking relationship, naturally the 
banking relationship also lengthens. Uniquely, the thesis also aims to check whether 
relationship banking could affect business life cycle theories on the prediction on 
small business’ capital structures, particularly, the thesis intends to check whether 
such effect varies across different types of banking markets. 
Objective Two: the thesis aims to find out the determinants for the small 
business to borrow from non-primary sources of finance (‘switching’ behaviour) 
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and the impacts of such ‘switching’ behaviour on the application of the loans 
and loan terms. 
There are substantial research supporting the favourite effect of relationship 
banking: Bharath et al. (2011), Berger and Udell (1995), Brick and Palia (2007) 
found that relationship banking effectively reduce the borrowing costs, while 
Angelini et al. (1998), Hernandez-Canovas and Martines-Solano (2010), Chakraborty 
and Hu (2006) demonstrate that relationship banking increases the availability of 
external finance. Relationship banking could even improve the corporate governance 
(Dass and Massa, 2011) and reduce the business failure rates (Gómez-Gonzále and 
Reyes, 2011). 
However, the dark side of relationship banking has also been found. 
Theoretically, Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (2004) modelled that 
with a stronger banking relationship, the incumbent banks take an informationally 
advantageous position for the small business comparing with the outside banks. This 
advantageous position gives the bank a kind of monopoly power over the borrowers 
and therefore, hold-up problem emerges. The negative effect of relationship banking 
has been empirically captured by Degryse and Cayseele (2000), D’Auria et al. (1999), 
etc. Overall, when the hold-up problem is greater than the beneficial effects of 
relationship banking, small businesses start to establish new banking relationships 
(Gopalan, 2011). 
Due to the particularity of the nature on this topic, it is very difficult to obtain 
the firm-bank relationship data, especially the data containing the relationship 
switching information. Therefore, there is very little pre-existing empirical research 
on the topic of relational financial institutions switching: Ongena and Smith (2001) 
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used the panel data on the firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1979 to 
1995. All of the data are derived from Kierulf’s Handbook, which is published by 
Oslo Stock Exchange. The dataset includes 111 firms on average a year and 419 firm-
bank observations. Duration analysis has been applied. They found, firstly, firm-bank 
relationship terminates when it matures. Secondly, maintaining multiple banking 
relationships could reduce the market power of any of the banks. Thirdly, firms tend 
to switch to larger banks. Overall, the findings support the lock-in effect of 
relationship banking. Farinha and Sntos (2002) investigated the data from the 
monthly reports for the banks in Portugal from 1980 to 1996 based on duration 
analysis. There are 1577 firms included, with 870 firms only maintaining a single 
borrowing relationship while 707 with multiple borrowing relationships. They found 
that firms usually start with only a single banking relationship. Afterwards, some of 
them develop multiple banking relationships. Firms with greater growth opportunities 
and firms with worse performance are more likely to maintain multiple banking 
relationships. Overall, the results concern with the hold-up effect of relationship 
banking. Berger et al (2005) investigated U.S. Survey of Small Business Finances 
1993 data on the determinants of number of borrowing relationships. They found that 
smaller banks are more likely to maintain the small business clients within a single 
banking relationship. The results support the beneficial effect of relationship banking 
and the information hypothesis (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995; Stein, 2002). 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) have researched on the data from Bolivian public 
credit registry, La Central de Información de Riesgos, from March 1999 to December 
2003. There are 2805 firms included, where there are 33084 loan initiations. They 
found that when switching to a new bank-firm relationship, firms receive the loan at a 
relatively lower price. Afterwards, the loan interest rate increases. The results support 
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the lock-in effect of relationship banking. Gopalan et al. (2011) adopted the data on 
more than 12000 loans from Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database during 
the period of 1990 to 2006 to investigate why firms develop new banking 
relationships. The firms included are medium or large size firms. They found that 
firms not included in Compustat database are less likely to establish a new banking 
relationship. However, within the subgroup of Compustat included firms, more 
informationally opaque firms are more likely to form new banking relationship. Firms 
in a new banking relationship receive larger amount of loans, and they would have 
lower capital expenditure, lower sales growth and lower financial leverage. Degryse 
et al. (2011) use the data on the loan contracts to Belgian SMEs during the period of 
1997 to 2003. They found that due to the mergers of the banks, some of the firms 
have to be ‘dropped’ or ‘switch’ to another banking relationship. And they have 
found solid evidence that the ‘dropped’ firms are severely harmed. One solution to 
hedge from such kind of negative influence, is to maintain multiple banking 
relationships. 
Overall, it is obviously that there is very little pre-existing research on this 
topic specially targeting at SMEs, where asymmetric information theories work 
better. Besides the loan interest rates, there is little research (Gopalan et al., 2011) 
aiming to investigate the impacts of switching on the approval rate of the loan 
application and loan terms, such as maturity. It is very unique for this thesis to take 
care of these issues. 
 
Objective Three: the thesis aims to investigate the determinants of the 
communication in person between small businesses and their relational financial 
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institutions, as well as the impacts of communication in person on the banking 
relationships, borrowing costs and discouraged borrowing for small firms. 
Along with the development of the banking industry, there are many lending 
technologies available for lending to small businesses, including financial statement 
lending, asset-based lending, fixed-asset lending, etc. These lending technologies 
have been well developed especially after the information technology innovation. 
However, relationship banking, a very traditional and effective lending technology 
specialized for small businesses, has never lost its importance in the dramatic change 
in information technology innovation (DeYoung et al, 2004; Berger and Udell, 2006) 
and it is still a very important approach for small businesses in obtaining external 
finance (Uchida et al, 2012). Certainly, it is attributed to one of the most distinctive 
characteristics of relationship banking – soft information transmission between the 
borrowers and the lenders, which could hardly be implemented by other lending 
technologies (Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004).  
“soft information” is defined as the kind of information which “cannot be 
directly verified by anyone other than the agent who produce it” (Stein, 2002:p.1892). 
Soft information cannot be completely quantified and easily transmitted, such as the 
business owner’s personal characteristics, attitudes toward risks, etc. (Petersen, 
2004). Soft information could be obtained by the lender from the borrower via the 
multiple interactions in person over time (Boot, 2000). In contrast, “hard 
information” is the kind of information which could be quantified and easily 
transmitted, such as financial ratios and credit scores (Udell, 2008). They could be 
conveyed by advanced technologies, such as internet banking (Han, 2008; Hertzberg 
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et al, 2010) as well as the traditional communication in person (Hertzberg et al, 
2010).  
Unlike large firms, for small businesses especially informationally opaque 
firms, the fixed costs for them to produce the standardized hard information, 
including audited financial statements, annual report, etc. would be much higher 
(Ang, 1991). Therefore, informationally transparent and (or) large firms are able to 
provide “hard” information to the financial institutions whilst informationally opaque 
and (or) small firms (e.g. small businesses) rely more heavily on “soft” information 
transmission to their proposed lenders (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Petersen, 2004). 
The distinctive difference between soft information transmission and hard 
information transmission, is that communication in person is essential for soft 
information transmission, but not necessary for hard information transmission 
(Petersen, 2004). Therefore, communication in person could be viewed as a signal of 
soft information transmission. Such soft information transmission alleviates the 
asymmetric information problem for small businesses and therefore, it should be 
beneficial to the availability and costs of external finance for small businesses. 
It has been theoretically modelled that soft information plays important role in 
relationship banking (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). And soft information transmission is 
preferable by the banks in a concentrated banking market as banks have more 
incentives (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). However, there have been very few 
empirical studies ensuring the role of soft information transmission in relationship 
banking as well as how banking market conditions could affect it. Peter and Rajan 
(2002) has done an investigation on the communication approach based on U.S. 
Survey of Small Business Finances 1993. They found that smaller firms are more 
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likely to communicate with the banks in person. Moreover, a concentrated banking 
market will increase the likelihood of communication in person approach. Berger et 
al. (2005) also researched on U.S. Survey of Small Business Finances 1993 data, they 
found that if the size of the relational bank is larger, the probability for the firm to 
communicate with the bank in person reduces. Also if the firms are located in 
metropolitan areas, the communication approach is more likely to be in person. 
However, neither of these two papers further investigated the impacts of 
communication approach on small business’ banking relationship, borrowing costs 
and availability. We are still uncertain about the answers on the impacts. This thesis, 
provide a comprehensive analysis on the impacts of communication in person on 
small business’ relationship banking, bank service usage, small business borrowing 
costs and financial availability. It extends the findings by Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
and Berger et al. (2005). Moreover, since Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Berger et al. 
(2005) only adopted U.S. Survey of Small Business Finances 1993 data, it could not 
track how communication in person approach could be affected by the quick 
development of information technology innovations in 1990s. This thesis will employ 
the U.S. Survey of Small Business Finances 1993, 1998 and 2003 data to track the 
dynamic influence. 
 
1. 3    Practical implications and contributions to the knowledge 
As reported by Wall Street Journal, the loans to the small business segment 
issued by the top 10 largest banks in the US, reduced 38% in 2014 comparing with 
2006. After the crisis, small businesses have to pay more for the borrowing, 
moreover, credit cards becomes the major source of finance rather than the ordinary 
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loans for small businesses, of which the interest rate is higher. Lending to the firms 
younger than 10 years old became extremely difficult (Simon, 2015). Also, it seems 
that banks lend more to large firms because, comparing with 2008, in the US, loans to 
the small business sector reduced by 14% while the loans to all size firms increased 
by 9%. The possible reason, is that the relationship lending is disappearing, said by 
Todd Anduze, director of the government-funded Small Business Development 
Center, reported by Wall Street Journal. Nowadays, when borrowing, small business 
feels hard to tick all of the criteria in the box for borrowing, which leads to the 
rejection of the loan application. This is a trend happening in the United States that 
standardized, non-personalized application are preferred by the banks whereas 
relationship banking, is being paid less and less attention to (Simon and Loten, 2014). 
It is very dangerous as it would harm the small business sector and further the US 
economy. This also partially explains why the total number of small business in the 
US dropped significantly in 2013 comparing with 2008. 
In Europe, some banks become aware of the importance of small businesses 
and they are taking some actions to ensure sufficient small business lending. As 
reported by Ana Botin, the Chief Executive of Santander UK, on Financial Times, 
Santander offers an innovative type of mezzanine finance to small businesses under 
Breakthrough programme, a £200,000,000 growth capital fund; on the other hand, 
Santander understands the importance of relationship banking and Santander is 
reviving this effective lending technique. Santander is considering to incorporate 
better Information Technologies into the relationship banking (Botin, 2013). In 
Germany, banks including BNP Paribas, HSBC, and Société Générale, etc. also aim 
to build more long-term relationships with small business clients and it will be 
beneficial for German economy (Stothard and Shotter, 2015). 
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The above reports from Wall Street Journal or Financial Times highlight the 
following aspects: firstly, small businesses in the United States are more and more 
difficult to borrow from the banks, particularly from large banks, as they have not got 
sufficient interests for small business lending; secondly, some banks began to 
consider to lend to small businesses. They understand the importance of relationship 
banking in small business lending. They also consider to incorporate Information 
Technologies into relationship banking. 
Certainly this thesis further extended these highlights. First, the thesis 
highlights that a longer banking relationship in a concentrated bank market has more 
value as it enables the small businesses to take more tax shield benefits with lower 
financial risks. For policy makers, on one hand, it is not a wise idea to increase the 
bank market competition in the view of small businesses as it eliminates the value of 
relationship banking. On the other hand, it is would be better for the government to 
ensure the stability of the bank market. Too many mergers and acquisitions or any 
dramatic change, may terminate the existing banking relationship as the firms need to 
make a decision on whether to ‘stay’, ‘drop’ or ‘switch ‘ a banking relationship 
(Degryse, 2011). This is harmful for nursing a longer banking relationship and it will 
further negatively affect small business finance and their survival. 
Secondly, the thesis confirms that when switching banking relationship, small 
businesses suffer from a higher loan interest rate, lower approval rate and a longer 
maturity. And it is found that smaller businesses or the small businesses with more 
risks are more likely to switch the relational banks. It reflects the dilemma of 
asymmetric information and adverse selection the small businesses are suffering 
from: The pathways for small business to signal their creditworthiness are few and it 
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is even difficult for them to breed a banking relationship. On the other hand, it also 
shows that relationship banking has no partiality for small businesses with poor 
quality as it is empirically proved in this thesis that such businesses are difficult to 
maintain a banking relationship. And it is prevalent that for the banks, if they would 
like to establish a new borrowing-lending relationship with a small business although 
it is stricter when screening, it is very likely that the loan will initially begin with a 
higher rate and a longer maturity. As bank mergers and acquisitions are happening in 
the markets frequently, it is better for the government to set up some policies 
maintaining the financial stability for the small businesses. Small businesses are 
much more sensitive to the changes of the financial institutions. Any significant 
change may severely harm the small business by higher borrowing costs and lower 
probability of access to the external finance. 
Thirdly, it is empirically found in this thesis that a concentrated banking 
market would be beneficial for soft information transmission. And better soft 
information transmission could strengthen the banking relationship, and reduce the 
borrowing costs and the probability of being discouraged. Indeed, in the United 
States, as reported by Wall Street Journal, small businesses find it very difficult for 
borrowing, because nowadays, relationship banking is being dropped by the banks in 
United States. Small businesses need to meet the hard criteria from the banks for 
borrowing, where soft information will be greatly dismissed. This is fatal for small 
business finance. Moreover, some banks, like Santander, are aware of the importance 
of relationship banking and they claim that they will not abandon this lending 
technology. They plan to better incorporate Information Technologies into the 
relationship banking. The effect of doing this is suspectable. This is because 
Information Technologies at this stage, could not well transmit the soft information. 
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As highlighted in this thesis, the channel of communication in person, is still very 
important to attract the attention of small businesses. Banks should not view the 
employment of the relationship loan officers as an expensive expenditure. Indeed, the 
intangible value of relationship loan officer is high because firms in good relationship 
with banks, will take a concentrated use of the services provided by the bank and it 
means that there are more chances for the banks to earn profits. The government 
could consider to encourage more innovative form of relationship banking. Certainly, 
the government could also encourage the development of the Information 
Technologies which focuses on the better transmission of soft information. 
 The thesis empirically supports and extends some pre-existing theories. First, 
the thesis further extended Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) relationship 
banking theory and the financial life cycle theory raised by La Rocca et al (2011). 
This thesis finds that the reverse life cycle effect/reputation effect, could be better 
reflected by the length of banking relationship rather than firm age. The length of 
banking relationship is a much stronger proxy than firm age for measuring the degree 
of information asymmetry problem. Particularly, it plays a significant role of 
benefiting small businesses in a concentrated banking market, whereas, the function 
of firm age is weak.  
Second, there are very few papers on the topic of banking relationship 
switching and it impact on small business finance. Ongena and Smith (2001) and 
Farinha and Santos (2002) found that firms with more risks are more likely to switch 
relational banks. Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), in a further step, found that the 
borrowing costs are lower if firms choose to switch the relationship. All of these 
research support the ‘lock-in’ effect of banking relationship; Ioannidou and Ongena 
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(2010) further found that the borrowing costs for new customers of the banks are 
lower. These research confirms the dark side of relationship banking. Gopalan et al 
(2011) found supporting evidence for the positive side of relationship banking. They 
found the negative impacts on firms’ finance if the firms switch their relational banks. 
However, Gopalan et al (2011) did not include small firms. Therefore, in summarize, 
this thesis is the first to investigate the determinants and the impacts on the loan terms 
(interest rate, approval rate and maturity) of relational bank switching. Unlike Ongena 
and Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos (2002) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), this 
thesis is also the first to support the positive side of relationship banking for small 
businesses on relational bank switching issue. 
Thirdly, Stein (2002) and Petersen (2004) defined and summarized the 
characters of soft information: soft information is hard to be quantified, transferred 
and hardened. Researchers tried to investigate the function of soft information in the 
lending process for small businesses (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Agarwal et al, 2011). 
However, due to the nature of soft information, scholars have to cite indirect proxies 
for measuring the soft information. This thesis, is the first to empirically investigate 
the function of soft information in banking relationship and its impact on borrowing 
costs and discouraged borrowing. In particular, communication in person method has 
been adopted as the measure of soft information. The thesis investigated Petersen’s 
(2004) research by empirical evidence in depth and found profound evidence 
supporting the beneficial effect of soft information communication. Moreover, it 
empirically found out that soft information plays better function in a concentrated 
banking market. 
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1. 4    Contemporary Implication of the Thesis 
Although this research is based on the US data from 1993 to 2003, it still 
sheds value in our days. The small business segment still plays an important role in 
the US economy. By 2013, there were 577,5055 firms in total running in U.S., out of 
which 575,6419 are small firms; there were 56,823,377 employments operated in the 
small business segment, which weights 48.05% of the total employment in the U.S.; 
41.24% of the payroll was made by small businesses (SUSB, 2016). It means small 
business contributes to the U.S. economy enormously, however, comparing with 
2008, such contribution reduced significantly (SUSB, 2016). Certainly financial crisis 
gives rise to this and it negatively affects small business sector. Between 2007 and 
2012 in the US, 6 per cent of the commercial banks and thrift institutions fell down 
and 86% of the insolvencies happened in the smaller financial institutions (Deyoung 
et al, 2015). This greatly affected small business segment as small business as small 
businesses are more likely to get loan finance from smaller financial institutions 
(Berger et al, 2005). Credit entering into the small business segment dropped 
substantially from 2005 to 2010. Before the crisis, 90% of the small businesses could 
obtain the finance they need, however, such ratio dropped sharply to 50% in 2009 
(Dolar, 2014). Relationship banking may help small business survive during the 
crisis. Empirical studies found that, in European economies, the credit supply during 
the financial crisis reduced significantly, however, the small businesses with strong 
banking relationship are not significantly affected (Popov and Udell, 2012). In the 
United States, pre-existing banking relationships, help small business hedge the credit 
supply shock from the banks. Relationship banking plays important function of 
enhancing small business financial situations and banks are less likely to issue loans 
to new customers (Deyoung et al, 2015). Apart from this, as the bank mergers and 
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acquisitions happening in the bank market, soft information transmission has been 
severely affected and this has already harmed small business (Ogura and Uchida, 
2014).  
Therefore, this thesis is meaningful even for the market nowadays, because: 
First, during and after the crisis, small business finance has been severely 
affected: half of the firms could not obtain the finance they need. Chapter 2 in this 
thesis, demonstrates the mechanism how relationship banking affect the capitals 
structure of the small businesses as well as the financial risks of the small firms. This 
would be one the solutions small firms could adopt to solve the dilemma for external 
finance. 
Second, after the crisis, there was a significant change of the bank market. 
Mergers and acquisition happens and consolidation may increase. Small firms have to 
make a decision on ‘stay in’, ‘terminate’ or ‘switch’ the banking relationship 
(Degryse, 2011). Before the decision is made, small firms need to balance the 
benefits and costs of the ‘switching’. Definitely, Chapter 3 shed lights on this. Apart 
from this, nowadays, Chapter 3 also helps the banks to make a judgement, how to 
attract new small business customers with good quality. 
Thirdly, although there has been a quick development of online banking 
nowadays (Han, 2008), the soft information transmission has not been solved by 
Information Technology. Small business needs to understand how soft information 
transmission could affect their finance and for the banks, it is still meaningful to 
know how to attract the small business customers to use the services offered by the 
bank as much as possible. Chapter 4 aims to solve all of these problems. 
- 67 - 
 
 
1.5    Data 
1.5.1    Introduction of the dataset 
In this thesis, the data from The Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) is 
adopted. SSBF was led by U.S. Federal Reserve Board which aims to investigate the 
finance of the small businesses in the U.S. in the nationwide scale. SSBF is 
advantageous because (Han et al, 2015; Rice and Strahan, 2010): 
Firstly, it is very representative for US small business finance. 
Secondly, the dataset is very inclusive, including the firm-aspect 
characteristics of the small businesses, owner-aspect characteristics of the small 
businesses, firm-bank (financial institutions) relationship characteristics, which fits 
all of the research models set in the thesis appropriately. In particular, the dataset also 
includes the banking market conditions constrained to localities. 
Thirdly, the dataset could capture the deregulation of the banking industry 
during the period of 1990s and the beginning of 21 century.  
There are 4 rounds of survey for SSBF: SSBF87, SSBF93, SSBF98 and 
SSBF03. 
In order to keep consistency, SSBF87 is not considered in the thesis, because 
SSBF87 is significantly different from the other 3 rounds. Some basic information 
considered in the thesis, such as firms’ delinquent history, firm age, etc., is not 
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included in SSBF87. Also SSBF87 contains two subgroups of samples which would 
be different from the other 3 rounds of the survey. 
The thesis considered all of the SSBF98 and SSBF03 samples. Since SSBF93 
does not contain the data regarding the credit score of the small firms, therefore, if 
credit score needs to be considered, SSBF93 has to be abandoned. 
Specifically, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, because credit score is one of the 
key variables in the model, therefore, SSBF93 has not been adopted and only SSBF98 
and SSBF03 are employed. 
On the other hand, in Chapter 4, because credit score is not considered in all 
of the models (except the discouraged borrowing models in Table 4-10), SSBF93, 
SSBF98 and SSBF03 are employed together. For Discouraged Borrowing models in 
Table 4-10, as credit score is employed for grouping the borrowers, SSBF93 has been 
abandoned and SSBF98 and SSBF03 are adopted only. 
 
1. 5.2    Recommendations on data for future research 
SSBF stopped at the round of SSBF03. Since then, there has been hardly a 
new survey which is so authoritative, comprehensive and with such huge influence in 
the area of relationship banking for small businesses and the influence by the local 
banking market. Databases such as Orbis, Bloomberg, Datastream, etc. are very 
excellent to retrieve data for large firms rather than small firms. Therefore, for small 
businesses, the research largely depends on the pre-existing surveys. Since 2003, 
some more surveys regarding small business finances include Kauffman Firm Survey 
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(Kapinos et al, 2016), World Bank’s World Business Environment Survey (Lipuma et 
al, 2013), Annual Small Business Survey (Cowling et al, 2015), Basic Survey of 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Ogawa et al, 2013), etc. 
 
1. 6    The structure of the thesis 
To comprehensively carry out the analysis, the rest of the thesis consists of 4 
chapters in total. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the mechanism of how relationship banking and banking 
market conditions affect small business’ capital structure. This topic is novel, as 
firstly, pre-existing studies suggest that the efficiency of local financial institutions 
relates with the cost of borrowing for the firms (La Rocca et al, 2011). However, the 
relationship between the efficiency of local financial institutions and local firms’ 
capital structure is still under-investigated. Moreover, disputes still exist on whether 
local banking market concentration increases the efficiency of local financial 
institutions to lend to local businesses (Chortareas et al, 2011; Petersen and Rajan, 
1994 and 1995; Homma et al, 2014; Ryan et al, 2014). Therefore, it is novelty to 
investigate the relationship between banking market conditions and the capital 
structure of small businesses in Chapter 2. Secondly, recent literatures pay an 
emerging emphasise on firm’s life cycle theories, in particular, on how capital 
structure adjusts according to the firm age, e.g. debt ratio decreases as firm age 
lengthens, following the reverse financial life cycle effect (La Rocca et al, 2011). And 
this chapter novelly finds out how to interpret the links between firms’ capital 
structure and relationship banking according to reverse financial life cycle effect and 
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how it works variously across different banking markets. Chapter 2 employs the data 
from SSBF98 and SSBF03, and finds out, firstly, without relationship banking, firms 
borrow less in a concentrated banking market than a competitive banking market, 
possibly due to a higher level of credit supply in a competitive banking market, 
consistent with the study by Ryan et al (2014); secondly, as the relationship banking 
involves in, the debt ratio drops more dramatically as the banking relationship 
lengthens in the competitive banking market than concentrated banking market, on 
one hand, supporting the beneficial effects of relationship banking and banking 
market concentration as modelled by Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995), on the 
other hands, confirming the reverse financial life cycle effect for the small firms. 
Moreover, it is also found that in a concentrated banking market, as the banking 
relationship lengthens, the small businesses suffer from a lower level of risks than 
that in a competitive banking market. The findings may reveal a compromised answer 
for the disputes on local banking market concentration and the efficiency of local 
financial institutions: for small businesses, without relationship banking, the 
efficiency of local financial institutions in a concentrated banking market falls behind 
than that in a competitive banking market, however, with the existence of relationship 
banking, such efficiency in a concentrated banking market will surpass that in a 
competitive banking market. 
Chapter 3 investigates the reason why some small businesses borrow from a 
non-primary financial institution and the impacts of such kind of behaviour. 
Relationship banking is widely accepted as a kind of powerful lending technique for 
the lenders to overcome asymmetric information problem, particularly for small 
businesses (Berger and Udell, 2006). However, there are also arguments that banking 
relationship might be costly for small businesses due to the “hold-up” problem, as 
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banks may extract extra rents from the borrowers based on the information advantage 
(Sharpe, 1990). According to SSBF 98 and 03, about one third of the small businesses 
borrowed from a non-primary source of finance. Chapter 3 aims to find out, whether 
the cause of such a phenomenon, derives from “hold-up” effect which drives the 
small businesses away, particularly firms with good quality; or derives from the 
mechanism of relationship banking which could diligently distinguish the quality of 
the small businesses and clear the firms with bad quality out of the banking 
relationship. This is novel as there is little pre-existing research showing the answer 
to this question. Moreover, Chapter 3 also investigates the impacts of such behaviour, 
e.g. the loan application approval rate, loan interest rate, and maturity. Chapter 3 
finds that, smaller firms and more financially risky firms are more likely to switch to 
a non-primary source of finance. And if a small firm borrows from a non-primary 
source of finance, it suffers from a lower loan approval rate and a higher interest rate 
charged for the loans. However, the maturity for the loan is longer. Such findings 
confirm the beneficial effect of relationship banking that firms with poor quality are 
cleared away from a banking relationship and the poor borrowers suffer from a severe 
adverse selection and credit rationing problem. On the other hand, to attract new 
customers, banks may offer some flexibility on maturity as the advantages to the new 
borrowers. Overall, Chapter 3 strongly supports the beneficial effects of relationship 
banking while little evidence on the detrimental effect of relationship banking has 
been found. 
Chapter 4 aims to investigate the importance of “soft information” in 
relationship banking. Although considerable literature confirms that relationship 
banking is unique comparing with other lending techniques as it could convey a mass 
of “soft information” from the borrowers to the lenders, it is still under-investigated 
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that, firstly, what kinds of small businesses are more likely to adopt “soft information” 
transmission with their lenders; secondly, how important it is for the “soft 
information” transmission for relationship banking and what benefits the small firms 
could obtain from “soft information” transmission for their finances. It is meaningful 
to explore the answers to these questions as it could empirically further extend 
Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) relationship banking theories. By employing 
SSBF 93, 98 and 03, Chapter 4 finds that the smaller firms and firms in a 
concentrated banking market are more likely to adopt “soft information” transmission. 
Demographic characteristics of the owners may affect the choice of “soft information” 
transmission as well. It also finds that “soft information” transmission is beneficial to 
maintain the banking relationship between the lenders and borrowers, to urge the 
small businesses to exclusively develop relationships with their primary banks and 
use the bank services. “Soft information” transmission could effectively reduce the 
borrowing cost for small businesses and decreases the probability of being 
discouraged for good borrowers. Such findings confirm the importance of “soft 
information” transmission for the small businesses to signal their creditworthiness 
and extend Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) relationship banking theories. 
Overall, this dissertation aims to investigate the impacts of relationship 
banking and banking market concentration on the small businesses external finance, 
particularly on small business capital structures, relational switching behaviour and 
“soft information” transmission issues where it is important to further extend Petersen 
and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) relationship banking theories while little pre-existing 
empirical evidence has been found. The structure of the dissertation is constructed as 
follows: Chapter 2 examines the role played by relationship banking and market 
concentration in small business capital structure decision making. Chapter 3 
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investigate a ‘changing’ behaviour where small firms borrow from non-primary 
sources of finance and its impacts on the financial issues of borrowers. Chapter 4 
investigates the determination of contact approaches in relationship banking between 
small businesses and banks and its impacts on small business finance. Chapter 5 
summarises and concludes for the whole thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Relationship Lending, Banking Market 
Concentration and Capital Structure of Small Businesses 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Capital structure is one of the most important issues in corporate finance and 
theoretical frameworks have been developed and underpinned corporate capital 
structure decision-making, such as Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1958 and 1963),  
Pecking Order Theory (POT) (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) and Trade-off 
Theory (TOT) (Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Taggart, 1977). There has also been 
ample empirical evidence supporting relevant capital structure theories. For example, 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Jone et al., (2011), Schulze et al (2015), Bartholdy 
et al (2015) provide empirical evidence supporting POT, and TOT has been tested by 
Ozkan (2001), Goldstein et al. (2001), Elsas and Florysiak (2015) and Strebulaev 
(2007). Empirical evidence on small business capital structure is available from, for 
instance, Watson and Wilson (2002), Michaelas et al. (1999), Aktas et al. (2011), 
Serrasqueiro and Nunes, (2012), López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, (2008), 
Serrasqueiro and Caetano (2015), Jõeveer (2013) and Palacín-Sánchez et al (2013). 
Most evidence suggests that pecking order and trade-off theories shed more light on 
the capital structure decision-making of small firms and the key differences between 
capital structure for a small business and large corporation could be summarized 
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from the following aspects: (1) small firms differ from large firms in terms of 
corporate governance issues, and the conflicts between owners and managers do not 
affect the capital structure decision-making of small firms. Because of the unique 
nature of being owner-managed, small businesses would be reluctant to issue 
external equity for fear of losing ownership and control of the business. Owners’ 
personal incentive and attitude towards risk also impacts the capital structure 
decision-making (Berger and Udell, 1998; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008); 
(2) because of severe asymmetric information problems and limited access to 
resources, small businesses can only have very limited access to public equity 
markets and they rely heavily on debt or private equity as external finance (Han and 
Zhang, 2012); (3) informal sources of finance play an important role (Berger and 
Udell, 1998), such as those from personal wealth, family, relatives, friends, etc.; (4) 
debt-tax shield is less attractive for small businesses than for large firms (Bhaird and 
Lucey, 2010).  
Compared with financing large firms, lenders face a greater degree of 
asymmetric information when financing small businesses (Ang, 1991), and as a 
result, it is more difficult for small businesses to obtain external finance (La Rocca et 
al., 2011; Abor et al, 2014) and they usually pay higher costs on loans (Cabral and 
Mata, 2003; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Also, small businesses are believed to be 
more risky and suffer from a higher failure rate than large firms (DeLone, 1988). In 
the capital structure decision, it has been found that small firms are inclined to adopt 
less information-sensitive sources of finance, such as retained earnings and debt4 (La 
Rocca et al., 2011; Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2012), and therefore their capital 
                                                 
4 In comparison with external equity financing. 
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structure decision-making is more likely to follow POT (López-Garcia and Sogorb-
Mira, 2008).  
More recent research on small business capital structure decisions tends to 
focus on the efficiency of local financial institutions (Beck et al., 2008; La Rocca et 
al., 2011). There is an intimate link between the cost of borrowing and the efficiency 
of local financial institutions (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Ryan et al., 2014). Lower 
borrowing costs and a higher degree of financial availability could effectively reduce 
the financial distress cost, therefore, according to TOT, firms with lower borrowing 
costs and a higher degree of financial availability may maintain a higher level of debt; 
While according to POT, lower borrowing costs enable a firm to gain greater access 
to debts, therefore firms maintain more debts. From this point of view, the 
predictions of TOT and POT on borrowing costs and capital structure are consistent: 
lower borrowing costs increase the debt ratio. 
However, debates exist on the linkages between small business borrowing 
costs and the efficiency of local financial institutions. There are four major 
hypotheses dominating the debates in this area: the Structure–Conduct–Performance 
(SCP) paradigm, the Relative Market Power (RMP) Hypothesis, the Efficient 
Structure Hypothesis (ESH) (Chortareas et al., 2011) and the Information-based 
Hypothesis (IH) (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995). According to the SCP 
hypothesis, fewer numbers of banks in the concentrated banking market may more 
easily induce the banks to collude, from which banks could be able to explore extra 
profits from their business customers, indicating that firms in such a banking market 
would suffer from higher borrowing costs (Homma et al., 2014; Mirzaei et al, 2013; 
Das and Kumbhakar, 2016). The predictions are similar according to the RMP, but 
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RMP is characterized by a direct focus on the market power of the banks: banks with 
a greater market share in the concentrated banking market have the power to exercise 
higher pricing, leading to higher borrowing costs for the firm (Berger, 1995; Mahbub 
et al, 2014). In contrast, the ESH indicates that the concentration of a banking market 
is derived from the higher efficiency of certain banks. Such high efficiency could 
definitely benefit the business customers through lower borrowing costs (Trujillo-
Ponce, 2013). In particular, there are two ways that certain banks could have such 
high efficiency: firstly, they may be characterized by superior management or 
production technologies to generate higher profits at lower costs (X-efficiency 
version of ESH:); secondly, they may be more efficient in operating with lower unit 
costs and higher unit profits, even if their management and technology are not 
advantageous (scale-efficiency version of ESH: ESS) (Castellanos and Garza-Garcia, 
2013). To sum up SCP and RMP predict a similar outcome: firms in a concentrated 
banking market suffer from higher borrowing costs, while the ESH demonstrates a 
different story. None of these three hypotheses have a clear focus on asymmetric 
information problems and their predictions could apply to either large firms or small 
businesses. 
The IH theory puts more emphasis on the asymmetric information problem 
with a special focus on small business borrowing. In a concentrated banking market, 
relationship banking is favoured by the banks and their small business customers, 
rather than any ‘arm’s length’ lending techniques, because of the existence of 
asymmetric information and adverse selection problems. Relationship banking 
enables the banks to acquire their small business customers’ information from 
historical contact; moreover, soft information could also be transmitted via 
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relationship banking, which is unique compared with any other lending techniques. 
Therefore, on the one hand, banks save the monitoring and screening costs for their 
lending to small business customers; on the other hand, it also saves small businesses 
the cost of signalling their creditworthiness (Ang, 1991; Berger and Udell, 2006; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995). Therefore, IH predicts that small businesses in a 
concentrated banking market have lower borrowing costs, which is similar to the 
ESH. 
To empirically investigate the relationship between a firm’s capital structure 
decisions and the local banking market conditions, and in particular to detect which 
referred hypothesis plays a significant role, this chapter employs the data from the 
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) to check which hypothesis works. As far 
as the author is aware, this is the first empirical study on the effects of market 
concentration and relationship banking on the capital structure of small firms. 
According to the IH, it is expected that a stronger relationship between lender and 
borrower would raise the debt ratio because of the easier access and lower cost of 
debt. However, it is not clear how capital market conditions affect the capital 
structure of small firms. According to SCP or RMP (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009), it 
is expected that small firms would have a lower debt ratio in a concentrated market 
than in a competitive market because of the higher costs of debt in a concentrated 
market. While, according to the ESH (Berger, 1995) or the IH (Petersen and Rajan, 
1995), the problem of asymmetric information would be less serious in a 
concentrated market than in a competitive market and thus small firms may have a 
higher debt ratio. The inconsistent expectations motivate the current empirical 
research on this topic. The nature of these hypotheses, banking relationship 
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characteristics and their interactions with banking market conditions will be 
emphasized in the analysis to distinguish the IH from the other banking market 
theories. 
This chapter also offers a new element in that it confirms the existence of the 
reverse financial life cycle/reputational searching effect’ and the beneficial effect of 
relationship banking. Recent literature i.e. La Rocca et al. (2011), Castro et al (2015), 
Ampenberger et al (2013) and Tian et al. (2015) has placed an emerging emphasis on 
the business life cycle effect to solve capital structure puzzles. A majority of these 
papers raise a serious concern regarding measuring the business life cycle by firm 
age or cash flow patterns. This chapter, for the first time, considers the length of 
banking relationship as a proxy of a firm’s financial life cycle, which is 
complementary to the classical financial growth cycle depicted  by Berger and Udell 
(1998). A firm starts to borrow when it needs external finance from a financial 
institution and a banking relationship is therefore formed. As the banking 
relationship develops to a mature stage, this chapter aims to investigate how the 
financial leverage changes along with the development of the banking relationship 
and how the effect varies across different banking market conditions. Borrowing the 
concept of the reverse financial life cycle effect (La Rocca et al., 2011), which 
indicates that a firm borrows when it is young, while the debt ratio decreases as the 
firm’s age increases, because more retained earnings are generated, this chapter finds 
that the reverse financial life cycle effect does not vary across banking market 
conditions; however, the beneficial effect of the banking relationship varies across 
different banking markets. Therefore, in combination with the reverse financial life 
cycle effect (La Rocca et al., 2011) and the beneficial effect of relationship banking 
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(Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995), the magnitude of the influence of a banking 
relationship varies across different banking market conditions.  
Overall, this chapter explores a new view from the perspective of the reverse 
financial life cycle theory, the relationship banking theory and the banking market 
theory to give some insights into answering the capital structure puzzle. The 
remainder of this chapter will be organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes a 
majority of literature in this area; an introduction to the data employed and data 
analysis including robustness check and further analysis will be demonstrated in 
Section 3, and Section 4 concludes the whole chapter. 
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2.2 Background Theories 
2.2.1 Capital structure theories 
The capital structure theories are developed from Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) who propose that in a perfect capital market, firm value is irrelevant to 
financial capital structure decisions. However, in the real world, information is 
asymmetric5 when financing informationally opaque borrowers, which potentially 
causes problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Such a scenario is similar to 
the ‘lemons’ market of used cars (Akerlof, 1970), where low-quality products or 
borrowers squeeze out the high-quality ones from the market. This is because, 
without an efficient signalling mechanism, it is costly for high-quality borrowers to 
signal their creditability (Heinkel, 1982; Ross, 1977). Moreover, the existence of the 
asymmetric information problem makes it costly for banks to identify the creditable 
small business. This section reviews the existing literature on capital structure 
theories and empirical evidence.  
 
2.2.1.1 Pecking order theory (POT) 
The pecking order theory is one of the most important theories in capital 
structure proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). The pecking 
order theory (POT) considers the asymmetric information issue and proposes that, 
                                                 
5 In the loan market, imperfect information does exist and, therefore, it is hard for banks to be certain 
of the riskiness of an investment by lending. Prices of loans themselves could not work efficiently for 
the demand–supply equilibrium and therefore, on the one hand, increasing the price may squeeze out 
certain types of borrowers, which is viewed as adverse selection; on the other hand, increasing the 
price of the loan may induce managers to abuse the borrowed capital to more risky projects, which is 
deemed as a moral hazard problem (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and 1992). 
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with a demand on finance, firms follow a hierarchical order from low-risk to high-
risk sources of finance, i.e. from internal sources of finance to external debt finance 
and then external equity as the last resort (Jone et al., 2011). Recent supporting 
empirical evidence on large firms are available from Fama and French (2002), 
Bruinshoofd and de Haan (2012), and Charalambakis and Psychoyios (2012). 
Asymmetric information is the key issue addressed by POT in capital 
structure  decisions and it has been found that POT sheds more light on small 
business capital structure than the MM model and TOT (Bhaird and Lucey, 2010; 
López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008). This is because, firstly, compared with large 
firms, small businesses have higher failure rates (Monk, 2000), less diversification 
(Ang, 1991) and stronger asymmetric information problems, which cause higher 
costs of debt for small business borrowers (Liu et al., 2011), higher agency costs for 
lenders (Aktas et al., 2011; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and greater degree of 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Ou and Haynes, 2006). Meanwhile, it 
has also been found that POT works better in a scenario with a greater degree of 
asymmetric information and a greater gap between the costs of finance from different 
information-sensitive sources (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). Secondly, it has been 
found that small businesses prefer additional capital from internal sources and they 
have very limited access to bond markets; and therefore commercial lenders, 
especially banks, dominate the small business debt market (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Supporting POT, it has also been found that small firms are reluctant to use external 
equity capital (e.g. Carpentier et al., 2012) because of the high costs for both external 
equity investors and small firms, due to the problem of asymmetric information. 
Thirdly, small business owner managers are control-averse (Aktas et al., 2011; 
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Cressy, 1995; Mueller, 2008). Therefore, raising external equity finance could be 
viewed as a ‘bad’ sign of having limited internal sources of finance – retained profits 
for instance – and limited access to external debt finance. Applications supporting 
POT for small and medium-sized enterprises’ capital structure decisions have been 
empirically tested by a variety of studies summarized in Table 2-1. 
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                                               Table 2-1:  Example Empirical Studies of POT in Small Business Capital Structure 
Authors Samples Data Source 
Analysis 
Methods Summary of findings 
Michaelas et 
al. (1999) 
3500 British small firms over period of 
1986 to 1995. Firms are aged from 23.3 on 
average in 1988 to 21.0 on average in 
1995. 
Lotus 
One-
Source 
database 
of UK 
small 
firms 
Least Squares 
Dummy 
Variable Fixed 
Effects Panel 
Data Analysis 
Profitability and age relate to gearing negatively, and 
growth is positively related to both short- and long-
term debt, supporting POT.   
Jordan et al. 
(1998) 
605 SMEs with less than 100 employees 
and 10 million pounds turnover, and at 
least 4 years old but less than 10 years old 
FAME Heckman 
Selection 
Model 
Firms in need of external finance are characterized as 
having higher debt ratio. 
Watson and 
Wilson (2002) 
655 firms in manufacturing sector from 
1990 to 1994. Firm age not specified. 
FAME Panel Data 
Fixed Effect 
Analysis 
The actual annual change of the total asset is heavily 
affected by the change of retained profits, less 
heavily affected by the change of debt and least 
heavily affected by the change of the equity finance, 
supporting POT. In particular, younger firms prefer 
retained profits and short-term debts. 
Sanchez-Vidal 
and Martin-
Ugedo (2005) 
584 small, 792 medium-sized and 190 
large (private) limited firms in non-
banking or insurance sector, over 1994 to 
2000. Firm age not specified and all of the 
firms were alive in 2000. 
BASI 
database 
from 
Informa, 
S. A. 
Fixed Effect 
Panel Data 
Analysis 
The changes of total assets are more largely due to 
the changes of retained earnings and debts, rather 
than the changes of equity. SMEs follow POT.  
Aktas et al. 
(2011) 
56,605 French micro businesses with 20 or 
less employees of the period from 1998 to 
2006. Firms are least 4 years old. 
Descriptive statistics of firm age not 
specified. 
DIANE 
database 
Fixed Effect 
Panel Data 
Analysis 
Very Small Firms prefer to use internal financing; 
they use debts as a complementary source of 
financing. Equity financing is the last resort. 
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2.2.1.2 Trade-off theory (TOT) 
Another important theory on capital structure is the trade-off theory (TOT). 
Robichek and Myers (1966) and Baxter (1967) initially proposed a static trade-off 
theory by considering the benefit and cost of using debt finance, such as tax shield 
and bankruptcy costs and suggested that there should be an optimal capital structure 
which maximizes the firm value. The trade-off of using debt finance has been 
confirmed by earlier theoretical studies, such as Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) and 
Warner (1977). Jensen and Meckling (1976) also contributed to TOT by introducing 
an agency theory, confirming the existence of the optimal capital structure, and 
further supporting evidence is available from Kim (1978), Brennan and Schwartz 
(1978), Bradley et al., (1984), and Lang et al., (1996). Dynamic TOT theories are 
important further developments for TOT, taking into consideration of the adjustment 
speed of a firm’s capital structure towards the target level (Ozkan, 2001). 
                Supporting empirical evidence on dynamic TOT is available from Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) and Hovakimian (2004), etc. For example, Goldstein et al. (2001) 
and Strebulaev (2007) find that capital structure moves within an appropriate range, 
and if it moves beyond this range, it would move back towards the optimal level. The 
adjustment speed6 varies between firms in different countries and industries and, for 
example, it was around 57% in the finance and utilities industry in the UK (Ozkan, 
2001), between 4% and 49% in Central and Eastern Europe (de Haas and Peeters, 
2006) and between 14% and 39% for the Swedish public companies during 1991–
2000 (Gaud et al., 2005). Table 2-2 summarizes the empirical studies of TOT in 
small business capital structure.  
                                                 
6 The adjustment speed is defined as the percentage of the gap a firm can adjust in one year from 
capital structure in year (t-1) and optimal capital structure in year t.  
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Indeed, Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2012) argue that TOT and POT could not be 
mutually exclusive in small businesses’ external financing, although they have 
inconsistent implications, such as whether there is an optimal capital structure (TOT) 
or not (POT), whether the relationship between profitability and debt ratio is positive 
(TOT) or not (POT).  However, both POT and TOT play an important role in the 
understanding of corporate financial decisions. For small businesses, it has been 
found that POT works better for those firms in an early stage and TOT works better 
for more established businesses. This is because POT sheds more light on more 
information-sensitive decision-making than TOT. Table 2-3 summarizes the 
empirical studies of both POT and TOT in small business capital structure. 
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Table 2-2: Empirical Studies of TOT in Small Business Capital Structure 
Authors Samples Data Source Analysis Methods Summary of findings 
López-
Gracia and 
Sogorb-
Mira (2008) 
3569 independent firms 
with less than 250 
employees and 40 million 
euros invoiced (or less than 
27 million assets). The 
average firm age of the 
dataset is 14.86 years. 
SABI database 
by Bureau van 
Dyck and Grupo 
Informa. 
Panel Data 
Instrumental 
Variable 
Techniques 
(GMM and 
2SLS) 
The empirical result has captured the capital 
structure adjustment speed of 36% towards its 
optimal capital structure. Positive relationship 
between size and leverage. Wald test shows that by 
‘ad hoc’ comparison, TOT has more explanatory 
power than POT.   
Sabiwalsky 
(2010) 
22,333 firm-years samples 
over 1991 to 2006 
(excluding financial 
sectors). Descriptive 
statistics regarding firm age 
is not specified. 
Compustat 
North America 
Nonlinear 
Structural 
Equation Model 
This study demonstrates that the capital structure is 
converging over time and there is optimal capital 
structure, supporting TOT. 
Mateev et 
al., (2013) 
3175 SMEs with less than 
250 employees in 7 Central 
and Eastern European 
countries over 2001 to 
2005. The average firm age 
of the dataset is 15 years. 
AMADEUS 
database 
Fixed Effect 
GMM Panel 
Data Analysis 
Tangible assets positively related with debt ratio, 
supporting TOT. 
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 Table 2-3: Empirical Studies of Both POT and TOT in Small Business Capital Structure 
Authors Samples Data Source Analysis Methods Summary of findings 
Serrasqueiro 
and Nunes 
(2012) 
495 young SMEs (less than 10 
years old) and 1350 old 
(otherwise) SMEs during 1999 
to 2006 in Portugal. SME 
selection criteria should meet 
two of the following 
conditions: 1) less than 250 
employees; 2) annual balance 
sheet no more than 43 million 
euros; 3) turnover no more 
than 50 million euros. The 
average ages for young firm 
group, old firm group or total 
samples are 5.34 years, 22.37 
years and 18.19 years 
respectively. 
SABI database 
by Bureau van 
Dijk 
Panel Data 
GMM with 
Heckman 
Selection 
Young firms are more likely to follow POT 
because of the information opaque problem while 
old firms are more likely to follow dynamic TOT.  
Newman et 
al. (2010) 
1539 SMEs during 2004 to 
2005 in Zhejiang Province, 
China. The average firm age 
of the dataset is 4.3 years. 
Zhejiang 
Provincial 
Statistics 
Bureau, China 
Cross-sectional 
OLS 
Negative relationship between total (or short) 
leverage and profitability (supporting POT); 
positive between total (or short) leverage and size 
(supporting TOT). 
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Complementary to TOT, researchers may also consider agency cost – Agency 
Cost Hypothesis (AT). AT was initially developed by Jenson and Meckling (1976), 
where the conflicts between the managers and shareholders. With the strong 
monitoring of the debt holders if the debt usage is high, the managers are less likely 
to abuse the debt investment for their own interest. Higher debt ratio reduces the 
agency costs derived from the conflicts between managers and shareholders (Kayo 
and Kimura, 2011). However, the conflicts between debtors and creditors also exist. 
It means, with a higher debt ratio, the risks of the firms shift to the creditors. The 
bankruptcy cost of the firm arises to compensate the default risks which have shifted 
to the creditors. Therefore, firms with heavier financial leverage are hard to increase 
the debt usage (Berger and di Patti, 2006; Jenson and Meckling, 1976).  
Due to the fact that 90% of small businesses are owner-managed (SSBF, 
1998 and 2003), the conflict between mangers and shareholders is not a major issue 
among small business sector. 
 
2.2.1.3 Firm’s financing life cycle 
Recent studies ascertain that the financial needs, the availability and cost of 
financing vary throughout the firm’s entire financing life cycle due to the nature of 
different stages of a firm’s financial life cycle (La Rocca et al., 2011). According to 
POT, the degree of information opacity changes during the firm’s entire financial life 
cycle. In particular, at the mature stage, firms are able to generate an internal source 
of finance, such as retained earnings, and they grow with relatively lower speed 
reflecting a decrease in their financial needs. Moreover, the risks decrease at the 
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mature stage. As a consequence, the need for external debt decreases as the firms get 
older (Berger and Udell, 1998; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004), which is 
conceptualized as the reverse financial life cycle effect (Hamilton and Fox, 1998). 
Moreover, according to the signalling theory, young firms are willing to get 
recognition by submitting themselves to the banks for monitoring, because they have 
few ways to signal their creditworthiness. As they get mature firms gain a track 
record of quality and creditworthiness, and therefore banks’ monitoring becomes 
secondary, which is viewed as the reputational searching effect (Diamond, 1991). 
 
2.2.2 Relationship lending and borrowing cost 
2.2.2.1 Favourable effect of relationship banking 
Cost of finance is an important factor that a small business has to consider 
when raising finance, and the cost of finance increases with the degree of asymmetric 
information problem (Mateev et al., 2013). It has been found that the information 
problem could be alleviated by relationship lending, which is favourable for both 
banks and small business borrowers. Firstly, relationship banking reduces the 
marginal information collection costs and the transaction costs to alleviate the 
information problem for banks (Liu et al., 2011; Peltoniemi, 2007). Secondly, 
relationship banking increases the flexibility of a loan contract (Boot, 2000) and the 
availability of finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). It mitigates the credit rationing 
problem even during financial crisis (Cotugno et al, 2013). Thirdly, relationship 
lending encourages banks to conduct closer supervision of the borrower’s 
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activities,and therefore, the risks of moral hazard can be reduced (Hernández-
Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2006). By theoretical modelling, Yosha (1995) 
suggests that keeping exclusive and strong relationships with banks could effectively 
reduce the probability that the inner confidential information of small businesses 
could be transferred to competitors. Relationship banking could even reduce the new 
business bankruptcies (Ogane, 2016). The favourable effects of relationship lending 
have been found by Berger and Udell (1995), Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), 
Bodenhorn (2003), Elsas (2005), Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano (2006), 
Peltoniemi (2007), Fidrmuc et al (2015), Kysucky and Norden (2015) and Petersen 
and Rajan (1994), from various perspectives.  
Asymmetric information plays an important role in the determination of 
financial leverage, according to POT (Fama and French, 2005) and informationally 
more transparent firms could obtain more favourable terms of credit (Diamond, 
1989; Myers, 1984; Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2012). Relationship lending could 
alleviate the degree of asymmetric information and hence reduce the probability of 
pledging collateral, the possibility of being financially constrained, the risk of 
unwarranted bankruptcy, the probability of business failure and credit risks (Boot 
and Thakor, 1994; Ferri et al., 2001; Gómez-González and Reyes, 2011). Therefore, 
relationship banking, as an effective way to overcome the asymmetric information 
problem, would have an impact on small business capital structure decisions. As 
relationship lending reduces the asymmetric information problem and the agency 
conflicts between small business owners and debtors, firms would benefit from debt 
finance being more available and at lower cost.  
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2.2.2.2 Unfavourablee effect of relationship banking 
It has been argued that as the banking relationship develops, a ‘hold-up’ 
effect may emerge, that is, banks may extract extra rents from the borrowers because 
of their position of monopoly regarding information acquisition. Theoretically, 
Sharpe (1990) has developed a mathematical model outlining such ‘hold-up’ 
problems. The model illustrates that the relational banks have more monopoly power 
in terms of information acquisition comparing with a transactional lender. Rajan 
(1992) has also developed a theoretical model to predict the hold-up effect of 
relationship lending. The model suggests that the informed bank has the power to 
influence the decision for a continuation project. However, transactional banks have 
no power to control a continuation project. For a small business, keeping multiple 
sources of external finance may help to get rid of the monopoly power from the 
informed bank. 
Empirically, Farinha and Santos (2002) have detected that firms may be 
concerned about a hold-up problem and tend to find a second source of finance to 
solve this problem. Bharath et al. (2007) indicate that from the view of the lender, as 
the borrower–lender relationship gets stronger, the lender can earn more benefits 
from this relationship. Degryse and Cayseele (2000) investigated 17,429 loans from a 
Belgian bank and they found the loan interest increases as the borrower–lender 
relationship gets longer. Such theoretical work and empirical evidence suggests that 
the hold-up problem may exist in the borrower–lender relationship, and keeping 
multiple sources of finance may be a solution to such an effect. 
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2.2.3 Summary of the literature review 
Different from large firms, small firms are more informationally opaque, 
which increases the cost of borrowing. Small firms are usually owner-managed and 
the existing shareholders of the small firms are less willing to issue external equity in 
order not to lose control of the firm (Berger and Udell, 1998). Therefore, small firms 
rely more heavily on debts for external finance and a lower cost of borrowing 
increases the use of debts by small firms. As discussed, a banking relationship may 
affect the borrowing cost beneficially or detrimentally – this is still pending further 
investigation. Similarly, the impact of the banking market on capital structure is 
blurred and it is aimed to investigate such an impact in a later section of this chapter.
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2.3 Data, Variables and Research Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
The empirical data used in this chapter is from the Survey of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF) 1998 and 2003, conducted by the USFederal Reserve, which aims 
to investigate the financial issues of small businesses throughout the United States. 
The survey collects information from randomly selected samples from Dun & 
Bradstreet that have fewer than 500 employees7 and the sample size is 4,240 in 2003, 
3,561 in 1998.8 Therefore, there are 7,801 samples in the pooled database. The SSBF 
data is superior because, first, it provides a representative overview of U..S small 
business finance in the US; second, it is comprehensive, offering information on the 
identification of local banking structures as well as banking relationship 
characteristics. Since SSBF data is cross-sectional, it is not possible to catch the 
dynamics of capital structure adjustment over time. However, the nature of cross-
sectional data could eliminate survival selection bias, which may occur when panel 
data is adopted, since small firms suffer from a high failure rate (Monk, 2000). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Please see the survey methodology report for more detailed information on sampling. 
8 Since SSBF 1987 and 1993 do not report the banking market concentration in detailed classification 
(competitive, moderately concentrated, highly concentrated banking market), as well as the D&B 
credit scores, I have adopted SSBF 1998 and 2003 only. 
95 
 
2.3.2 Dependent variables 
              To investigate capital structure, Rajan and Zingales (1995) have suggested 
three measurements of leverage that could be used in the empirical analysis, as 
summarized in Table 2-4.  
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    Table 2-4: Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Measurements of 
Capital Structure 
Leverage Advantages Disadvantages 
Ratio of Total 
Liabilities to Total 
Assets (Toliabratio) 
Broadest definition 
This may overstate the level of 
leverage and could be easily 
influenced by transaction items 
other than financing, such as 
accounts payable. 
Ratio of Debt (short-
term debt plus long-
term debt) to Total 
Assets (Rdta) 
More appropriate than 
Toliabratio (only if 
trade credit is not 
treated as financing 
method) 
Some assets might not be 
reflected, e.g. trade credit may 
decrease the amount of debt by 
using Rdta for firms with trade 
credit, and leverage will be 
understated. 
Ratio of Total Debt 
to Net Assets 
(Rdtna)  
This cannot be affected 
by trade credit 
This could be affected by other 
items irrelevant to finance, e.g. 
assets held against pension 
liabilities. It may understate 
leverage. 
Source: Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
In the existing empirical studies, Alderson and Betker (1995), Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) and Mueller (2008) use Toliabratio; whilst, Fischer et al., (1989) 
use the ratio of total liabilities to total liabilities plus market value of equity as the 
measurement of leverage. In the following empirical analysis, I measure the financial 
leverage by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Toliabratio). Moreover, to 
investigate the long-term liabilities, I follow Jackling and Johl (2009) and use the 
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ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets (Nocuratio) as a measure of capital 
structure, reflecting the firm’s long-run solvency (Wang et al., 2007). For 
comparison, I also employ the ratio of current liabilities to total assets (Shtratio), 
reflecting the firms’ short-term financial leverage. 
A variable ‘Finrisks’, measuring the level of financial risks, has been 
constructed according to the categorical proxies of the D&B score reported by 
SSBF98 and SSBF03. The firms within the top two least risky categories in SSBF98 
and SSBF03 are coded 1; while the firms within the top two most risky categories in 
SSBF98 and SSBF03 are coded 3; all of the rest of the firms ranked in the middle in 
SSBF98 and SSBF03 in terms of credit risks are coded as 2.  ‘Finrisks’ could be 
viewed as a proxy to measure the likelihood of being financially distressed.  The 
definitions of all of the dependent variables are listed in Table 2-5. 
 
Table 2-5: Dependent Variables – Measures of Capital Structure 
Dependent 
Variables Definition Purpose 
Toliabratio Total Liabilities / Total Assets A proxy suitable to limited 
information disclosure firms when 
debt ratio is not available (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1991). 
Nocuratio Non-current Liabilities / Total 
Assets 
A proxy of long-term ratio between 
liabilities and assets, reducing the 
transactional effects. 
 Shtratio Short-term Liabilities / Total 
Assets 
Reflects short-term financial 
leverage. 
Finrisks According to D&B score, firms 
are categorized by 3 layers: 1 as 
least risky firms and 3 as most 
risky firms 
To measure the firms’ financial 
risk. 
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The summary statistics for the dependent variables are reported in Table 2-6 
in the later sessions: total liabilities weight 67% of the total assets, while the ratios 
for long-term liabilities and short-term liabilities are 57% and 20%, respectively. The 
mean value of Finrisks  is 1.89, indicating firms are overall in a relatively less risky 
position. There are 23.70% of the firms ranked as most financially risky. 
 
2.3.3 Empirical approaches 
In order to investigate the impacts of relationship banking and banking 
market conditions on the capital structure decision of small businesses, the empirical 
model is set based on Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) model, since it is highly relevant 
to firms’ capital structure with regards to relationship banking theories. Banking 
relationship characteristics and local banking market characteristics as well as the 
demographic characteristics of small businesses (Ozkan, 2001) and their owners 
(Storey, 1994) are included: 
            Capital Structure (Toliabratioi) = α0+α1×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1𝑖) + 
α2×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2𝑖) + α3× control variables (𝑋3𝑖) 
+ɛi                                                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-1-A) 
Capital Structure (Nocuratioi) = α0+α1×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1𝑖) + 
α2×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2𝑖) + α3× control variables (𝑋3𝑖) 
+ɛi                                                                                       ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-1-B) 
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Capital Structure (Shtratioi) = α0+α1×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1𝑖 ) + 
α2×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2𝑖) + α3× control variables (𝑋3𝑖) 
+ɛi                                                                                      
                                                                            ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-1-C) 
where X1 in equation (2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-C) indicates the relationship 
characteristics variables, X2 in equation (2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-C) indicates the 
banking market concentration characteristics variables and X3 in equation (2-1-A), 
(2-1-B) and (2-1-C) indicates the control variables. ɛ stands for an error term, α0 is 
the constant term. “i” indicates the “ith”observation (firm observation). The 
dependent variables for equation (2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-C) are ‘Toliabratio’, 
‘Nocuratio’ and ‘Shtratio’ respectively.  
In the capital structure literatures, there are a variety of firm and owner 
characteristics determinants found which could affect the firms’ capital structure 
decisions, including firm size (Ozkan, 2001), firm age (La Rocca et al, 2011), 
profitability (Ozkan, 2001), non-debt tax shield (Ozkan, 2001), firm’s ownership 
characteristics (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010), family business characteristics 
(Romano et al, 2001), gender of the owners (Cole, 2013), educational background of 
the owners (Robb and Robinson, 2014), type of the firm (Robb and Robinson, 2014), 
firm’s delinquent record in history (Cole, 2013) and whether the firm is a start-up or 
not (La Rocca et al, 2011). Accordingly, all of the corresponding variables describing 
the above characteristics are considered into the set of firm and owner characteristics 
variables in the analysis. It is also believed that banking relationship characteristics 
and banking market conditions could affect the costs and availability of external 
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finance for small firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The nature of banking 
relationship, could be measured by the length of banking relationship and total 
number of ties of banking relationship (Iturralde et al, 2010). The costs and 
availability of external finance for small business are also affected by the type of 
relational financial institution (DeYoung et al, 2004) and banking market 
concentration (measured by Herfindahl Index) (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In 
particular, as the thesis focuses on the interaction between banking relationships and 
banking market conditions, the interaction terms are constructed following Han et al 
(2009a). The interaction term is specialized to ensure both of the individual terms 
could work together to influence the dependent variable. 
Because of the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, the optimality of capital 
structure by a dynamic adjusting model could not be easily adopted (Ozkan, 2001). 
As a result, I adopt a financial risks model to distinguish the beneficial or detrimental 
effect brought by the same set of independent variables as in the equation (2-1-A), 
(2-1-B) and (2-1-C) on firms’ financial risks. The dependent variable of financial 
risks model is Finrisks. By considering the capital structure model and financial risks 
model together, certain beneficial effects, e.g. an increase of financial leverage with a 
decrease of financial risks for a small firm, implicates that a firm could be able to 
receive more tax shield benefits without increasing financial distress costs.  
Therefore, the financial risks model is constructed as follows: 
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Ordered Probit (Yi’) = α0’+α1’×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1i) + 
α2
’×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2𝑖) + α3’× control variables 
(𝑋3𝑖) +ɛ’   
                                              ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-2) 
In equation (2-2), Y’ here denotes the dependent variable – ‘Finrisks’. “i” 
indicates the “ith”observation (firm observation). 
Ordered probit models are selected as the dependent variable, ‘Finrisks’, has 
only 3 ranked values – ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ – in recording. Therefore, OLS could not be 
applied for such a dependent variable as OLS works for continuous variable. In 
Ordered Probit Models, it is assumed that there is a latent continuous variable, ‘Y*’,  
Yi* = α0’+α1’×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1i ) + α2’×Banking Market 
Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2𝑖) + α3’× control variables (𝑋3𝑖) +ɛ’ 
                                              ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-3) 
‘Y*’ could be any value from negative indefinite to positive indefinite. “i” 
indicates the “ith”observation (firm observation). In this way, Y* could be 
transformed to Y by using standard normal cumulative density function – F().  ‘F()’ 
is defined as follows:  
F(Y*) = ∫ 𝑒
−
𝑥
2
√2𝜋
𝑌∗
−∞
 dx 
                                              ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-4) 
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Assume P[y=γ] which indicates the probability for y being the value of γ 
and xiβ indicates ‘α0’+α1’×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1𝑖) + α2’×Banking Market 
Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2𝑖) + α3’× control variables (𝑋3𝑖)’. Therefore, the 
probabilities for Y to be 1, 2, 3 respectively would be as follows (suppose the terms 
are standardized): 
P[Y=1] = P[Y*≤μ1] = P[xiβ + ɛ’≤ μ1] = P[ɛ’≤ μ1- xiβ] = F(μ1- xiβ) 
                                              ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-5) 
P[Y=2] = P[μ1<Y*≤μ2] = P[μ1<xiβ + ɛ’≤ μ2] = P[μ1- xiβ <ɛ’≤ μ2- xiβ] = 
F(μ2- xiβ) - F(μ1- xiβ) 
                                              ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-6) 
P[Y=3] = P[Y*>μ2] = 1-P[xiβ + ɛ’≤ μ2] = 1-P[ɛ’≤ μ2- xiβ] = 1 - F(μ2- xiβ) 
                                              ….……………………….……..Eq. (2-7) 
For the estimation of the model, maximum likelihood estimation has been 
employed (Greene, 2003).  
Overall, the findings will be drawn by the comparison between the analysis 
results for Model [(2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-C)] and (2-2). In particular, the 
following issues will be highlighted. 
a) By comparing Model [(2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-C)] and (2-2), a net 
beneficial or detrimental effect of a certain independent variable could 
be captured as follows: a decrease in financial leverage in Model [(2-
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1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-C)] and an increase in financial risks in Model 
(2-2): strong detrimental effect, as the firm receives less tax shield 
benefits and suffers from more financial risks.  
b) A decrease in financial leverage in Model [(2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-
C)] and a decrease in financial risks in Model (2-2): net effect not 
clear. 
c) An increase in financial leverage in Model [(2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-
C)] and a decrease in financial risks in Model (2-2): strong beneficial 
effect, as the firm receives more tax shield benefits and it is exposed 
to less severe financial risks. 
d) An increase in financial leverage in Model [(2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-
C)] and an increase in financial risks in Model (2-2): net effect not 
clear. 
 
2.3.4 Independent variables 
In the capital structure literatures, there are a variety of firm and owner 
characteristics determinants found which could affect the firms’ capital structure 
decisions, including firm size (Ozkan, 2001), firm age (La Rocca et al, 2011), 
profitability (Ozkan, 2001), non-debt tax shield (Ozkan, 2001), firm’s ownership 
characteristics (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010), family business characteristics 
(Romano et al, 2001), gender of the owners (Cole, 2013), educational background of 
the owners (Robb and Robinson, 2014), type of the firm (Robb and Robinson, 2014), 
firm’s delinquent record in history (Cole, 2013) and whether the firm is a start-up or 
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not (La Rocca et al, 2011). Accordingly, all of the corresponding variables describing 
the above characteristics are considered into the set of firm and owner characteristics 
variables in the analysis. It is also believed that banking relationship characteristics 
and banking market conditions could affect the costs and availability of external 
finance for small firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The nature of banking 
relationship, could be measured by the length of banking relationship and total 
number of ties of banking relationship (Iturralde et al, 2010). The costs and 
availability of external finance for small business are also affected by the type of 
relational financial institution (DeYoung et al, 2004) and banking market 
concentration (measured by Herfindahl Index) (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In 
particular, as the thesis focuses on the interaction between banking relationships and 
banking market conditions, the interaction terms are constructed following Han et al 
(2009a). In line with this, variables regarding the characteristics of the firms and their 
owners, banking relationship and local banking market concentration have been 
selected and reported in Table 2-6, with definitions and summary statistics given. 
Not reported are control variables, including industry (SIC), region and year of 
survey dummies. 
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Table 2-6: Definition of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 Definition Obs Mean Median Std. Min Max 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Dependent Variables 
       Toliabratio* Total Liabilities/Total Assets 7650 0.67 0.41 0.87 0.00 3.36 0.06 0.87 
Nocuratio* Non-current Liabilities/Total Assets 7650 0.57 0.31 0.75 0.00 2.96 0.02 0.77 
Shtratio* Short-term Liabilities/Total Assets 7650 0.20 0.07 0.29 0.00 1.05 0.00 0.28 
Finrisks Financial Risks score 7772 1.89 2.00 0.76 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 
Independent Variables 
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Firmsize Ln(1+ total number of employees) 7798 2.29 1.79 1.40 0.69 6.19 1.10 3.33 
Firmage Firm age in years 7801 15.54 13.00 12.28 0.00 104.00 6.00 22.00 
Indprofits Industry normalized (profits / total assets)2 7497 -0.86E3 -0.29E3 -2.94E3 -0.02 2.33E3 -0.68E3 -0.03E3 
Depratio Firm’s depreciation: depreciation/total assets 7794 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.51 
Ownermag =1 if owner managed; 0 otherwise 7742 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Family =1 if the firm is family controlled; 0 otherwise 7801 0.84 1.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Female =1 if the firm is woman-owner controlled; 0 otherwise 7742 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Eduba 
=1 if the firm is controlled by the owners with bachelor degree 
educational background or above; 0 otherwise 7742 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Corporat = 1if a firm is a corporation; 0 otherwise 7769 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Bankrupt =1 if a firm declares bankruptcy history within 7 years; 0 otherwise 7801 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Startup = 1if a firm is aged younger than 2 years; 0 otherwise 7801 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
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Relationship Characteristics         
Length Length of banking relationship in years 7600 9.81 6.00 9.72 0.00 95.99 3.00 14.00 
Logprimdist Ln(1+ distance to the primary financial institution in miles) 7600 1.50 1.10 1.37 0.00 8.09 0.69 2.08 
Primebank =1if the primary financial institution is a bank; 0 otherwise 7600 0.85 1.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Numrlat 
Number of financial institutions from which a firm obtains financial 
services and products 7801 2.59 2.00 1.82 0.00 20.00 1.00 3.00 
Banking Market Characteristics         
HHIL = 1if a firm locates in a competitive banking market; 0 otherwise. 
3 7800 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
HHIM 
= 1if a firm locates in a moderately concentrated banking market; 0 
otherwise. 3 7800 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
HHIH = 1if a firm locates in a highly concentrated; 0 otherwise. 
3 7800 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Interactions         
HHILlength HHIL* length of relationship 7599 0.63 0.00 3.56 0.00 57.03 0.00 0.00 
HHIMlength HHIM* length of relationship 7599 4.07 0.00 7.62 0.00 95.99 0.00 5.00 
HHIHlength HHIH* length of relationship 7599 5.10 0.17 8.78 0.00 81.78 0.00 6.98 
HHILfage HHIL*length of relationship 7800 0.96 0.00 4.95 0.00 103.00 0.00 0.00 
HHIMfage HHIM*length of relationship 7800 6.65 0.00 11.00 0.00 104.00 0.00 10.00 
HHIHfage HHIH*length of relationship  7800 7.93 1.00 11.78 0.00 100.00 0.00 13.00 
 
1 Not reported here, but available from the author, are industry dummies based on 2-digit SIC, regional dummies and year dummies. 
2 Following Han et al. (2009b), we normalize the ROA (R) by industry and year. We define the industry normalized ratios (R′) as 𝑅′𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 - 1𝑁𝑗,𝑡 
∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)𝑁𝑗,𝑡𝑖=1 , where j indicates sector, i indicates the individual firm, t indicates year. 
3 A competitive banking market is defined as the market with a Herfindahl Index lower than 1000. A moderately concentrated banking market is defined as 
a market with a Herfindahl Index of between 1000 and 1800. A concentrated banking market is the market with a Herfindahl Index higher than 1800. 
* denotes that the corresponding variables are winsorized at 5th/95th percentile to deal with outlier problem following Chen and Chen (2012).
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2.3.5 Correlation matrices 
Correlation matrices for the continuous variables and categorical variables are 
listed in Tables 2-7 and 2-89. Multicollinearity problem may not be of any concern 
since most correlation coefficients are not higher than 0.310. 
 
                                                 
9 Pearson’s correlation coefficient and Spearman correlation coefficient are widely accepted as the 
measurements of correlations. Correlation is calculated by the covariance between the two variables 
divided by the standard deviation of both of two variables. Pearson’s correlation focuses on the value 
while Spearman correlation works on the ranks of the corresponding variables. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients work better for the continuous variables while Spearman correlation coefficients are 
applied better for the binary variables or non-normally distributed variables (Eisinga et al, 2013). 
Therefore, following Han (2009b), I have separated the variables into two groups – continuous 
variables and discrete variables. For the continuous variables, I report the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients while for discrete variables in Table 2-7, I present the Spearman correlation coefficients 
in Table 2-8. 
10 The only exceptions include the correlation between firm size and number of banking relationships, 
and firm age and length of banking relationships. However, the VIF value reported in the later session 
do not indicate a multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 2-7: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for Continuous Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Toliabratio 1.00             
2 Nocuratio 0.96*** 1.00            
3 Shtratio 0.56*** 0.43***11 1.00           
4 Firmsize 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.19*** 1.00          
5 Firmage -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.03** 0.26*** 1.00         
6 Indprofits 0.00 -0.01 -0.03** 0.01 -0.02 1.00        
7 Depratio 0.00 0.02 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.06*** 1.00       
8 Length -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.05*** 0.09*** 0.44*** 0.03*** -0.02* 1.00      
9 Logprimdist 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.10*** -0.02 -0.02* 0.03** -0.10*** 1.00     
10 numrlat 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.47*** 0.09*** 0.02* 0.05*** 0.01 0.15*** 1.00    
11 HHILlength -0.01 -0.02* 0.00 0.03*** 0.10*** 0.01 -0.02 0.20*** -0.01 0.00 1.00   
12 HHIMlength -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02** 0.06*** 0.20*** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.47*** -0.04*** 0.02 -0.09*** 1.00  
13 HHIHlength -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03*** 0.04*** 0.27*** 0.03** 0.02 0.62*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.10*** -0.31*** 1.00 
(‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively). 
                                                 
11  The value is 0.43 because of the following reasons. Firstly, Nocuratio measures ‘non-current Liabilities/Total Assets’ while Shtratio describes ‘short-term 
Liabilities/Total Assets’. They focus on different aspects. In particular, Nocuratio is more inclined for long-term liabilities while Shtratio describes short-term liabilities. 
Therefore, the correlation between them is not high. Secondly, the winsorization has been taken individually for each variable and in this way, the outlier effects are 
controlled. For the observations which are winsorized, the connections between Nocuratio and Shratio become weak. Thirdly, the SSBF data was collected from small 
businesses. For small businesses, the accuracy of the financial statements might be as high as those from listed companies. Some of the data collected from the survey 
might be based on estimation for the small business. 
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Table 2-8: Spearman Correlation Matrix for Categorical Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Finrisks 1.00            
2 Corporat -0.09*** 1.00           
3 Startup 0.13*** -0.07*** 1.00          
4 Ownermag 0.02* -0.12*** 0.03** 1.00         
5 Bankrupt 0.08*** -0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03** 1.00        
6 Family 0.01 -0.17*** -0.02* 0.08*** 0.01 1.00       
7 Female 0.02* -0.09*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02 0.12*** 1.00      
8 Eduba -0.02 0.10*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 1.00     
9 Primbank -0.04*** 0.11*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.04*** 1.00    
10 HHIL -0.01 0.03*** 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02* 0.03** 0.03** 1.00   
11 HHIM 0.02** 0.01 0.00 -0.02* -0.02 0.00 -0.02* 0.05*** 0.03** -0.22*** 1.00  
12 HHIH -0.02* -0.03** 0.00 0.01 0.02** 0.00 0.03** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.25*** -0.89*** 1.00 
(‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively). 
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2.3.6 Univariate statistics 
From the results in Table 2-9, it is clearly shown that firms characterized as 
risky, manager managed, family business, male owner, owner with better education, 
in the form of a corporation, start-up, located in a less concentrated banking markets 
are more heavily financially leveraged.  
The univariate test shows that, firms in the form of corporation, with a 
separation of management and ownership, or owned by a family, are characterized 
by higher total/long-term/short-term financial leverage. These three characteristics 
are concerned with better informational transparency in terms of corporate 
governance. However, when firms are newly founded or even have a history of 
bankruptcy, they employ higher total/long-term/short-term financial leverage as well.  
The univariate test also shows that demographic characteristics of the owners 
may affect firms’ short-term financial leverage only: female owners or the owners 
with a weak educational background may take on a lower level of short-term 
financial leverage, reflecting their attitudes towards the liquidity risks. Although the 
character of the relational financial institution has no impact on the overall financial 
leverage, it is found that if the relational financial institution is a bank, firms might 
be able to take on more short-term debt while they use long-term debt less often. 
Banking market conditions do affect the financial leverage for small firms. The 
overall financial leverage would be higher in a competitive banking market while 
being lower in a concentrated banking market. Both long-term and short-term 
financial leverage are higher in a concentrated banking market.  
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Table 2-9: Univariate Statistics (Testing Variable Grouped by Dichotomous Variables) 
Panel A: Testing Variable - 
Toliabratio 
 
Panel B: Testing Variable - 
Nocuratio  
Panel C: Testing Variable - 
Shtratio 
Grouping 
Variable 
(X) 
Mean 
Value 
for 
Group
A  
(X=0) 
Mean 
Value 
for 
Group 
B  
(X=1) 
Differenc
e 
between 
the two 
groups 
 
Grouping 
Variable 
(X) 
Mean 
Value 
for 
Group 
A  
(X=0) 
Mean 
Value 
for 
Group 
B  
(X=1) 
Differen
ce 
between 
the two 
groups 
 
Grouping 
Variable 
(X) 
Mean 
Value 
for 
Group 
A  
(X=0) 
Mean 
Value 
for 
Group B  
(X=1) 
Differen
ce 
between 
the two 
groups 
Corporat 0.54 0.77 -0.23***  Corporat 0.47 0.65 -0.18***  Corporat 0.14 0.25 -0.11*** 
Startup 0.66 0.84 -0.18***  Startup 0.56 0.74 -0.18***  Startup 0.20 0.18 0.02 
Ownermag 0.74 0.66 0.07**  Ownermag 0.62 0.57 0.05*  Ownermag 0.25 0.19 0.06*** 
Bankrupt 0.67 0.82 -0.15**  Bankrupt 0.57 0.69 -0.12**  Bankrupt 0.20 0.23 -0.03 
Family 0.76 0.65 0.11***  Family 0.62 0.56 0.06***  Family 0.26 0.19 0.07*** 
Female 0.67 0.66 0.01  Female 0.57 0.57 0.00  Female 0.21 0.18 0.03*** 
Eduba 0.66 0.68 -0.01  Eduba 0.57 0.57 0.00  Eduba 0.19 0.21 -0.01* 
Primbank 0.71 0.68 0.03  Primbank 0.61 0.57 0.04*  Primbank 0.18 0.21 -0.03*** 
HHIL 0.67 0.76 -0.09**  HHIL 0.57 0.63 -0.06*  HHIL 0.20 0.22 -0.03* 
HHIM 0.67 0.68 -0.01  HHIM 0.56 0.58 -0.01  HHIM 0.20 0.20 -0.00 
HHIH 0.69 0.66 0.03*  HHIH 0.58 0.56 0.03  HHIH 0.20 0.20 0.01 
(Panel A, B and C present the univariate statistics for the 3 dependent variables respectively - Toliabratio, Nocuratio and Shtratio. In each row in 
the individual Panel, all of the observations are grouped in two by each corresponding grouping variable (X) in the same row. The observations are 
grouped in Group A if the corresponding grouping variable (X) in the same row is valued as 0. The observations are grouped in Group B if the 
corresponding grouping variable (X) in the same row is valued as 1. The mean value of the corresponding dependent variable in Group A(B) is presented 
in the cell in Group A(B) column. The difference value between the two groups is reported in the column on the right in each panel. All of the grouping 
variables are dichotomous variables. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.) 
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2.3.7 Main empirical results 
2.3.7.1 Determinants of capital structure 
The determinants of the total/long-term/short-term capital structure for the 
US small businesses are presented in Table 2-10, identifying the relationships 
between capital structure and a set of explanatory variables. The full samples from 
SSBF98 and SSBF03 have been included. The dependent variables for the four 
models in Table 2-10 are Toliabratio, Nocuratio, Shtratio and Finrisks, respectively. 
OLS has been applied in Model 1 to Model 3 while an ordered probit model has been 
employed in Model 4. Variance inflation factor (VIF) has been chased. The VIFs for 
HHIM and HHIH are 5.21 and 5.12 respectively. Given any other variables, the VIFs 
are below 5, indicating the non-existence of multicollinearity problems (Hadad et al., 
2011). Overall, the R-squares are relatively low but at an acceptable level. For the 
research on small business finance, due to the large variation of the data in small 
business finance sector, sometimes the R-squares are lower than large firms. For 
example, to investigate the costs and the availability of trade credit by the dataset of 
SSBF, the R-squares of the models tested by Giannetti et al (2011) range from 0.01 
to 0.06 in general. This could be applied to the models in later sections. 
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Table 2-10: Determinants of Capital Structure 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of capital structure (Models 1 to 3) 
and financial risks (Model 4). OLS regressions12 are employed in Model 1 to Model 3. 
Ordered probit model is applied for Model 4. Control variables including industrial and 
regional dummies are not reported in the table. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ stand for the confidence level 
of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The diagnostic F or Chi2 statistics are reported and they 
indicate the good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors have been used.) 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 413 
Dependent Variables Toliabratio Nocuratio Shtratio Finrisks 
Constant 0.7822
*** 
(0.0779) 
0.6225*** 
(0.0690) 
0.2397*** 
(0.0260)  
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2003 Year Dummy -0.1062
*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0864*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.1339*** 
(0.0295) 
Firm and Owner Characters     
Firmsize -0.0217
** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0315*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0004 
(0.0134) 
Corporat 0.2203
*** 
(0.0236) 
0.1805*** 
(0.0211) 
0.0675*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.1367*** 
(0.0318) 
Firmage -0.0060
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0126*** 
(0.0014) 
Startup 0.1209
** 
(0.0487) 
0.1130*** 
(0.0428) 
-0.0256* 
(0.0146) 
0.3089*** 
(0.0539) 
Indprofitsx -0.7539 (4.0020) 
-0.9293 
(3.5470) 
1.6805 
(1.4191) 
5.6661 
(6.2419) 
Depratio -0.0127 (0.0352) 
0.0460 
(0.0315) 
-0.1207*** 
(0.0110) 
0.1203*** 
(0.0436) 
Ownermag -0.0468 (0.0311) 
-0.0369 
(0.0275) 
-0.0188* 
(0.0112) 
-0.0170 
(0.0473) 
Bankrupt 0.1714
** 
(0.0786) 
0.1343* 
(0.0696) 
0.0583** 
(0.0253) 
0.4864*** 
(0.0961) 
Family -0.0497
* 
(0.0268) 
-0.0247 
(0.0237) 
-0.0240** 
(0.0097) 
0.0243 
(0.0399) 
Female 0.0204 (0.0231) 
0.0177 
(0.0207) 
-0.0046 
(0.0074) 
-0.0150 
(0.0304) 
Eduba -0.0252 (0.0201) 
-0.0272 
(0.0179) 
-0.0090 
(0.0068) 
-0.0329 
(0.0278) 
Relationship Characters     
                                                 
12 Tobit regressions have been applied as well. The signs, significance of the coefficients of the key 
variables are all the same for the listed key variables. Results not reported but available on requests. 
13 The two cuts for the Ordered Probit model are -0.6719 and 0.4796 respectively; the standard 
deviations for these two cuts are 0.1065 and 0.1062 respectively. 
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Length -0.0031
*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0072*** 
(0.0017) 
Logprimdist 0.0069 (0.0075) 
0.0063 
(0.0068) 
-0.0002 
(0.0026) 
0.0112 
(0.0103) 
Primebank 0.0112 (0.0302) 
0.0048 
(0.0269) 
0.0177* 
(0.0095) 
-0.0207 
(0.0379) 
Numrlat 0.0615
*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0581*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0088*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0158* 
(0.0085) 
Banking Market Characters     
HHIM -0.1021
** 
(0.0460) 
-0.0728* 
(0.0409) 
-0.0294** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0573 
(0.0598) 
HHIH -0.1392
*** 
(0.0457) 
-0.1102*** 
(0.0406) 
-0.0336** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0989* 
(0.0599) 
Obs 7,267 7,267 7,267 7,239 
F-Statistics 15.54*** 15.25*** 26.44***  
Chi2 Statistics    515.12*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 
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A) Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Certain variables are easily recognized as having a beneficial or detrimental effect on 
small businesses. As reported in Model 1 to Model 3 in Table 2-10, corporations have a 
significantly higher debt ratio, while Model 4 shows that the financial distress risks are lower 
for corporations. Regarding the corporate governance characteristics, corporations are less 
informationally opaque to the lenders, therefore they enjoy more tax shield benefits with 
lower bankruptcy costs. However, if a firm has any bankruptcy record (Bankrupt), similarly 
to Table 2-10 Model 1 to Model 4, it has greater financial leverage but also higher financial 
risks. Such an increase of financial leverage seems to be an involuntary effect, where firms 
with bankruptcy records have lower financial solvency to reduce the financial leverage and, 
therefore, they are more restricted financially. Such results confirm that simply employing 
financial leverage models and chasing the nature of the relationship between each 
corresponding independent variable and dependent variables (Model 1 to 3) would not be 
sufficient without employing Model 4 simultaneously, to distinguish the beneficial or 
detrimental effect for the independent variables. 
Firm age (Firmage) is negatively relevant to any type of financial leverage (Model 1 
to 3) as well as financial risks (Model 4). The result supports the reverse financial life cycle 
effect and reputational searching effect. On the one hand, small firms would use debt at the 
starting stage and rebalance to reduce the liabilities at the mature stage; on the other hand, as 
predicted by signalling theory, at the start-up stage, young firms like to submit themselves to 
the banks to signal their creditability and at a latter stage, since monitoring by banks is not 
that important to small businesses, debts should be reduced to a lower level (La Rocca et al., 
2011). 
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Family (Family) characteristics are negatively related with total or short-term 
financial leverages (Table 2-10: Models 1 and 3) in line with the findings by Romano et al. 
(2001). According to POT, family business would like to use retained profits first, rather than 
external finance, in order not to lose control of the business (Storey, 1994).  
B) Relationship Characteristics 
As reported in Table 2-10, I have adopted four measurements in description of the 
banking relationship – length of relationship (length), distance between the small business 
and banks (Logprimdist), nature of the relational financial institutions (Primebank), and total 
number of banking relationships (Numrlat) the small businesses own, in consonance with 
Petersen and Rajan’s (1994) model. In general, length of banking relationship and total 
number of banking relationships are statistically significant in all of the four models. 
The results show that small firms with more banking relationship ties are more 
heavily financially leveraged and they are more likely to be financially constrained as well, 
supporting Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano (2006 and 2007). Total number of 
relationships measures the strength of the banking relationship: firms with more banking 
relationship ties develop weaker banking relationships and signal less transparently to each 
individual bank, and therefore for them the agency costs and monitoring costs are higher. 
They are exposed to a higher level of financial risks. 
In terms of length of banking relationship, firstly, Model 4 indicates that as the 
banking relationship lengthens for small firms, the firms’ financial risks decrease. This 
confirms that, different from credit-scoring, financial statement lending and asset-based 
lending, relationship lending is able to transmit ‘soft’ information from the small business to 
the financial institutions. Therefore, a stronger banking relationship enhances the level of 
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informational transparency of the small firms. It enables the banks to save monitoring costs 
and the small business to save signalling costs for its creditworthiness (Boot and Thakor, 
2000; Petersen and Rajan, 1995 ). However, Models 1 to 3 indicate that a longer banking 
relationship decreases the financial leverages, where reverse financial life cycle theories 
apply. Firms borrow at the beginning of the banking relationship and as the banking 
relationship lengthens, firms should be more able to generate retained earnings, which are of 
no cost according to POT, to pay off debts (Hamilton and Fox, 1998). Therefore, as the 
banking relationship develops, small firms decrease financial leverage as a result of the 
reverse financial life cycle effect and they suffer less from financial risks as a result of the 
beneficial effect of the banking relationship. 
C) Banking Market Concentrations 
As indicated in Models 1 to 3, in Table 2-10, in a concentrated banking market, small 
business are leveraged less heavily (total liabilities ratio, long-term liabilities ratio, short-term 
liabilities ratio). Model 4 shows that in a concentrated banking market, small firms are less 
likely to be financially distressed. Such findings, indicates that, firstly, banking market 
concentration decreases the financial risks which supports the theoretical models proposed by 
Petersen and Rajan (1995), Hauswald and Marquez (2006). 
 
2.3.7.2 Determinants of capital structure – models with interaction terms 
In order to better explore the findings from Table 2-10, I have employed a further four 
regression models with interaction terms on banking market concentration and length of 
banking relationship. SCP, RMP and EFS hypotheses apply for common circumstances, 
without preferences on any particular type of banking market conditions, while the 
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Information Hypothesis highlights that the beneficial effect of banking relationship 
particularly better applies in a concentrated banking market. Therefore, by considering the 
interaction terms, it should be possible to test whether there is any amplification of the 
beneficial effect of relationship banking in a concentrated banking market. 
Table 2-11 employs the same data set as Table 2-10. The interaction terms, on 
competitive banking market dummy and length of banking relationships, moderately 
concentrated banking market dummy and length of banking relationships, highly 
concentrated banking market dummy and length of banking relationships, have been 
considered in the regression models. The dependent variables for the four models in Table 2-
11 are Toliabratio, Nocuratio, Shtratio and Finrisks, respectively. OLS has been applied in 
Models 5 to Model 7, while the ordered probit model has been employed in Model 8. The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) has been calculated: the VIFs for HHIM and HHIH are 
10.0014 and 9.98 respectively. For any other variables, the VIFs are below 5, indicating the 
non-existence of multicollinearity problems (Hadad et al., 2011). The R-squares for the 
models are very similar to Table 2-10. The explanations would be the same. 
 
                                                 
14 A VIF lower than 10 indicates no multicollinearity problems (Lu et al, 2015; Pollitte et al, 2015).  
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Table 2-11: Determinants of Capital Structure – with Interaction Terms 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of capital structure (Models 5 to 7) and 
financial risks (Model 8). OLS regressions15 are employed in Models 5 to 7. Ordered probit model is 
applied for Model 8. Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are not reported in 
the table. ‘***’,’**’,’*’ stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The 
diagnostic F-statistics or Chi2 statistics indicates a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are 
adopted.) 
Model Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 816 
Dependent Variables Toliabratio Nocuratio Shtratio Finrisks 
Constant 0.8484*** 
(0.0883) 
0.6892*** 
(0.0785) 
0.2459*** 
(0.0291) 
 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2003 YearDummy -0.1056*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0859*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.049*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.1339*** 
(0.0295) 
Firm and Owner Characters     
Firmsize -0.0214** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0312*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0004 
(0.0135) 
Corporat 0.2201*** 
(0.0236) 
0.1803*** 
(0.0211) 
0.0674*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.1368*** 
(0.0318) 
Firmage -0.0060*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0126*** 
(0.0014) 
Startup 0.1209** 
(0.0487) 
0.1130*** 
(0.0428) 
-0.0256* 
(0.0146) 
0.3088*** 
(0.0539) 
Indprofitsx -0.7840 
(4.0028) 
-0.9572 
(3.5482) 
1.6804 
(1.4196) 
5.6668 
(6.2415) 
Depratio -0.0132 
(0.0352) 
0.0455 
(0.0315) 
-0.1208*** 
(0.0110) 
0.1203*** 
(0.0436) 
Ownermag -0.0465 
(0.0311) 
-0.0366 
(0.0275) 
-0.0188* 
(0.0112) 
-0.0169 
(0.0473) 
Bankrupt 0.1722** 
(0.0786) 
0.1352* 
(0.0696) 
0.0584** 
(0.0253) 
0.4864*** 
(0.0962) 
Family -0.0493* 
(0.0268) 
-0.0243 
(0.0237) 
-0.0240** 
(0.0097) 
0.0243 
(0.0399) 
Female 0.0202 
(0.0231) 
0.0177 
(0.0207) 
-0.0046 
(0.0074) 
-0.0150 
(0.0304) 
Eduba -0.0253 
(0.0201) 
-0.0274 
(0.0179) 
-0.0090 
(0.0068) 
-0.0329 
(0.0278) 
Relationship Characteristics     
                                                 
15 Tobit Regressions have been applied for Model 5, 6 and 7. All of the independent variables in Model 5 (Tobit 
Regression), 6 (Tobit Regression) and 7 (Tobit Regression)  remain the same as in Model 5, 6 and 7. The main 
findings from Tobit regressions are consistent with the findings by OLS regressions. 
16 The two cuts for the Ordered Probit model are -0.6745 and 0.4768 respectively; the standard deviations for 
these two cuts are 0.1176 and 0.1172 respectively. 
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Logprimdist 0.0069 
(0.0075) 
0.0063 
(0.0068) 
-0.0002 
(0.0026) 
0.0112 
(0.0103) 
Primebank 0.0105 
(0.0302) 
0.0041 
(0.0269) 
0.0177* 
(0.0095) 
-0.0207 
(0.0379) 
Numrlat 0.0614*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0580*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0088*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0158* 
(0.0085) 
Banking Market Characteristics     
HHIM -0.1696*** 
(0.0653) 
-0.1400** 
(0.0586) 
-0.0348* 
(0.0206) 
-0.0596 
(0.0829) 
HHIH -0.2135*** 
(0.0646) 
-0.1857*** 
(0.0579) 
-0.0413** 
(0.0204) 
-0.1022 
(0.0824) 
Interaction Terms     
HHILlength -0.0093
*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0093*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0013 
(0.0010) 
-0.0074 
(0.0058) 
HHIMlength -0.0030
* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0008 
(0.0005) 
-0.0072*** 
(0.0026) 
HHIHlength -0.0023
* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0022* 
(0.0011) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
-0.0071*** 
(0.0022) 
Obs 7,267 7,267 7,267 7,239 
F-Statistics 14.80*** 14.62*** 24.94***  
Chi2 Statistics    515.26*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 
 
Firstly, in Model 8 in Table 2-11, the significantly negative coefficients of 
HHIMlength and  HHIHlength indicate that as the length of banking relationship increases, 
small firms in a moderately concentrated banking market and highly concentrated banking 
market are exposed to a lower level of financial risks. Such findings confirm the beneficial 
effect of a banking relationship, while no benefits of banking relationships have been found 
in a competitive banking market. The findings are consistent with the predictions of the 
Information Hypothesis (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995), particularly from the 
insignificance of the coefficient of HHILlength and the significance of the coefficients of 
HHIMlength and HHIHlength.  
Secondly, Model 7 in Table 2-11 shows that none of the banking relationship–
banking market conditions interaction terms play a significant role in the determination of 
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short-term financial leverage. This model only found that a higher degree of banking market 
concentration reduces the usage of short-term financial leverage. To a certain extent, the 
results find a detrimental effect of banking market concentration on small firms’ short-term 
financial leverage, supporting RMP or SCP, but not a very strong one17. 
Thirdly, Models 5 and 6 demonstrate very similar findings: a (moderate or high) 
banking market concentration decreases both total financial leverage and long-term financial 
leverage. On the other hand, the interaction terms are all significantly negatively relevant to 
the dependent variables, which confirms the reverse financial life cycle effect – as the 
banking relationship lengthens, firms employ a lower total financial leverage or long-term 
financial leverage. However, the magnitude of the coefficients of HHILlength, HHIMlength 
and HHIHlength vary. F-tests have been conducted and reported in Table 2-12 to chase the 
magnitude of the coefficients. 
Table 2-12: F-tests for the Coefficients of the Interaction Terms in Models 5 and 6 
(This table presents the F-tests for the coefficients of the interaction terms in Models 5 and 6 from 
Table 2-11. ‘b_variable’ indicates the coefficient of the corresponding variable. The values reported in 
the F-test Result column are the F-statistics, df1=1, df2=7,231). 
 Null Hypotheses F-test Result 
Model 5 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIMlength 3.47* 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIHlength 4.45** 
b_HHIMlength = b_HHIHlength 0.12 
Model 6 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIMlength 4.25** 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIHlength 5.68** 
b_HHIMlength = b_HHIHlength 0.23 
 
                                                 
17 A strong form of evidence supporting RMP or SCP would be a decrease of financial leverage with an increase 
of financial risks. 
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Table 2-12 reveals that, statistically speaking, in either Model 5 or Model 6 from 
Table 2-11, the coefficient of HHILlength is lower than the coefficients of HHIMlength and 
HHIHlength. There is no difference between the coefficients of HHIMlength and 
HHIHlength. As indicated earlier, although reverse financial life cycle effect has been 
captured, which means as the banking relationship lengthens, the total or long-term financial 
leverage decreases, financial leverages decrease less quickly in a (moderately or highly) 
concentrated banking market than those in a competitive banking market. The reason for this 
might be that a banking relationship could effectively reduce the borrowing costs for small 
firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) because at a mature stage of a banking relationship, small 
firms might be able to generate more retained earnings. If the borrowing cost is high, 
according to POT, firms would prefer retained earnings as the first priority for finance, while 
if the borrowing cost decreases, firms are more able to rely more on financial leverage and 
enjoy the tax shield benefits. The beneficial effect captured from Model 8 Table 2-11 also 
confirms such findings – firms with a longer banking relationship suffer less from financial 
risks.  
To better demonstrate the relationship between banking relationship and firms’ 
financial leverage under various banking market conditions – competitive banking market 
(HHIL), moderately concentrated banking market (HHIM) and highly concentrated banking 
market (HHIH) – five figures have been presented in relation to Models 5, 6 and 8. Figure 2-
1 and Figure 2-2 show the relationship between length of banking relationship and total 
financial leverage (Figure 2-1, based on Model 5 in Table 2-11) or long-term financial 
leverage (Figure 2-2, based on Model 6 in Table 2-11), respectively, under various banking 
market conditions. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show that as the banking relationship increases, 
total/long-term financial leverage decreases quickly in a concentrated banking market, while 
it drops slowly in a moderately or highly concentrated banking market. This confirms again 
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that on the one hand, the reverse financial life cycle effect works to decrease the financial 
leverages in general; on the other hand, due to the beneficial effect of relationship banking, 
where the borrowing cost is lower and therefore firms do not need to rely on retained 
earnings that heavily, the financial leverages decrease slowly in moderately or highly 
concentrated banking markets. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show that firms’ capital structure in a 
competitive banking market  is sensitive to decrease as time goes on, while firms’ capital 
structure in a moderately or highly concentrated banking market is sustained at a relatively 
steady level to decrease slowly. 
Figures 2-3, 2-4 and 2-5 further prove such findings. In a moderately or highly 
concentrated banking market, as the banking relationship lengthens, the probability of being a 
less financially risky firm increases and the probability of being a moderately or more 
financially risky firm decreases, while a banking relationship has no influence on financial 
risks in a competitive banking market. This suggests that the financial distress risks reduce in 
a moderately or highly concentrated banking market as the banking relationship develops. It 
also confirms the reason why in Figures 2-1 and 2-2, in a moderately or highly concentrated 
banking market, financial leverages decrease more slowly as the banking relationship 
lengthens. 
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Figure 2-1:  Toliabratio, relationship banking and banking market conditions. 
 
(The horizontal axis presents the length of banking relationship in years (Length) and the 
vertical axis shows the total financial leverage ratio (Toliabratio). The figure is drawn 
according to the results of Model 5 in Table 2-11. 
            Capital Structure (Toliabratioi) = α0+α1×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1𝑖) + 
α2×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2𝑖) + α3× control variables (𝑋3𝑖) +ɛi                                                                                          
….…………………………………..Eq. (2-1-A) 
For competitive banking markets, the mean values of the independent variables are 
nominated taken from Table 2-6 and they are applied in the equation (2-1-A). The 
coefficients of each term are taken from the results of Model 5 in Table 2-11. Any variables 
not regarding competitive banking market, e.g. HHIM, HHIH, HHIMlength and HHIHlength, 
even statistically significant, will be removed. In this way, every term will be fixed at a 
number, except HHILlength. For HHILlength (in years), experimental numbers from 0 to 50 
has been given and in this way, 51 values of ‘Toliabratio’ will be obtained correspondingly, 
which means 51 pairs of data – scatters(length of banking relationship, total financial 
leverage) are built. Connecting all of the scatters, the HHIL line in the figure is obtained. The 
slope of this line is the coefficient of the term – HHILlength. In the similar way, the lines are 
drawn for moderately concentrated banking market and highly concentrated banking market 
respectively.)
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Figure 2-2:  Nocuratio, relationship banking and banking market conditions. 
 
(The horizontal axis presents the length of banking relationship in years (Length) and the 
vertical axis shows the long-term financial leverage ratio (Nocuratio). The figure is drawn 
according to the results of Model 6 in Table 2-11. 
            Capital Structure (Nocuratioi) = α0+α1×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1𝑖) + 
α2×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2𝑖) + α3× control variables (𝑋3𝑖) +ɛi                                                                                      
….…………………………………..Eq. (2-1-B) 
For competitive banking markets, the mean values of the independent variables are 
nominated taken from Table 2-6 and they are applied in the equation (2-1-B). The 
coefficients of each term are taken from the results of Model 6 in Table 2-11. Any variables 
not regarding competitive banking market, e.g. HHIM, HHIH, HHIMlength and HHIHlength, 
even statistically significant, will be removed. In this way, every term will be fixed at a 
number, except HHILlength. For HHILlength (in years), experimental numbers from 0 to 50 
has been given and in this way, 51 values of ‘Toliabratio’ will be obtained correspondingly, 
which means 51 pairs of data – scatters(length of banking relationship, long-term financial 
leverage) are built. Connecting all of the scatters, the HHIL line in the figure is obtained. The 
slope of this line is the coefficient of the term – HHILlength. In the similar way, the lines are 
drawn for moderately concentrated banking market and highly concentrated banking market 
respectively.) 
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Figure 2-3:  Relationship banking and probability of being the LEAST financially risky 
firms under different banking market conditions 
 
(The horizontal axis presents the length of banking relationship in years (Length) and the 
vertical axis shows the probability of being the least financially risky firms (percentage). The 
figure is drawn according to the results of Model 8 in Table 2-11. 
            Ordered Probit (Y’) = α0’+α1’×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1) + 
α2
’×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2) + α3’× control variables +ɛ’   
                                              ….…………………………………..Eq. (2-2) 
For the highly concentrated banking markets, the mean values of the independent variables 
are nominated taken from Table 2-6 and they are applied in the equation (2-2). The 
coefficients of each term are taken from the results of Model 8 in Table 2-11. Any variables 
not regarding highly concentrated banking market, e.g. HHIM, HHIL, HHIMlength and 
HHILlength, even statistically significant, will be removed. In this way, every term will be 
fixed at a number, except HHIHlength. For HHIHlength (in years), experimental numbers 
from 0 to 50 has been given and in this way, 51 values of probabilities will be obtained 
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correspondingly, which means 51 pairs of data – scatters(length of banking relationship, the 
probability of being the least financially risky firms) are built, following equation (2-5) as 
follows.  
P[Y=1] = P[Y*≤μ1] = P[xiβ + ɛ’≤ μ1] = P[ɛ’≤ μ1- xiβ] = F(μ1- xiβ) 
                                              ….…………………………………..Eq. (2-5) 
μ1 Indicates the cut1 as shown in the footnotes with Model 8 in Table 2-11. 
Connecting all of the scatters, the HHIH line in the figure is obtained. As the probability is 
calculated based on cumulative standard normal distribution function, therefore the line is 
indeed a curve. The coefficient of the interaction term HHIHlength is attributed to the 
curvature. In the similar ways, the curve is drawn for moderately concentrated banking 
market. Since the coefficients of HHIMlength and HHIHlength are very close to each other, 
the two curves almost overlap. Because the coefficient of HHILlength is insignificant in 
Model 8 in Table 2-11, the line for competitive banking markets should be just a horizontal 
line as the probability of being the least financially risky firms is irrelevant with the length of 
banking relationship.) 
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Figure 2-4:  Relationship banking and probability of being the MODERATELY 
financially risky firms under different banking market conditions 
 
(The horizontal axis presents the length of banking relationship in years (Length) and the 
vertical axis shows the probability of being MODERATELY financially risky firms 
(percentage). The figure is drawn according to the results of Model 8 in Table 2-11. 
            Ordered Probit (Y’) = α0’+α1’×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1) + 
α2
’×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2) + α3’× control variables +ɛ’   
                                              ….…………………………………..Eq. (2-2) 
For the highly concentrated banking markets, the mean values of the independent variables 
are nominated taken from Table 2-6 and they are applied in the equation (2-2). The 
coefficients of each term are taken from the results of Model 8 in Table 2-11. Any variables 
not regarding highly concentrated banking market, e.g. HHIM, HHIL, HHIMlength and 
HHILlength, even statistically significant, will be removed. In this way, every term will be 
fixed at a number, except HHIHlength. For HHIHlength (in years), experimental numbers 
from 0 to 50 has been given and in this way, 51 values of probabilities will be obtained 
correspondingly, which means 51 pairs of data – scatters(length of banking relationship, the 
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probability of being moderately financially risky firms) are built, following equation (2-6) as 
follows.  
P[Y=2] = P[μ1<Y*≤μ2] = P[μ1<xiβ + ɛ’≤ μ2] = P[μ1- xiβ <ɛ’≤ μ2- xiβ] = F(μ2- xiβ) - 
F(μ1- xiβ) 
                                              ….…………………………………..Eq. (2-6) 
μ1 and μ2 Indicate the cut1 and cut2 as shown in the footnotes with Model 8 in Table 2-11. 
Connecting all of the scatters, the HHIH line in the figure is obtained. As the probability is 
calculated based on cumulative standard normal distribution function, therefore the line is 
indeed a curve. The coefficient of the interaction term HHIHlength is attributed to the 
curvature. In the similar ways, the curve is drawn for moderately concentrated banking 
market. Since the coefficients of HHIMlength and HHIHlength are very close to each other, 
the two curves almost overlap. Because the coefficient of HHILlength is insignificant in 
Model 8 in Table 2-11, the line for competitive banking markets should be just a horizontal 
line as the probability of being the least financially risky firms is irrelevant with the length of 
banking relationship.) 
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Figure 2-5:  Relationship banking and probability of being the MOST financially risky 
firms under different banking market conditions. 
 
(The horizontal axis presents the length of banking relationship in years (Length) and the 
vertical axis shows the probability of being the MOST financially risky firms (percentage). 
The figure is drawn according to the results of Model 8 in Table 2-11. 
            Ordered Probit (Y’) = α0’+α1’×Relationship Characteristics (𝑋1) + 
α2
’×Banking Market Concentration Characteristics (𝑋2) + α3’× control variables +ɛ’   
                                              ….…………………………………..Eq. (2-2) 
For the highly concentrated banking markets, the mean values of the independent variables 
are nominated taken from Table 2-6 and they are applied in the equation (2-2). The 
coefficients of each term are taken from the results of Model 8 in Table 2-11. Any variables 
not regarding highly concentrated banking market, e.g. HHIM, HHIL, HHIMlength and 
HHILlength, even statistically significant, will be removed. In this way, every term will be 
fixed at a number, except HHIHlength. For HHIHlength (in years), experimental numbers 
from 0 to 50 has been given and in this way, 51 values of probabilities will be obtained 
correspondingly, which means 51 pairs of data – scatters(length of banking relationship, the 
probability of being the MOST financially risky firms) are built, following equation (2-7) as 
follows.  
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P[Y=3] = P[Y*>μ2] = 1-P[xiβ + ɛ’≤ μ2] = 1-P[ɛ’≤ μ2- xiβ] = 1 - F(μ2- xiβ) 
                                              ….…………………………………..Eq. (2-7) 
μ2 Indicates the cut2 as shown in the footnotes with Model 8 in Table 2-11. 
Connecting all of the scatters, the HHIH line in the figure is obtained. As the probability is 
calculated based on cumulative standard normal distribution function, therefore the line is 
indeed a curve. The coefficient of the interaction term HHIHlength is attributed to the 
curvature. In the similar ways, the curve is drawn for moderately concentrated banking 
market. Since the coefficients of HHIMlength and HHIHlength are very close to each other, 
the two curves almost overlap. Because the coefficient of HHILlength is insignificant in 
Model 8 in Table 2-11, the line for competitive banking markets should be just a horizontal 
line as the probability of being the least financially risky firms is irrelevant with the length of 
banking relationship.) 
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2.3.8 Robustness check and further analysis 
2.3.8.1 Firm age effect and length of banking relationship effect 
The correlation between firm age and length of banking relationship is 0.44. Although 
no multicollinearity problem has been detected in the earlier regression analysis, there are 
concerns as to whether the influence of a banking relationship on financial leverages captured 
in the previous analysis derives from the firm age effect rather than the banking relationship 
itself. As confirmed by La Rocca et al. (2011), firm age is believed to affect small firms’ 
financial leverages due to POT, reverse life cycle effect, etc. Therefore, this section aims to 
distinguish the influence of a banking relationship and the impact of firm age on small firms’ 
financial leverage. 
In this section, based on the regressions in 2.4.7.2, I include another three interaction 
terms: the interaction between firm age with the three banking market condition dummies – 
HHILfage, HHIMfage and HHIHfage. The expectation would be to find the differences on 
the influence of firm age on financial leverages with reference to the influence of banking 
relationship. Again, collinearity tests (VIF) have been applied and no such problems are 
found. 
Table 2-13 confirms that, in general, as firm age or banking relationship increases, 
total (Model 9) or long-term (Model 10) financial leverage decreases, supporting the reverse 
financial life cycle effect. It could also be drawn from Model 11 that all of the interaction 
terms except HHILlength are negatively related to financial risks. Table 2-14 reports the F-
tests on the coefficients of the interaction terms in Models 9 and 10. A significant value of the 
F-test indicates the referred two coefficients are statistically different. 
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In general, besides the reverse financial life cycle effect caused by firm age and 
banking relationship, banking relationship affects firms’ financial leverages in different 
mechanisms, because firstly, Table 2-14 shows that the magnitudes of the coefficients of the 
interaction terms HHILfage, HHIMfage and HHIHfage are statistically the same across 
various banking market conditions, while it shows that as banking relationship lengthens, 
financial leverages decreases significantly more quickly in competitive banking market than 
those in a moderately or highly concentrated banking market. Secondly, from Table 2-13, it 
can be seen that, when firms get older, the financial risks drop, whatever kind of banking 
market concentration there is. In contrast, banking relationship only works to reduce the 
financial risks (Model 11) for small businesses in a moderately or highly concentrated 
banking market. There is no effect found for the competitive banking market. Such findings 
confirm that the Information Hypothesis (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995) applies for 
length of banking relationship but has no effect on firm age.  The findings also reveal how the 
reverse financial life cycle effect and the relationship banking beneficial effect work to affect 
small firms’ financial leverages together. 
Overall the R-squares for the models in Table 2-13 are very similar to those in Table 
2-10. And the explanation would be the same. 
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Table 2-13: Determinants of Capital Structure – with Interaction Terms 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of capital structure (Models 9 and 10) and 
financial risks (Model 11). OLS regressions are employed in Models 9 and 10. Ordered probit model 
is applied for Model 11. Control variables including industrial, regional and year dummies are not 
reported but available on request. Firm and Owner Characteristics include Firmsize, Corporat, Startup, 
Indprofitsx, Depratio, Ownermag, Bankrupt,Family, Female and Eduba. Relationship Characteristics 
include Logprimdist, Primebank and Numrlat. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ stand for the confidence level of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. The diagnostic F-statistics or Chi2 statistics indicate a good model fitness. 
Robust Standard Errors are used.) 
 
Model Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Dependent Variables Toliabratio Nocuratio Finrisks 
Constant 0.8442
*** 
(0.0961) 
0.6881*** 
(0.0851)  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and Owner Characters Yes Yes Yes 
Relationship Characters Yes Yes Yes 
Banking Market Characteristics    
HHIM -0.1626
** 
(0.0775) 
-0.1378** 
(0.0689) 
-0.0420 
(0.0990) 
HHIH -0.2108
*** 
(0.0770) 
-0.1854*** 
(0.0684) 
-0.0651 
(0.0984) 
Interaction Terms    
HHILlength -0.0096
*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0094*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0089 
(0.0066) 
HHIMlength -0.0028
* 
(0.0016) 
-0.0029** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0076*** 
(0.0027) 
HHIHlength -0.0024
* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0022* 
(0.0012) 
-0.0065*** 
(0.0023) 
HHILfage -0.0056
* 
(0.0030) 
-0.0052** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0101* 
(0.0054) 
HHIMfage -0.0063
*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0054*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0119*** 
(0.0021) 
HHIHfage -0.0059
*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0138*** 
(0.0020) 
Obs 7,267 7,267 7,239 
F-statistics 14.03*** 13.85***  
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Chi2 Statistics   516.81*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.06 0.06 0.04 
 
Table 2-14: F-tests for the Coefficients of the Interaction Terms in Models 9 and 10 
(This table presents the F-tests for the coefficients of the interaction terms in Models 9 and 10 from 
Table 2-13. ‘b_variable’ indicates the coefficient of the corresponding variable. The values reported in 
the F-test Result column are the F-statistics, df1=1, df2=7,229.) 
 Null Hypotheses F-test Result 
Model 9 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIMlength 3.31* 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIHlength 4.99** 
b_HHIMlength = b_HHIHlength 0.05 
b_HHILfage = b_HHIMfage 0.05 
b_HHILfage = b_HHIHfage 0.01 
b_HHIMfage = b_HHIHfage 0.07 
Model 10 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIMlength 3.71** 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIHlength 4.87** 
b_HHIMlength = b_HHIHlength 0.15 
b_HHILfage = b_HHIMfage 0.01 
b_HHILfage = b_HHIHfage 0.00 
b_HHIMfage = b_HHIHfage 0.02 
 
2.3.8.2 Alternative measurement of financial risks 
In the main test, financial risks constructed by D&B credit score have been adopted. 
In addition to this, an alternative proxy to measure the financial constraints–discouraged 
borrowing will be introduced in this section. ‘Discouraged borrowers’ are defined as the 
firms who did not apply for the credit even when they needed external finance over the last 
three years because they were worried their applications would be turned down. And pre-
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existing evidence suggests that discouraged borrowing is a self-selection mechanism and 
severely financially risky firms are more likely to discourage themselves (Kon and Storey, 
2003; Han, 2009a). Therefore, the probability of being discouraged by themselves might be a 
good proxy of the small firms’ financial risks, as such firms’ finances are heavily constrained. 
Table 2-15 represents the regression result for discouraged borrowing, where in the 
regressions, the dependent variable is whether the firm is a discouraged borrower or not 
(1=yes; 0=no). It shows that a weaker banking relationship, which is characterized as a 
shorter period of time (length) or more banking relationship ties (numrlat), results in a higher 
probability of being a discouraged borrower, supporting the Information Hypothesis 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995). Moreover, it reveals that banking relationship only 
works to reduce the likelihood of being discouraged when borrowing in a moderately or 
highly concentrated banking market. In a competitive banking market, there is no influence 
of banking relationship detected. On the contrary, as reported in Table 2-16, the magnitudes 
of the impact of firm age on reducing the likelihood of being discouraged when borrowing 
are the same across various banking market conditions. 
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Table 2-15: Determinants of Discouraged Borrower 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of a discouraged borrower (Models 12 and 
13). Probit regressions are employed. Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are 
not reported in the table. ‘***’,’**’,’*’ stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. The diagnostic Chi2 statistics indicate a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are 
used. ) 
Model Model 12 Model 13 
Dependent Variables Discourage Discourage 
Constant -0.4944
*** 
(0.1476) 
-0.4216** 
(0.1842) 
Region YES YES 
Industry YES YES 
2003 YearDummy -0.2579
*** 
(0.0394) 
-0.2581*** 
(0.0393) 
Firm and Owner Characteristics   
Firmsize -0.1632
*** 
(0.0191) 
-0.1638*** 
(0.0191) 
Corporat 0.0532 (0.0424) 
0.0540 
(0.0424) 
Firmage -0.0141
*** 
(0.0022)  
Startup -0.0165 (0.0688) 
-0.0166 
(0.0688) 
Indprofitsx 0.7905 (8.4371) 
0.8951 
(8.4379) 
Depratio 0.2532
*** 
(0.0600) 
0.2540*** 
(0.0600) 
Ownermag 0.0849 (0.0672) 
0.0842 
(0.0672) 
Bankrupt 1.2357
*** 
(0.1032) 
1.2343*** 
(0.1031) 
Family 0.0482 (0.0549) 
0.0472 
(0.0549) 
Female 0.0866
** 
(0.0405) 
0.0860** 
(0.0404) 
Eduba -0.1909
*** 
(0.0383) 
-0.1905*** 
(0.0383) 
Relationship Characteristics   
Length -0.0158
*** 
(0.0026) 
 
138 
 
Logprimdist 0.0196 (0.0137) 
0.0198 
(0.0137) 
Primebank -0.0439 (0.0514) 
-0.0432 
(0.0514) 
Numrlat 0.1127
*** 
(0.0114) 
0.1127*** 
(0.0114) 
Banking Market Characteristics   
HHIM 0.0133 
(0.0868) 
-0.0780 
(0.1554) 
HHIH 0.0120 (0.0864) 
-0.0505 
(0.1549) 
Interaction Terms   
HHILlength  -0.0140 
(0.0101) 
HHIMlength  -0.0140
*** 
(0.0039) 
HHIHlength  -0.0172
*** 
(0.0036) 
HHILfage  -0.0208
** 
(0.0099) 
HHIMfage  -0.0136
*** 
(0.0033) 
HHIHfage  -0.0138
*** 
(0.0029) 
Obs 7,267 7,267 
Chi2 Statistics 587.92*** 586.56*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.11 0.11 
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Table 2-16: χ2-tests for the Coefficients of the Interaction Terms in Model 13 
(This table presents the χ2-tests for the coefficients of the interaction terms in Model 13 from Table 2-
15. ‘b_variable’ indicates the coefficient of the corresponding variable. The values reported in the χ2-
test Result column are the χ2-statistics, df=1.) 
 Null Hypotheses χ2-test Result 
Model 13 
b_HHIMlength = b_HHIHlength 0.37 
b_HHILfage = b_HHIMfage 0.48 
b_HHILfage = b_HHIHfage 0.46 
b_HHIMfage = b_HHIHfage 0.00 
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2.3.8.3 Alternative sampling 
Although in some countries, such as the US, Germany or France, the definition of 
SMEs indicates firms with no more than 500 employees, there are some other countries, such 
as the UK, that define SMEs as firms with no more than 250 employees (Ayyagari, 2007). 
This criteria is also applied in certain industry in Netherland, such high-tech industry (de 
Jong, 2013). In line with the UK standard as an alternative sampling strategy, I have also 
done the main test analysis only on the firms with no more than 250 employees.  Table 2-17 
and 2-18 report the main regression results without or with interaction terms respectively. It 
can be seen in Table 2-17 that a longer banking relationship decreases financial leverages and 
financial risks. The banking market concentration dummies are all significant for financial 
leverage models. Although they are not significant in Model 17, the interaction terms 
between length of banking relationship and banking market concentration in Model 21 are 
negatively relevant to financial risks, which means banking market conditions matter in 
determining the financial risks for small business. Moreover, as confirmed in Table 2-19, 
although reverse financial life cycle effect is captured in Models 14, 15, 18 and 19, where the 
total or long-term financial leverages decrease along with the development of banking 
relationship, the beneficial effect of banking relationship has also been captured, due to the 
fact that the magnitude of the coefficient of HHILlength is much larger statistically than those 
of HHIMlength or HHIHlength. In general, the findings in Tables 2-17, 2-19 and 2-20 are 
highly robust compared with the main tests. 
Overall, the R-squares in Table 2-17 and Table 2-18 are similar to Table 2-10. The 
explanations would be the same. 
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Table 2-17: Determinants of Capital Structure (Alternative Sampling) 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of capital structure (Models 14 to 16) and 
financial risks (Model 17). OLS regressions are employed in Models 14 to Model 16. Ordered probit 
model is applied for Model 17. Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are not 
reported in the table. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The 
diagnostic F-statistics or Chi2 Statistics indicate a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are 
used.) 
Model Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
Dependent Variables Toliabratio Nocuratio Shtratio Finrisks 
Constant 0.7938
*** 
(0.0794) 
0.6352*** 
(0.0703) 
0.2387*** 
(0.0265) 
0.7938*** 
(0.0794) 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2003 YearDummy -0.1079
*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0879*** 
(0.0196) 
-0.0498*** 
(0.0073) 
-0.1363*** 
(0.0298) 
Firm and Owner Characteristics     
Firmsize -0.0248
*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.0352*** 
(0.0083) 
0.0245*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0108 
(0.0141) 
Corporat 0.2209
*** 
(0.024) 
0.1821*** 
(0.0214) 
0.0666*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.1253*** 
(0.0322) 
Firmage -0.0061
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0131*** 
(0.0015) 
Startup 0.1194
** 
(0.0489) 
0.1117*** 
(0.043) 
-0.0261* 
(0.0147) 
0.2987*** 
(0.054) 
Indprofitsx -0.6286 (4.0737) 
-0.8475 
(3.608) 
1.7248 
(1.4438) 
7.2264 
(6.2574) 
Depratio -0.0151 (0.0354) 
0.0438 
(0.0317) 
-0.1195*** 
(0.0111) 
0.1193*** 
(0.0439) 
Ownermag -0.0532
* 
(0.032) 
-0.0432 
(0.0283) 
-0.0197* 
(0.0115) 
-0.025 
(0.0482) 
Bankrupt 0.163
** 
(0.0792) 
0.1267* 
(0.0698) 
0.0547** 
(0.0257) 
0.4684*** 
(0.097) 
Family -0.0553
** 
(0.0275) 
-0.0301 
(0.0243) 
-0.0252** 
(0.0099) 
0.024 
(0.0405) 
Female 0.0211 (0.0233) 
0.0185 
(0.0209) 
-0.0044 
(0.0075) 
-0.0185 
(0.0305) 
Eduba -0.0245 (0.0204) 
-0.0271 
(0.0182) 
-0.0086 
(0.0069) 
-0.0387 
(0.0281) 
Relationship Characteristics     
Length -0.0031
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0071*** 
(0.0017) 
Logprimdist 0.006 (0.0077) 
0.0056 
(0.0069) 
-0.0002 
(0.0027) 
0.0089 
(0.0105) 
Primebank 0.0131 (0.0305) 
0.0064 
(0.0272) 
0.0188** 
(0.0096) 
-0.0099 
(0.038) 
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Numrlat 0.0641
*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0604*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0086*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0174** 
(0.0088) 
Banking Market Characteristics     
HHIM -0.1057
** 
(0.0466) 
-0.0754* 
(0.0414) 
-0.0299** 
(0.0149) 
-0.0534 
(0.0605) 
HHIH -0.1411
*** 
(0.0464) 
-0.1119*** 
(0.0411) 
-0.0330** 
(0.0148) 
-0.0878 
(0.0605) 
Obs 7,147 7,147 7,147 7,119 
F-statistics 15.09*** 14.84*** 25.33***  
Chi2 Statistics    525.17*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 
 
143 
 
Table 2-18: Determinants of Capital Structure – with Interaction Terms 
(Alternative Sampling) 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of capital structure (Models 18 to 20) and 
financial risks (Model 21). OLS regressions are employed in Models 18 to 20. Ordered probit model 
is applied for Model 21. Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are not reported 
in the table. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’  stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The 
diagnostic F-statistics or Chi2 Statistics indicate a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are 
used.) 
Model Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Dependent Variables Toliabratio Nocuratio Shtratio Finrisks 
Constant 0.8642
*** 
(0.0899) 
0.7063*** 
(0.0799) 
0.2443*** 
(0.0297)  
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2003 YearDummy -0.1072
*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0872*** 
(0.0196) 
-0.0497*** 
(0.0073) 
-0.1362*** 
(0.0298) 
Firm and Owner Characteristics     
Firmsize -0.0244
*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0348*** 
(0.0083) 
0.0245*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0108 
(0.0141) 
Corporat 0.2208
*** 
(0.024) 
0.1819*** 
(0.0214) 
0.0666*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.1252*** 
(0.0323) 
Firmage -0.0061
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0131*** 
(0.0015) 
Startup 0.1194
** 
(0.0489) 
0.1116*** 
(0.043) 
-0.0262* 
(0.0147) 
0.2989*** 
(0.0539) 
Indprofitsx -0.6704 (4.0743) 
-0.8877 
(3.6089) 
1.7229 
(1.4441) 
7.2174 
(6.2573) 
Depratio -0.0156 (0.0354) 
0.0433 
(0.0317) 
-0.1195*** 
(0.0111) 
0.1193*** 
(0.0439) 
Ownermag -0.0533
* 
(0.0319) 
-0.0434 
(0.0283) 
-0.0197* 
(0.0115) 
-0.0249 
(0.0482) 
Bankrupt 0.1637
** 
(0.0792) 
0.1276* 
(0.0698) 
0.0549** 
(0.0257) 
0.4681*** 
(0.097) 
Family -0.0549
** 
(0.0275) 
-0.0297 
(0.0243) 
-0.0251** 
(0.0099) 
0.024 
(0.0405) 
Female 0.0210 (0.0233) 
0.0184 
(0.0209) 
-0.0043 
(0.0075) 
-0.0186 
(0.0305) 
Eduba -0.0247 (0.0204) 
-0.0273 
(0.0182) 
-0.0086 
(0.0069) 
-0.0386 
(0.0281) 
Relationship Characteristics     
Logprimdist 0.0061 (0.0077) 
0.0056 
(0.0069) 
-0.0002 
(0.0027) 
0.0089 
(0.0105) 
Primebank 0.0124 (0.0306) 
0.0057 
(0.0272) 
0.0187* 
(0.0096) 
-0.0100 
(0.0380) 
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Numrlat 0.064
*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0603*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0086*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0174** 
(0.0088) 
Banking Market Characteristics     
HHIM -0.1778
*** 
(0.0661) 
-0.1471** 
(0.0593) 
-0.0348* 
(0.0208) 
-0.0589 
(0.0842) 
HHIH -0.2191
*** 
(0.0655) 
-0.1915*** 
(0.0587) 
-0.0398* 
(0.0206) 
-0.0878 
(0.0837) 
Interaction Terms     
HHILlength -0.0098
*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0098*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0012 
(0.0010) 
-0.0073 
(0.0059) 
HHIMlength -0.0030
* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0007 
(0.0005) 
-0.0067*** 
(0.0026) 
HHIHlength -0.0024
* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0022* 
(0.0012) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.0022) 
Obs 7,147 7,147 7,147 7,119 
F-statistics 14.37*** 14.24*** 23.91***  
Chi2 Statistics    526.00*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 
 
Table 2-19: F-tests for the Coefficients of the Interaction Terms in Models 18 and 19 
(This table presents the F-tests for the coefficients of the interaction terms in Models 18 and 19 from 
Table 2-11. ‘b_variable’ indicates the coefficient of the corresponding variable. The values reported in 
the F-test Result column are the F-statistics, df1=1, df2=7,111.) 
 Null Hypotheses F-test Result 
Model 18 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIMlength 3.86** 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIHlength 4.75** 
b_HHIMlength = b_HHIHlength 0.09 
Model 19 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIMlength 4.72** 
b_HHILlength = b_HHIHlength 6.13** 
b_HHIMlength = b_HHIHlength 0.20 
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2.3.8.4 Nonlinear Relationship 
In this chapter, Model 1 to 4 in Table 2-10 indicates a monotonic negative 
relationship between firm age or the likelihood of financial distress. They also reveal a 
monotonic negative relationship between the length of banking relationship and debt ratios or 
the likelihood of financial distress. This section aims to investigate whether nonlinear 
relationships for firm age and length of banking relationship have been found. The results are 
as follows. Overall the R-squares in Table 2-20 are very similar to those in Table 2-10. The 
explanations would be the same. 
 
Table 2-20: Determinants of Capital Structure (Nonlinear Relationship) 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of capital structure (Models 22 to 24) and 
financial risks (Model 25). OLS regressions are employed in Model 1 to Model 3. Ordered probit 
model is applied for Model 25. Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are not 
reported in the table. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’  stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The diagnostic F-statistics or Chi2 Statistics indicate a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are 
used.) 
Model Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 
Dependent Variables Toliabratio Nocuratio Shtratio Finrisks 
Constant 0.8231
*** 
(0.0794) 
0.6614*** 
(0.0704) 
0.2489*** 
(0.0266)  
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2003 Year Dummy -0.1033
*** 
(0.0217) 
-0.0838*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0483*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.1268*** 
(0.0296) 
Firm and Owner Characters     
Firmsize -0.0216
** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0314*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0009 
(0.0134) 
Corporat 0.2218
*** 
(0.0236) 
0.1820*** 
(0.0211) 
0.0677*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.1337*** 
(0.0319) 
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Firmage -0.0107
*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0099*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0026*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0240*** 
(0.0030) 
Firmagesquare 0.0001
*** 
(0.8700E-4) 
0.0001*** 
(0.2310E-4) 
0.1000E-4 
(0.0964E-4) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
Startup 0.0847
* 
(0.0507) 
0.0782* 
(0.0447) 
-0.0328** 
(0.0153) 
0.2201*** 
(0.0565) 
Indprofitsx -0.4334 (3.9898) 
-0.6144 
(3.5387) 
1.7301 
(1.4186) 
6.4068 
(6.2139) 
Depratio -0.0136 (0.0351) 
0.0451 
(0.0315) 
-0.1208*** 
(0.0110) 
0.1183*** 
(0.0437) 
Ownermag -0.0449 (0.0310) 
-0.0350 
(0.0275) 
-0.0185* 
(0.0112) 
-0.0124 
(0.0471) 
Bankrupt 0.1700
** 
(0.0787) 
0.1330* 
(0.0697) 
0.0578** 
(0.0254) 
0.4836*** 
(0.0963) 
Family -0.0465
* 
(0.0268) 
-0.0217 
(0.0238) 
-0.0235** 
(0.0097) 
0.0318 
(0.0400) 
Female 0.0191 (0.0231) 
0.0165 
(0.0207) 
-0.0048 
(0.0074) 
-0.0182 
(0.0304) 
Eduba -0.0257 (0.0201) 
-0.0277 
(0.0179) 
-0.0091 
(0.0068) 
-0.0346 
(0.0279) 
Relationship Characters     
Length -0.0045
** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0042** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0015* 
(0.0008) 
-0.0118*** 
(0.0037) 
Lengthsquare 0.4500E-4 (0.3920E-4) 
0.3850E-4 
(0.3810) 
0.2030E-4 
(0.1430E-4) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Logprimdist 0.0065 (0.0075) 
0.0060 
(0.0068) 
-0.0003 
(0.0026) 
0.0102 
(0.0103) 
Primebank 0.0127 (0.0302) 
0.0062 
(0.0270) 
0.0181* 
(0.0095) 
-0.0168 
(0.0379) 
Numrlat 0.0620
*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0586*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0089*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0168** 
(0.0085) 
Banking Market Characters     
HHIM -0.1016
** 
(0.0460) 
-0.0723* 
(0.0409) 
-0.0292** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0546 
(0.0597) 
HHIH -0.1385
*** 
(0.0457) 
-0.1095*** 
(0.0406) 
-0.0334** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0957 
(0.0597) 
Obs 7,267 7,267 7,267 7,239 
F 14.74*** 14.47*** 25.01***  
CHI2    565.30*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 
 
Model 22 to 25 in Table 2-20 consider the quadratic terms regarding firm age and 
length of banking relationship in the regressions. Firstly, the quadratic term of the length of 
banking relationship is not significant for all of the 4 models, indicating there is a monotonic 
negative relationship between the length of banking relationship and debt ratios or the 
likelihood of financial distress. Secondly, Model 22, 23 and 25 confirms of the existence of 
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the non-linear relationship between firm age and (total or long-term) debt ratios or the 
likelihood of financial distress. The relationship between firm age and short-term debt ratio is 
still monotonic negative. Such findings implicate that firm age and the length of banking 
relationship are not alternative parameter in the regressions.  
Model 22, 23 and 25 describe an inverse parabola relationship between firm age and 
(total or long-term) debt ratios or the likelihood of financial distress. For Model 22, the 
symmetric axis of the inverse parabola is 53.5 years (= -(-0.0107)/(0.0001*2)). It indicates for 
the firms which are younger than 53.5 years’ old, there is a monotonic negative relationship 
between firm age and total debt ratio. In the dataset, almost 99% of the firms are younger 
than 53.5 years old, and there is only a monotonic negative relationship between firm age and 
total debt ratio for these firms. It means the original regressions in Table 2-10 or the later 
tables, quadratic terms are not necessary as it only values for about 1% of the firms in the 
dataset. Such rationale also works for Model 23 and Model 25, as the symmetric axis for 
Model 23 is 49.5 years; for Model 45, the symmetric axis is 60 years. Overall, it shows that 
the non-linear effect will never appear in the initial 50 to 60 years of the life of the business. 
The original models work well. 
In summary, by considering the findings from Table 2-20, it could conclude that 
essentially it makes no difference to remove the quadratic terms there as shown in the 
original thesis in Table 2-10. 
For the other models, e.g. modes with interaction terms etc., Non-linear effect is not 
further investigated, because, firstly, as indicated there is no non-linear effect on firm age for 
all of the models. Secondly, for the length of banking relationship, it does not bother for 
about 99% of the firms. Thirdly, by taking the quadratic terms of the length of banking 
relationship in the models with interactions, there will be more risks  of multicollinearity 
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problem as the VIF for the models with interaction terms, would increase to a value higher 
than 10 if the quadratic terms are included in the regression. 
 
2.3.8.5 Endogeneity Issues 
Endogeneity issue might affect the accuracy of the estimation for regressions, 
particularly for the analysis on cross-sectional data. Consistency is one of the very important 
issue regarding the accuracy of the estimators in the regressions. The existence of the 
endogeneity problem would severely affect the consistency of the estimators in the 
regressions. Endogeneity problem derives from the omitted variables bias which means the 
error term covariates with one or some of the independent variables in the equation and in 
this way, the consistency of the estimator weakens (Wooldridge, 2016). Instrumental 
Variable Analysis, Treatment Regressions, Propensity Score Matching, etc. are effective for 
eliminating the endogeneity problems. 
To make sure the result does not suffer from endogeneity problem, particularly for the 
variable of bankruptcy variable – ‘Bankrupt’, two approaches have been adopted to 
investigate this issue. Firstly, for equation (2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-C), as ‘Bankrupt’ is a 
dichotomous variable while the dependent variables for equation (2-1-A), (2-1-B) and (2-1-
C) are all continuous variables, treatment effect regressions are adopted. A variety of 
instrumental variables are experimented, including, the bankruptcy rate in the region of the 
firm’s location, in the industry of the firm in corresponding years; the rate for the businesses 
of being delinquent in record  in the region of the firm’s location, in the industry of the firm 
in corresponding years, etc. For all of these regressions, the LR tests reject the existence of 
endogeneity problem. For equation (2-2), since the dependent variable is an ordinal variable 
with 3 scales, and ‘Bankrupt’ is a dichotomous variable, following Roodman (2011), a 
recursive mixed-process model has been adopted dealing with the endogeneity issues. A 
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variety of instrumental variables are experimented, including, the bankruptcy rate in the 
region of the firm’s location, in the industry of the firm in corresponding years; the rate for 
the businesses of being delinquent in record  in the region of the firm’s location, in the 
industry of the firm in corresponding years, etc. For all of these regressions, the LR tests 
reject the existence of endogeneity problem. 
The second approach is to follow Craig and Hardee (2007), excluding the suspicious 
variables which might be associated with endogeneity problem. Apparently, if there is any 
significant endogeneity problem, the results excluding these variables would be significantly 
different from the results including these variables. When such strategy is applied by 
excluding ‘Bankrupt’, the results are fairly the same as that if it is included. Therefore, the 
endogeneity problem for ‘Bankrupt’ might not be a major concern. The R-squares in Table 2-
21 and Table 2-22 are very similar to Table 2-10. The explanations would be the same. Table 
2-21 and Table 2-22 report the regression results excluding the bankruptcy variable. 
 
Table 2-21: Determinants of Capital Structure18 (for Endogeneity Check) 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of capital structure (Models 26 to 28) and 
financial risks (Model 29). OLS regressions19 are employed in Model 26 to Model 28. Ordered probit 
model is applied for Model 29. Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are not 
reported in the table. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’  stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The diagnostic F-statistics or Chi2 Statistics indicate a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are 
used) 
Model Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 
Dependent Variables Toliabratio Nocuratio Shtratio Finrisks 
                                                 
18 The two cuts for the Ordered Probit model are -0.6929 and 0.4553 respectively; the standard deviations for 
these two cuts are 0.1063 and 0.1060 respectively. 
19 Tobit regressions have been applied as well. The signs, significance of the coefficients of the key variables are 
all the same for the listed key variables. Results not reported but available on requests. 
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Constant 0.7904
*** 
(0.0779) 
0.6288*** 
(0.0690) 
0.2424*** 
(0.0260)  
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2003 Year Dummy -0.1062
*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0865*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.1334*** 
(0.0295) 
Firm and Owner Characters     
Firmsize -0.0217
** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0315*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0002 
(0.0134) 
Corporat 0.2195
*** 
(0.0236) 
0.1798*** 
(0.0211) 
0.0672*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.1389*** 
(0.0318) 
Firmage -0.0060
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0014) 
Startup 0.1222
** 
(0.0487) 
0.1140*** 
(0.0428) 
-0.0256* 
(0.0147) 
0.3134*** 
(0.0536) 
Indprofitsx -0.7603 (4.0026) 
-0.9342 
(3.5485) 
1.6784 
(1.4210) 
5.6459 
(6.2410) 
Depratio -0.0133 (0.0352) 
0.0456 
(0.0315) 
-0.1209*** 
(0.0110) 
0.1176*** 
(0.0436) 
Ownermag -0.0453 (0.0311) 
-0.0357 
(0.0275) 
-0.0183* 
(0.0112) 
-0.0126 
(0.0473) 
Family -0.0495
* 
(0.0268) 
-0.0246 
(0.0237) 
-0.0240** 
(0.0097) 
0.0250 
(0.0400) 
Female 0.0203 (0.0231) 
0.0177 
(0.0207) 
-0.0046 
(0.0074) 
-0.0153 
(0.0304) 
Eduba -0.0274 (0.0201) 
-0.0290 
(0.0179) 
-0.0098 
(0.0068) 
-0.0389 
(0.0278) 
Relationship Characters     
Length -0.0031
*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.0017) 
Logprimdist 0.0074 (0.0075) 
0.0067 
(0.0068) 
-0.0001 
(0.0026) 
0.0125 
(0.0103) 
Primebank 0.0100 (0.0302) 
0.0039 
(0.0269) 
0.0173* 
(0.0095) 
-0.0237 
(0.0379) 
Numrlat 0.0612
*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0581*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0087*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0148* 
(0.0085) 
Banking Market Characters     
HHIM -0.1020
** 
(0.0460) 
-0.0727* 
(0.0409) 
-0.0294** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0569 
(0.0596) 
HHIH -0.1380
*** 
(0.0457) 
-0.1092*** 
(0.0406) 
-0.0332** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0951* 
(0.0596) 
Obs 7,267 7,267 7,267 7,239 
F-statistics 15.95*** 15.66*** 27.06***  
Chi2 Statistics    494.71*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.03 
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Table 2-22: Determinants of Capital Structure – with Interaction Terms20 (for 
Endogeneity Check) 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of capital structure (Models 30 to 32) and 
financial risks (Model 33). OLS regressions21 are employed in Models 30 to 32. Ordered probit model 
is applied for Model 33. Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are not reported 
in the table. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’  stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The 
diagnostic F-statistics or Chi2 Statistics indicate a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are 
used) 
Model Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 
Dependent Variables Toliabratio Nocuratio Shtratio Finrisks 
Constant 0.8562
*** 
(0.0883) 
0.6953*** 
(0.0784) 
0.2486*** 
(0.0291) 
 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2003 YearDummy -0.1057
*** 
(0.0217) 
-0.0859*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.1334*** 
(0.0295) 
Firm and Owner Characters     
Firmsize -0.0214
** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0312*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0002 
(0.0135) 
Corporat 0.2193
*** 
(0.0236) 
0.1796*** 
(0.0211) 
0.0674*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.1388*** 
(0.0318) 
Firmage -0.0060
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0014) 
Startup 0.1223
** 
(0.0487) 
0.1141*** 
(0.0428) 
-0.0251* 
(0.0147) 
0.3135*** 
(0.0536) 
Indprofitsx -0.7917 (4.0034) 
-0.9633 
(3.5496) 
1.6777 
(1.4215) 
5.6422 
(6.2407) 
Depratio -0.0137 (0.0352) 
0.0451 
(0.0315) 
-0.1209*** 
(0.0110) 
0.1176*** 
(0.0436) 
Ownermag -0.0450 (0.0311) 
-0.0354 
(0.0275) 
-0.0182* 
(0.0112) 
-0.0126 
(0.0473) 
Family -0.0491
* 
(0.0268) 
-0.0242 
(0.0238) 
-0.0239** 
(0.0097) 
0.0250 
(0.0400) 
Female 0.0202 (0.0231) 
0.0176 
(0.0207) 
-0.0046 
(0.0074) 
-0.0153 
(0.0304) 
                                                 
20 The two cuts for the Ordered Probit model are -0.6947 and 0.4536 respectively; the standard deviations for 
these two cuts are 0.1173 and 0.1170 respectively. 
21 Tobit Regressions have been applied for Model 30, 31 and 32. All of the independent variables in Model 30 
Tobit, 31 Tobit and 32 Tobit remain the same as in Model 30, 31 and 32. The main findings from Tobit 
regressions are consistent with the findings by OLS regressions. 
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Eduba -0.0275 (0.0201) 
-0.0291 
(0.0179) 
-0.0098 
(0.0068) 
-0.0389 
(0.0278) 
Relationship Characteristics     
Logprimdist 0.0073 (0.0075) 
0.0067 
(0.0068) 
-0.0001 
(0.0026) 
0.0125 
(0.0103) 
Primebank 0.0093 (0.0302) 
0.0031 
(0.0270) 
0.0173* 
(0.0095) 
-0.0238 
(0.0379) 
Numrlat 0.0611
*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0578*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0087*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0148* 
(0.0085) 
Banking Market Characteristics     
HHIM -0.1696
*** 
(0.0653) 
-0.1400** 
(0.0586) 
-0.0348* 
(0.0206) 
-0.0595 
(0.0825) 
HHIH -0.2114
*** 
(0.0646) 
-0.1841*** 
(0.0579) 
-0.0406** 
(0.0204) 
-0.0964 
(0.0820) 
Interaction Terms     
HHILlength -0.0094
*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0093*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0013 
(0.0010) 
-0.0075 
(0.0057) 
HHIMlength -0.0030
* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0008 
(0.0005) 
-0.0072*** 
(0.0026) 
HHIHlength -0.0024
* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0022* 
(0.0011) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
-0.0074*** 
(0.0022) 
Obs 7,267 7,267 7,267 7,239 
F-statistics 15.16*** 14.99*** 25.49***  
Chi2 Statistics    494.80*** 
Adj(/Pseudo) R^2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.03 
 
Moreover, in the model for the determinants of loan acceptance set by Cassar et al 
(2015), empirically tested by SSBF data, ‘bankrupt’ has not been considered to be an 
endogenous independent variable. Indeed, in the models for the determinants of capital 
structure, cost or availability of external finance for small business found in the pre-existing 
literatures, the following variables have been considered not being endogenous: firm size 
(number of employees), incorporation, firm age, profitability, tangibility,  the gender of 
owner, owner’s educational background, number of banking relationships (Cole, 2013); 
length of banking relationships, banking market concentration (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 
1995); family business, prime financial institution being banks, distance between borrowers 
and lenders (Han, 2009a); start-up status (Han et al, 2014); owner-managed status (Han et al, 
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2008). These cover all of the independent variables selected in this chapter, which means, 
firstly, the full selection of the independent variables are supported by pre-existing literatures; 
secondly, it is less likely for the models in this chapter to suffer from endogeneity problem22.  
 
2.4 Implications and Conclusions 
This chapter sheds light on small business capital structure theories. The novelty 
contribution of this chapter is that, relationship lending and banking market concentration 
work pronouncedly as the determinants of small business capital structure decisions together 
with the reverse financial life cycle theory. Although ample empirical research has been 
carried out on the determinants of small business capital structure, this chapter is unique in 
checking the favourable/unfavourable effects of relationship lending and banking market 
concentration from a capital structure perspective, measured as both total debt ratio and long-
term debt ratio.  
Since asymmetric information plays a fundamental role in both capital structure 
theory (Lambert et al., 2012) and relationship lending theory (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), 
there should, theoretically, be close links between capital structure and relationship lending, 
and such impacts could only be found in a non-competitive banking market, which is 
consistent with the theoretical models proposed by Petersen and Rajan (1995). This chapter is 
unique in applying both traditional capital structure theories and relationship lending theories 
together to outline the relationship between firms’ capital structure and relationship lending. 
The major findings are, firstly, there is a general application of the reverse financial life cycle 
                                                 
22 Further robustness checks have been carried out. For example, the comparisons between corporations and 
non-corporations have been done. The reverse financial life cycle theory and relationship banking theory well 
perform among the corporations. 
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effect on financial leverages for all of the small businesses, and such an effect does not vary 
across different banking market conditions. Firms’ reduce the leverage as their financial life 
increases. Secondly, relationship banking has been found to be beneficial to small firms in 
reducing financial risks and, therefore, allows more tax-shield benefits. It enables the firms to 
reduce the speed of reduction of their leverage. Thirdly, without considering relationship 
banking, banking market concentration itself might have a weak detrimental effect on small 
businesses supporting the existence of SCP or RMP. Fourthly, the beneficial effect of 
relationship banking applies better for corporations than non-corporations. Overall, 
theoretically speaking, this chapter reveals that SCP/RMP and Information Hypothesis are 
not mutually exclusive. And in a concentrated banking market, as the banking relationship 
develops, the speed at which the financial leverage drops is significantly lower than that in a 
competitive banking market.  
This chapter informs both banks and small businesses. For the banks, especially in the 
concentrated banking market, relationship lending is an effective lending technology where 
there might be greater demands from small business customers. When designing relationship 
lending products, the banks need to also understand there is a decreasing demand for credit as 
the banking relationship lengthens and that in a competitive banking market this demand 
drops more quickly than in a moderately or highly concentrated banking market. For small 
businesses, relationship lending is still a very important tool for obtaining external finance in 
a concentrated banking market to better use financial leverage. 
The research is subject to some limitations. Firstly, although SSBF offers the 
information about banking market concentration measured at microeconomic scale which is 
much advantageous than country or state level, the proxy provided by SSBF is categorical 
rather than continuous variables. It is not available to test the non-linear effect of banking 
market concentration which might be potentially an issue as considered by Chong et al (2013). 
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Moreover, since the postal codes of the firms are confidential, it is not feasible to establish 
some alternative proxies of banking market concentration, e.g. Concentration Ratios, Lerner’s 
Index, etc., which may help show a more comprehensive view of banking market 
concentration. Therefore, in the future if SSBF could publish the postal code, it would be 
beneficial for further research in depth. 
Secondly, due to the cross-sectional nature of SSBF, it is not available for the research 
to follow the dynamic adjustment models to empirically test the convergence of capital 
structure towards to the optimal level (Ozkan, 2001). The causality could not be examined 
econometrically as well. Moreover, since the companies in the pools in each round of survey 
are not the same, it is not yet available to track the lagged or long-term effect of banking 
market concentration on firms’ capital structure decisions. Thus, we call for more the future 
in the panel data structure. 
As raised by Petersen and Rajan (1994), the external finance for small firms could be 
affected by both of the supply and demand sides of the credits. SSBF provides 
comprehensive information regarding the demand sides of the credits, however, due to the 
confidentiality of the firms’ addresses and the survey, more information regarding the supply 
side of the credits is not available.  Therefore, the research has limited power to capture the 
impacts on firms’ capital structure from the banks. In the future survey, if this issue could be 
considered and the data regarding this issue could be published, it would facilitate the 
research in depth. 
Although the latest SSBF dataset was released in October 2008, the last round of the 
survey happened in 2003 or 2004, which was more than 10 years ago. There is still numerous 
research focusing on SSBF dataset, e.g. Cole and Mehran (2016), Cassar et al (2015), Han et 
al (2015), etc. However, concern rises as that the external finance for small business with a 
more updated effectiveness, particularly during and after the financial crisis, might be more 
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valuable to be focused on (Berger et al, 2015). It is not available to empirically test such an 
issue by SSBF. Therefore, new round of survey is called for. 
Apart from the above limitations, the research could also be improved in future in the 
following approaches: firstly, the research could be conducted separately in 1998 and 2003, 
and in this way, it enables to investigate the impacts of Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in effect since 1997. Moreover, according to Petersen and Rajan 
(1994 and 1995), the asymmetric information problem is less severe for older firms than 
younger firms, as well as larger firms than smaller firms. Thus, it is also considerable to split 
the SSBF dataset by younger firms group and older firm group, or medium-sized group and 
small-sized group for analysis and comparison. 
   
 
 157 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: Why Small Business Borrow from Non-
primary Sources? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Asymmetric information problem plays an important role in determining the 
financing behaviour of small businesses (Ang, 1991). Relationship lending is 
believed to be one of the mechanisms which could effectively overcome asymmetric 
information problem where lenders could acquire ‘soft information’ via the 
relationship with small business customers (Boot, 2000; Berger and Udell, 2006; 
Udell, 2008).  However, the ‘hold-up’ problem may emerge as the relationship 
develops and thus banks may extract extra rents from borrowers based on the 
information advantage gained from stronger relationships with borrowers (Sharpe, 
1990; Brunner and Krahnen, 2013). Therefore, there is a trade-off between the 
favourable and detrimental effects of relationship lending on the availability and 
price of small business finance and hence there have been inconsistent empirical 
findings from existing literature. For example, a ‘net’ favourable effect has been 
reported on the reduction of loan price (Bharath, et al., 2011) and improved 
availability of finance (Hernandez-Canovas and Martines-Solano, 2010; Bolton et al, 
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2013). Meanwhile, the effects could offset each other and an insignificant effect of 
relationship lending on loan prices has also been found (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Wu and Chua, 2012). Where the hold-up problem is stronger, a ‘net’ detrimental 
effect would be observed, such as a higher loan rate with a longer relationship 
(Degryse and Ongena, 2005). However, the hold-up problem could be mitigated by 
switching to another source of finance (Degryse and Cayseele, 2000; Farinha and 
Satos, 2002; Gopalan et al, 2011; Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010).  
Despite there are large volumes of research on small business relationship 
lending, there is little done on the small business behaviour of switching relationship 
lenders – borrowing from a non-primary financial institution (In this chapter, such 
behaviour is named “switching behaviour” for short). According to SSBF 1998 and 
2003, for all of the most recent loan applications (issued or rejected within 1 year), 
33.74% amongst them were submitted to the firms’ non-primary financial institution. 
Since relationship lending is conducted with firms’ primary financial institution 
while transactional lending more probably occurs with firms’ non-primary financial 
institution (Ono et al, 2014), theoretically, the informational opacity is less severe for 
primary financial institution to deal with the loan application than non-primary 
financial institution, the research question generates as follows: 
a) What is the likeliness of switching to alternative lenders for small businesses?  
b) What is the impact of such switching behaviour on small business finance in 
terms of  i) The loan approval probability; ii) The loan Interest Spread; iii) 
The maturity of the loan 
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Based on relationship lending and banking market concentration theories 
derived from Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995), this study falls into the research 
area of relational bank switching where there has been a few empirical studies with 
an exception of Ongena and Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos (2002), Berger et al., 
(2005), Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), Degryse et al., (2011) and Gopalan et al., 
(2011). It contributes to the existing literature in the following unique ways. First, 
differing from the studies on bank side (e.g. Berger et al., 2005), this chapter focuses 
on the relationship with banks from the perspective of small businesses, such as the 
duration, scope and non-bank relationship etc. Second, different from a passive bank 
switch, e.g. because of bank mergers (Degryse et al, 2011), the current study looks at 
a voluntary selection of lenders where other bank relationships exist. It also considers 
all possible relationships with any types of financial institutions rather than banks 
only. Thirdly, the samples are typical small businesses which are smaller than those 
samples used by Onega and Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos (2002), Gopalan 
(2011) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)23 in the similar areas. Fourthly, by using 
samples from U.S., I could be able to investigate how the effects of relationship 
banking changes over local capital market concentrations which have been identified 
as an important element in small business finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Han et 
al., 2009a). Fifthly, this chapter investigated not only the determinants of “switching 
behaviour” of the most recent loan application, but also the impacts of “switching 
behaviour” on the probability of loan application to be approved by the financial 
institutions, the cost of the loans and the availability of the loans. To my best 
knowledge, it is the first research to investigate the impacts of “switching behaviour” 
                                                 
23 These four studies also use samples from large firms. 
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on the loan deals. Table 3-1 summarises the key differences of the specified research 
topic between this chapter and other empirical studies. 
Inconsistent with the research by Ongena and Smith (2001), Farinha and 
Santos (2002) and  Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), by analysis on 1,823 most recent 
loan applications from SSBF 1998 and 2003, hold-up effect has not been found in the 
this study. The research finds that, firstly, more financially risky firms or 
informationally opaque firms are more likely to do the bank switching, e.g. smaller 
firms, firms with more risky D&B credit score, etc., which is not consistent with the 
predictions by “lock-in” effect theories, supporting an information hypothesis view 
of the relationship banking theories. Secondly, when the primary financial institution 
is a bank, or the firm has checking or saving accounts in the primary financial 
institution, it is less probably for the firm to do the switching, implicating the 
importance of relationship banking, which could effectively reduce the information 
acquisition costs. Thirdly, it has been confirmed that banking market concentration 
plays a significant role to maintain the small businesses in the banking relationship. 
Banking market competition leads to higher borrowing cost, which supports Petersen 
and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) theoretical predictions. Fourthly, it finds that if firms 
choose not to borrow from their primary financial institution, both of the borrowing 
cost and application rejection rate would be higher. However, the maturity of the 
loan deal lengthens for these firms, which might be the motivations of “switching 
behaviour” providing the existence of a lower loan application approval rate and a 
higher interest rate. In general, these findings support Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 
and 1995) small business borrowing theories. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews 
relevant literature and Section 3 introduces the data, variables, methodology and the 
empirical results. Finally, Section 4 discusses the empirical findings and concludes 
this chapter. 
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3.2 Literature review  
A greater degree of asymmetric information problem in financing smaller 
firms (Ou and Haynes, 2006) could cause a higher cost of finance for small business 
borrowers, relatively higher information acquisition cost for lenders, moral hazard 
problem and adverse selection problems (Ang, 1991; Darrough & Stoughton, 1986). 
Relationship lending has been found to play an important role in mitigating 
information asymmetry problem and in lowering the cost of finance (Berger and 
Udell, 1995). The information asymmetry problem could also be mitigated when a 
small firm becomes more established with more tracking records and as a result, the 
cost of finance could be lower and the availability of finance could be improved 
(Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2012; Peltoniemi and Vieru, 2013; Deng et al, 2014). 
Meanwhile, with a stronger and longer banking relationship, ‘hold-up’24 problem 
may emerge where lenders could charge a higher rate on loans (Degryse and Caseele, 
2000) and  the favourable effects of relationship banking could be ameliorated. When 
the negative effects of hold-up problem are greater than the favourable effects of 
relationship banking, small firms intend to form new banking relationships (Gopalan, 
2011). Hence, the following sections review both theoretical and empirical literature 
on the effects of relationship banking.  
                                                 
24 The phenomenon that banks may attract borrowers at relatively lower loan interest rate at the 
beginning and later extract extra rents along with time (von Thadden, 2004) 
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Table 3-1: Summary of Relevant Literatures on Switching: Target Firms and Behaviours 
 Target Firms Target firms’ behaviours 
This chapter Small Businesses in U.S. Borrowing from non-primary financial institutions 
Ongena and Smith (2001) 
Listed companies in Oslo Stock 
Exchange 
Termination of relationship banking 
Farinha and Santos (2002) All-size Portugal firms 
Firms which have set only one tie of relationship banking  start  
to keep multiple relationships 
Berger et al (2005) Small Businesses in U.S. Relationship bank exclusivity. 
Ioannidou and Ongena 
(2010) 
All-size Bolivian firms 
In past 12 months, firms borrowed from a bank where they never 
set up relationships 
Gopalan et al (2011) Medium and large size firms 
Multinomial: firms borrow always from relationship banks (0), 
keeping multiple relationship banks (1), switching relationship 
banks respectively (2). 
Degryse et al (2011) Belgian SMEs 
Because of relationship banks have merged, firms have to be 
‘forced’ to choose to ‘stay’, ‘drop’ or ‘switch’ relationship 
banks. 
 164 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical Models 
The favourable effects of relationship banking have been theoretically 
modelled by Diamond (1989) and Boot and Thakor (1994). Diamond (1989) 
indicates that taking adverse selection into consideration and under the situation of 
all of the borrowers with little track record would be given same interest rate, as 
more and more information (repayment/track record, ex post profitability) was 
produced and conveyed to the lenders, the borrowing interest rate will obviously 
decrease as the relationship gets matured. Relationship lending could effectively 
reduce the adverse selection problems for the lenders. Boot and Thakor (1994) also 
proposed in their theoretical model that, on one hand, a long banking relationship 
will reduce the interest rate of the unsecured loans and decrease the probability to 
pledge collateral; moreover, relationship lending could ameliorate moral hazard 
problem. 
Theoretical modelling of hold-up problems and bank-switching could be 
found from Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (2004). These theoretical 
models take similar underpinning assumptions such as that relationship lending 
alleviates the degree of asymmetric information problem and banks could obtain 
information advantages by developing a stronger or longer relationship with their 
customers. The information advantages are greater when the customers are more 
informationally opaque (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010). 
Sharpe (1990) models the cost of bank switch for borrowers because of the 
adverse selection issue. By developing a longer and stronger relationship with 
customers, the incumbent banks could gain information advantages against 
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‘outsiders’ on the quality of borrowers and the information advantages could be 
developed into a monopoly power over borrowers. As the relationships become 
longer and stronger, the asymmetric information problem could be alleviated and 
meanwhile, the cost of hold-up problem increases. If firms switched to ‘outside’ 
banks, they may suffer from a higher interest rate because the firms would be pooled 
with other low quality borrowers. Rajan (1992) models that, because of informational 
advantages, insider banks may extract extra rents from the existing borrowers. While 
borrowing from additional sources and setting priority appropriately could restrict 
the insider bank’s monopoly power and prevent them from extracting extra rents. 
Borrowers could also benefit from a lower interest rate from bank switching and 
riskier borrowers are more likely to switch to an outsider bank (von Thadden, 2004) 
 
3.2.2 Empirical Literatures 
Ample empirical research has examined the effects of relationship banking, 
especially on the availability and cost of finance. The favourable effects on lowered 
costs of borrowing have been reported by Bharath et al., (2011), Berger and Udell 
(1995), Brick and Palia (2007), and Athavale and Edmister (2004) and the effects on 
the improved availability of finance have been found by Petersen and Rajan (1994), 
Berger and Udell (1995), Angelini et al. (1998), Hernandez-Canovas and Martines-
Solano (2010), Bharath et al. (2011),  Jimenez et al., (2006), and Chakraborty and Hu 
(2006). Relationship banking has also been found to have additional favourable 
effects on the improvement of borrower’s corporate governance (Dass and Massa, 
2011) and on the reduction of business failure rates and the credit risk of borrowers 
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(Gómez-Gonzále and Reyes, 2011). Meanwhile, the negative effects of relationship 
banking, in the form of a hold-up problem, especially on the increased loan rates as 
firm-bank relationship develops, have also been found by Degryse and Cayseele 
(2000), Angelini, et al., (1998), D’Auria et al., (1999), and Hanley and Crook 
(2005)25. Businesses with larger size may switch banks in order to increase the loan 
size (Gopalan et al., 2011) and to lower loan prices (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010).  
 
3.2.3 “Stay” vs “Change”? 
As shown in both theoretical and empirical research, when small business 
needs external finance and to ensure where to seek the sources of the finance, the 
small business has to balance the benefits and costs to borrow from its primary 
financial institution since primary financial institution is usually relationship-based 
while non-primary financial institutions are more often transaction-based (Ono et al, 
2014). More strongly built relationship could effectively save the banks from high 
monitoring costs and transaction costs (Ang, 1991) and mitigate credit rationing 
problem (Shikimi, 2013); On the other hand, hold-up effect of relationship lending 
may emerge as the relationship gets stronger (Rajan, 1992; Cao et al, 2015). Because 
of the monopolistic advantage for primary financial institution to hold the 
information of the small business comparing with other financial institutions, 
primary financial institution may extract extra rents from the loans from its small 
business customers as the banking relationship develops. When such lock-in cost 
                                                 
25 An insignificant effect of relationship banking on loan rate has also been reported by Wu and Chua 
(2012). 
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increases to a higher level than switching cost, small business turns to seek for 
external finance from another financial institution (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010).  
Retaining multiple borrowing relationships allows each of the relational 
financial institution to reduce monitoring because of duplicate monitoring.  This is 
more preferable for small business with lower profitability and higher risks (poor 
finance) (Carletti, 2004; Elsas et al, 2004; Shikimi, 2013). Because of the powerful 
information monopolistic advantage of primary financial institution, small business 
with poor finance characters could be more easily to be distinguished by primary 
financial institution. Such firms are more likely to seek external finance from other 
sources. As the severe adverse selection problem in small business loan market, 
firms escaping from the situation of “trapping” in single financial institution may 
suffer from severe credit rationing problem from the new banks. Such firms suffer 
from a higher rejection rate for their loan application. The empirical evidence has 
been found by Farinha and Santos (2002) by collecting data from Portugal central 
bank and select sample firms founded after 1980 and initially borrowed from a single 
bank. They find that as a relationship matures, firms are more likely to develop 
additional relationships, especially for businesses with greater growth opportunities 
and poor performance. 
Other factors matter in small business’ switching decision process, such 
banking market concentration and structure of firms’ relational bank. Banking 
market concentration could strongly influence the strength of relationship lending 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995) or even acts as a determinant for firms to establish 
relationship lending or not (Elsas, 2005). As empirically captured by the research of 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), firms in a more concentrated banking market are less 
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likely to borrow from new banks since banks in concentrated banking market are less 
intensely to attract new customers by much lower loan interests. Bank size is another 
determinant, as smaller firms tend to borrow from smaller size banks for better 
information transmission through the managerial layers of banks (Berger et al, 2005). 
M&A of the banks is also another factor to force the small business to make a 
decision on switching: if the related bank is merged with other banks, business 
customers would have to make a decision on to switch to another bank (switch), to 
simply drop the relationship and do not establish any new one (drop) or to stay with 
the newly merged bank (stay). Moreover, a single-relationship with the target bank in 
a merger is more likely to terminate the relationship and business customers are more 
likely to terminate a relationship by dropping than by switching (Degryse et al., 
2011). 
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3.3 Data and empirical methodology 
3.3.1 Data Source 
The empirical data used in this chapter is from the Survey of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF) conducted by US Federal Reserve and aims to investigate the 
financial issues of small businesses throughout United States. The survey collects 
information from randomly selected samples from Dun & Bradstreet which have 
fewer than 500 employees26 and the sample size is 4240 in 2003 and 3561 in 1998. 
Therefore, there are 7801 samples in the pooled data over 2 rounds. 
SSBF provides very detailed information on small business’ firm 
characteristics and owner characteristics. Moreover, it also supports very specific 
information on firm-financial institution relationship characteristics and most recent 
loan characteristics. It allows me to track the history of the characters of primary 
firm-financial institution relationship and relationship with the financial institution 
dealing with most recent loans. This study only considers the most recent loan 
applications made within 12 months prior to the interview date. In other words, the 
samples limits to 1823 loan applications, including 497 loan applications in 1998 and 
1326 loan applications in 2003.  
In the new dataset with 1823 loan applications, there are 398 successful loan 
applications and 99 denied loan applications in 1998 with an approval rate of 
80.08%. While in 2003, there are 1214 successful loan applications and 112 denied 
loan applications indicating an approval rate of 91.55%. Overall, there are 1612 
                                                 
26 Please see the survey methodology report for more detailed information on sampling (SSBF, 1998 
and 2003). 
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successful loan applications and 211 rejected loan applications. The financial 
institutions approved 88.43% of the loan applications. 
 
3.3.2 Variables 
This chapter aims to investigate why small businesses borrow from a lender 
which is a non-primary source of financial services and to investigate the impacts of 
such “switching behaviour”, e.g. on the probability for small business to get loan 
application approved, the interest rate of the loan deals and loan maturity. The most 
important financial institution which provides financial services to small businesses 
is defined as the ‘primary’ source by the survey and all other institutions from which 
small firms obtain financial services are ‘non-primary’ sources. The relationship with 
primary financial institution has been widely used in the empirical research such as 
Berger and Udell (1998), Berger et al., (2001) and Saparito and Coombs (2013). 
Moreover, such ‘primary’ relation is less likely to be transactionally oriented (Ono et 
al., 2014). As indicated in Table 3-2, the dependent variables include 
“SWITCHBORROW”, “APPROVAL”, “SPREAD” and “MATURITY”. 
“SWITCHBORROW” aims to investigate the determinants of “switching behaviour” 
while the other three variables reflect the cost and availability of the loan deals. 
Moreover, I have followed Cole et al (2004) to organise the full set of 
independent variables. The explanatory variables could be classified into 5 groups: 1) 
Small business’ firm characters and owner characters. 2) Loan characters. 3) 
Relationship characters. 4) Bank characters. 5) Banking market characters. The 
definition and summary characteristics has been listed in Table 3-2. And correlation 
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matrix for continuous variables has been presented in Table 3-3. As reported in Table 
3-2, a typical firm in this dataset is an owner-managed family corporation with 50 
employees, 16.69 years of age, with a moderately financial risky score, an 
industrialized ROA of -6.72%, with a gentleman as the owner with an educational 
background under degree level. The primary banking relationship is of 10 years’ 
length and the distance between the firm and the financial institution is 50 miles, and 
the firm has savings/checking accounts in the primary financial institution. Table 3-
3A and Table 3-3B show the correlation matrix for the continuous variables and 
categorical variables respectively, in general, there are no strong correlation detected 
except the correlation between firm size and loan size27. It indicates it is less likely to 
suffer from multicollinearity problem for the regressions. 
 
 
                                                 
27 VIF test has been done as well in later sessions and no multicollinearity problem has been found. 
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Table 3-2: Summary Statistics for All the Variables 
 (Industry and region dummies are not reported here, available on request) 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Median S.D. Min Max 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile 
Dependent Variables 
SWITCHBORROW 1: if most recent loan application from non-primary financial institution; 0, otherwise. 1823 0.34 0 0.47 0 1 0 1 
APPROVAL 1: if most recent loan application is approved; 0, otherwise. 1823 0.88 1 0.32 0 1 1 1 
SPREAD Spread between loan interest rate and prime rate (%)28 1180 2.35 1.75 2.40 0.02 25.58 1.00 3.00 
maturityorignal Maturity of the loans (in months) 1544 43.10 12 60.46 1 576 12 60 
MATURITY Ln(1+maturityoriginal) 1544 3.24 2.56 1.00 0.69 6.36 2.56 4.11 
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
TOTEM Total number of employees 1823 49.60 20 72.32 0 486 5 66 
LOGTOTEM Ln(1+totem) 1823 3 3.04 1.44 0 6.19 1.79 4.20 
FAGE Firm age in years 1823 16.69 14 12.86 0 103 7 23 
LOGFAGE Ln(1+fage) 1823 2.61 2.71 0.78 0 4.64 2.08 3.18 
CORPORAT 1: firm is corporation; 0, otherwise 1822 0.71 1 0.45 0 1 0 1 
FINRISK 1-3: 1 = financially least risky firms; 3 = financially most risky firms 1823 1.87 2 0.76 1 3 1 2 
INDYEARROA Industry normalized (profits / total assets)29 (%) 1812 -6.72 -1.16 29.33 -202.78 272.84 -5.30 -0.23 
                                                 
28 Although there are 1612 loan deals approved, 432 firms reported a negative or zero spread of which I have discarded for the variable of “spread”. 
29 Following Han et al (2009b), I normalize the ROA (R) by industry and year. I define the industry normalized Ratios (R′) as 𝑅′𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 - 1𝑁𝑗,𝑡 ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)𝑁𝑗,𝑡𝑖=1 , where j 
indicates sector, i indicates the individual firm, t indicates year. 
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OWNERMANAGED 1: if owners are managers; 0, otherwise. 1785 0.88 1 0.32 0 1 1 1 
FAMILY 1: if over 50% of the ownership come from the same family; 0, otherwise. 1823 0.77 1 0.42 0 1 1 1 
FEMALE 1: if over 50% of the owners are female; 0, otherwise. 1785 0.22 0 0.42 0 1 0 0 
EDUBA 1: if over 50% of the owners have a degree or higher educational qualification; 0, otherwise. 1785 0.49 0 0.50 0 1 0 1 
Most Recent Loan Application Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE Ln(1+amount of dollars of most recent loan application) 1823 11.73 11.51 1.96 5.71 17.73 10.31 13.12 
LOCDUM 1: if most recent loan is line of credit; 0, otherwise. 1823 0.61 1 0.49 0 1 0 1 
Financial Institution Characteristics 
PRIMEBANK 1: if primary financial institution is commercial bank; 0, otherwise 1823 0.86 1 0.34 0 1 1 1 
Firm - Financial Institution Relationship Characteristics 
PRIMESAVE 1: if the firm use checking/savings service from the primary financial institution; 0, otherwise. 1822 0.92 1 0.28 0 1 1 1 
PRIMEREL Length of relationship in months with the primary financial institution 1823 120.42 83.77 123.24 0 1152 35.97 168.02 
LOGPRIMEREL Ln(1+PRIMREL) 1823 4.32 4.44 1.05 0 7.05 3.61 5.13 
PRIMEDIST Distance in mills between the firm and the primary financial institution 1823 40.85 3 215.18 0 3041 1 10 
LOGPRIMEDIST Ln(1+PRIMDIST) 1823 1.68 1.39 1.44 0 8.02 0.69 2.4 
Banking Market Conditions Characteristics 
HHIL 1: if firm in competitive banking market; 0, otherwise 1823 0.06 0 0.23 0 1 0 0 
HHIH 1: if firm in highly concentrated banking market; 0, otherwise 1823 0.48 0 0.50 0 1 0 1 
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Table 3-3A: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for Continuous Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 SPREAD 1.00        
2 LOGTOTEM -0.27*** 1.00       
3 LOGFAGE -0.15*** 0.30*** 1.00      
4 INDYEARROA 0.02 0.04 -0.01 1.00     
5 LOGMRLSIZE -0.34*** 0.62*** 0.22*** 0.03 1.00    
6 LOGPRIMEREL -0.03 0.11*** 0.36*** 0.03 0.07*** 1.00   
7 LOGPRIMEDIST -0.02 0.09*** -0.02 -0.04 0.14*** -0.16*** 1.00  
8 MATURITY 0.01 -0.11*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.09*** -0.02 0.02 1.00 
(“***”, “**”, “*” stand for 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively) 
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Table 3-3B: Spearman Correlation Matrix for Categorical Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 APPROVAL 1.00               
2 SWITCHBORROW -0.09*** 1.00              
3 YEAR98DUMMY -0.08*** 0.23*** 1.00             
4 CORPORAT 0.10*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 1.00            
5 STARTUP -0.05* 0.09*** 0.05** -0.11*** 1.00           
6 RISKYSCORE -0.11*** 0.10*** 0.13*** -0.10*** 0.13*** 1.00          
7 OWNERMANAGED -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.09*** 0.03 0.01 1.00         
8 FAMILY -0.03 0.07*** 0.05* -0.12*** -0.03 0.00 0.06** 1.00        
9 FEMALE 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.16*** 1.00       
10 EDUBA -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.06*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.05** -0.13*** -0.14*** 1.00      
11 LOCDUM 0.06** -0.24*** -0.28*** 0.11*** -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07*** 0.03 0.09*** 1.00     
12 PRIMEBANK 0.04 -0.18*** -0.01 0.09*** -0.06** -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 1.00    
13 HHIL 0.04 -0.01 -0.05** 0.05* 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06*** 1.00   
14 HHIH 0.01 -0.01 0.07*** -0.04* 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04* -0.03 -0.06** -0.05** -0.24*** 1.00  
15 PRIMEBANK 0.02 -0.12*** -0.10*** 0.07*** -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05** -0.00 0.01 0.07*** 0.43*** 0.06* -0.02 1.00 
(“***”, “**”, “*” stand for 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively)  
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3.3.3 Univariate Analysis 
As indicated by Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995), relationship lending 
could mitigate the informational opacity problem for small business. Information 
transmission overtime between firms and financial institution could be accumulated, 
especially for soft information. Relational financial institution could effectively 
reduce the information acquisition costs and monitoring costs and ameliorate credit 
rationing problem for relational small business customer (Shikimi, 2013). Moreover, 
since firms with poor quality of finance are usually discouraged for borrowing by 
self-selection mechanism (Han, 2009a), firms with loan application submitted to 
primary financial institution would be better distinguished and suffer from less cost 
for adverse selection problem than those firms made loan applications submitted to a 
transactional financial institution. The loan application approval rate should be 
higher for primary financial institution than non-primary financial institution. 
Similarly, the loan interest rate should be lower for primary financial institution than 
non-primary financial institution, while loan maturity should be longer. 
In Table 3-4, I have grouped all of the loan applications into two subsample 
groups and presented summary statistics for each group and compared the difference 
between these two groups for each variable. From Table 3-4, it is shown that if the 
firms choose to make the loan application from their primary financial institutions 
rather than non-primary financial institution, they would be characterized as follows: 
larger size, larger firm age, larger size of the loan amount in the application, less 
financially risky, higher profitability, longer relationship and closer distance with the 
primary financial institution, in corporation, lower probability to be family business, 
lower probability to be  owned by female. Moreover, those firms made the 
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application for lines of credits, or their primary financial institution is a bank, or they 
have checking/savings accounts in the primary financial institution. In summarize, 
from the univariate analysis, more informational transparent firms (larger size, older, 
good credit record, stronger relationship with primary financial institution, etc) 
would like to make loan applications from primary financial institution. Moreover, if 
firms borrow from primary financial institutions, the loan approval rate would be 
higher, and the loan deals are characterized as: lower interest rates, shorter maturity. 
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Table 3-4: Summary Statistics for Loan Applications from Primary and Non-
primary Financial Institutions Subsamples 
(“***”, “**”, “*” stand for 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively) 
Continuous Variables Comparison  
Variables  
Loan Applications from 
Non-primary Financial 
Institution 
(Subsample A) 
 
Loan Applications 
from Primary 
Financial Institution 
 (Subsample B) 
 Difference between Subsample A and B 
   Mean S.E.   Mean S.E.  Diff t-Stat 
SPREAD   2.80 0.16   2.09 0.06  0.71 4.91*** 
MATURITY   3.60 0.05   3.07 0.03  0.53 9.85*** 
LOGTOTEM   2.57 0.06   3.22 0.04  -0.65 -9.28*** 
LOGFAGE   2.45 0.03   2.69 0.02  -0.24 -6.35*** 
INDYEARROA   -9.01 1.41   -5.56 0.75  -3.46 -2.37** 
RISKYSCORE   1.97 0.03   1.82 0.02  0.17 4.50*** 
LOGMRLSIZE   11.02 0.07   12.10 0.06  -1.08 -11.45*** 
LOGPRIMEREL   4.21 0.04   4.38 0.03  -0.17 -3.24*** 
LOGPRIMEDIS
T   1.76 0.07   1.63 0.04  0.12 1.74
*** 
Binary Variables Comparison 
   Mean S.E.   Mean S.E.  Diff z-Stat 
APPROVAL   0.81 0.02   0.92 0.01  -0.12 -7.40*** 
CORPORAT   0.62 0.02   0.76 0.01  -0.14 -6.05*** 
STARTUP   0.09 0.01   0.05 0.01  0.05 3.84*** 
OWNERMANAGE
D   0.89 0.01   0.88 0.01  0.01 0.86 
FAMILY   0.82 0.02   0.75 0.01  0.07 3.43*** 
FEMALE   0.24 0.02   0.21 0.01  0.02 1.13** 
EDUBA   0.49 0.02   0.50 0.01  -0.01 -0.75 
LOCDUM   0.44 0.02   0.69 0.01  -0.24 -10.08*** 
PRIMEBANK   0.78 0.02   0.91 0.01  -0.13 -7.77*** 
PRIMESAVE   0.86 0.01   0.95 0.01  -0.09 -6.83*** 
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3.3.4 Empirical Models and Results 
This session aims to solve the following two research questions: 1) What 
kinds of small business would like to borrow from non-primary resources? 2) Does 
“switching behaviour” affect the approval, cost and maturity of the loan applications 
for small businesses?  
 
3.3.4.1 Who are more likely to borrow from non-primary resources? 
To investigate this question, I employ Equation (3-1) following Cole et al 
(2004): 
Prob(SWITCHBORROWi=1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 × Firm and Owner Characters (X1i) + 𝛼2 
× Most Recent Loan Application Characters (X2i) + 𝛼3  × Primary Relationship 
Characters (X3i) + 𝛼4 × Banking Market Concentration Characters (X4i) + εi                                  
                                                         ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-1) 
where Prob(SWITCHBORROWi=1) is the probability of most recent borrowing 
from a non-primary lender and 𝛼0  is the constant term, εi is the error term. ‘i’ 
indicates the ‘ith’ firm in the dataset. I have adopted Probit Regression for the 
estimation. Table 3-5 presents the results of the estimation. 
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Table 3-5 Determinants for Most Recent Loan Application Choice from 
Firms’ Non-primary Financial Institutions 
 Coe (S.E.) dy/dx 
Constant 2.6457
*** 
(0.4307)  
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Region Dummies YES YES 
YEAR98DUMMY 0.3587
*** 
(0.0835) 13.13% 
Firm and Owner Characters   
LOGTOTEM -0.0721
** 
(0.0336) -2.56% 
CORPORAT 0.0672 (0.0839) 2.37% 
LOGFAGE -0.0568 (0.0574) -2.02% 
STARTUP 0.1152 (0.1622) 4.18% 
INDYEARROA -0.0013 (0.0014) -0.05% 
RISKYSCORE 0.0832
* 
(0.0449) 2.96% 
OWNERMANAGED -0.1304 (0.1063) -4.74% 
FAMILY -0.0111 (0.0876) -0.39% 
FEMALE -0.0023 (0.0825) -0.08% 
EDUBA 0.1504
** 
(0.0715) 5.34% 
Loan Deal Characters   
LOGMRLSIZE -0.1307
*** 
(0.0236) -4.64% 
LOCDUM -0.4908
*** 
(0.0711) -17.69% 
Banking Relationship Characters   
LOGPRIMEREL 0.0260 (0.0358) 0.92% 
LOGPRIMEDIST -0.0085 (0.0271) -0.30% 
PRIMEBANK -0.5833
*** 
(0.1100) -22.14% 
PRIMESAVE -0.3247
** 
(0.1460) -12.15% 
Banking Market Conditions   
HHIL 0.0892 (0.1483) 3.23% 
HHIH -0.1348
* 
(0.0711) -4.78% 
Observations 1765  
Wald χ2 321.69***  
Log Likelihhod -960.98  
Pseudo R2 15.16%  
Predicted probability 31.46%  
 (Table 3-5 presents the Probit regressions for the determinants of Most Recent Loan 
Application (MRLA) Choice from Primary/Non-primary financial institutions. The 
dependent variable is SWITCHBORROW. Control variables including industrial and 
regional dummies are not reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF for all regressions have been calculated, no 
multicollinearity problem has been found. Robust Standard Errors are used.) 
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Table 3-5 presented the model to answer the first research question: a) What 
is the likeliness of switching to alternative lenders for small businesses? The Chi2 
statistic indicates a good model fitness for the regression. As presented in Table 3-5, 
firstly, it is shown that firm size negatively associates with “switching behaviour”. 
Larger size firms are less likely to borrow from non-primary financial institution and 
the marginal effect is -2.56%. This could be interpreted as small firms are supressed 
to the non-primary sources of finance when their quality has been identified by the 
primary bank. Secondly, more financially risky firms are not likely to borrow from 
their primary financial institution with a marginal effect of 2.96%, possibly due to 
the same reason as firm size. Moreover, it is found that if the owner of the firm has 
better educational background, it is 5.34% more likely for the firm to borrow from a 
non-primary financial institution.  
In terms of the loan characters – loan size and loan type, both of which are 
significant at 1% level. Loan size is negatively related with “switching behaviour” 
with a marginal effect of -4.64%. Information advantage of primary financial 
institution plays important role here for the loan application with larger size. 
Secondly, business lines of credit are 17.69% more likely to be made from primary 
financial institution. Comparing with other types of loans, lines of credit are issued 
based on the accumulation of previous information and therefore, it is less likely for 
small business to apply lines of credit from non-primary financial institutions.  
In terms of financial institution relationship characters in the regression, 
firstly, primary banking relationship and the distance between the firm and its 
primary financial institutions play insignificant role for the “changing” decision. The 
possible reason will be explored in section 3.3.5.1 for further analysis. Secondly, 
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when primary financial institution is a commercial bank, the firm is less likely to 
borrow from a non-primary financial institution and the likelihood of “switching 
behaviour” would be reduced by 22.14%, as the commercial banks have stronger 
market power to maintain the firms to borrow within the institution. A dummy of 
whether the firm is using any checking or savings service from its primary financial 
institution has been considered in the regression, as another proxy describing the 
primary banking relationship. It is shown that if a firm has already set up a bank 
account with its primary financial institution, the firm would like to borrow from the 
same financial institution. Such result is consistent with the theories from Norden 
and Weber (2010) and Sufi (2009), as such services could provide additional 
information to the service supplier financial institution and it saves the monitoring 
cost of the loan application as well as the information acquisition costs. In general, if 
a firm has a bank account in the primary bank, there is 12.15% less chance for the 
firm to borrow from a non-primary financial institution. These findings confirm that 
existing relationships would be able to retain the firm with the same financial 
resource for loan applications.  
Moreover, HHI as a measurement of banking market concentration for the 
firm has been considered into the regression. Table 3-5 shows that there is a negative 
relationship between highly concentrated banking market and “switching behaviour”, 
indicating that in a more competitive banking market, small business is more 
probably to borrow from non-primary resources. This supports Petersen and Rajan’s 
(1994 and 1995) relationship lending and banking market concentration theory.  
Overall, Table 3-5 supports Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) 
relationship lending and banking market concentration theory. Firms with severe 
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financial risks and higher degree of asymmetric information problem are more likely 
to switch to non-primary source of finance. While the existing banking relationship 
and better informational transparency would be able to maintain the firm to borrow 
within the banking relationship. The adjusted R-square is 5.76% for only control 
variables included in the regression. And firm and owner characteristics, loan deal 
characteristics, banking relationship characteristics and banking market 
concentration contribute30 2.84%, 3.86%, 2.49% and 0.2% to the adjusted R-square 
respectively.   
 
3.3.4.2 Does the behaviour of borrowing from non-primary financial institution 
increase the probability for the loan application to be approved? 
 
Based on the analysis in the earlier session, Questions as “whether the 
behaviour of borrowing from non-primary financial institution increases the 
probability for the loan application to be approved” emerge. In other words, what is 
the motivation of such “switching behaviour”? Does it benefit if small business 
borrow from a non-primary financial institution, e.g. is the loan application approval 
rate higher for such “switching behaviour”. To deal with loan applications from 
small business, financial institutions need to consider the monitoring cost and the 
risks associated with monitoring intensity (Carletti, 2004). Comparing with other 
financial institutions, primary financial institution holds stronger information 
advantages towards the firm (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995). However, primary 
                                                 
30 All of the values here are absolute value. 
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financial institution may also exert its market power based on the information 
advantage to explore extra rents (Rajan, 1992). Therefore, in this section, based on 
the model of Cole et al (2004), I have used the dependent variable 
(SWITCHBORROW) in the previous section as an explanatory variable for the 
following regression model: 
Prob(APPROVALi=1) = 𝛼0 + β × SWITCHBORROWi + 𝛼1 × Firm and 
Owner Characters (X1i) + 𝛼2 × Most Recent Loan Application Characters (X2i) + 𝛼3 
× Primary Relationship Characters (X3i) + 𝛼4 × Banking Market Concentration 
Characters (X4i) + εi                                  
                                                        ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-2) 
where Prob(APPROVALi=1) is the probability of getting approved for the loan 
application and 𝛼0 is the constant term, εi is the error term. ‘i’ indicates the ‘ith’ firm 
in the dataset. I have adopted Probit Regression for the estimation. Table 3-6 presents 
the results of the estimation. 
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Table 3-6 Determinants of Most Recent Loan Application Approval 
Decision 
  Probit 
  Coe(S.E) dy/dx 
Constant  0.6973 (0.6207)  
SWITCHBORROW  -0.3303
*** 
(0.0977) -4.57% 
YEAR98DUMMY  -0.2647
** 
(0.1090) -3.69% 
Industry Dummies  YES  
Region Dummies  YES  
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
LOGTOTEM  0.1714
*** 
(0.0437) 2.18% 
CORPORAT  0.2120
** 
(0.1018) 2.89% 
LOGFAGE  0.2194
*** 
(0.0754) 2.79% 
STARTUP  0.1660 (0.1984) 1.89% 
INDYEARROA  -0.0006 (0.0021) -0.01% 
RISKYSCORE  -0.3174
*** 
(0.0596) -4.04% 
OWNERMANAGED  0.005 (0.1526) 0.06% 
FAMILY  -0.3298
** 
(0.1349) -3.65% 
FEMALE  -0.0648 (0.1024) -0.85% 
EDUBA  0.1509 (0.0969) 1.92% 
Loan Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE  -0.0010 (0.0310) -0.01% 
LOCDUM  -0.1218 (0.0971) -1.52% 
Banking Relationship Characteristics 
LOGPRIMEREL  0.0338 (0.0458) 0.43% 
LOGPRIMEDIST  0.0446 (0.0375) 0.57% 
PRIMEBANK  0.1202 (0.1347) 1.63% 
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PRIMESAVE  0.3642
** 
(0.1644) 5.80% 
Banking Market Concentration Characteristics 
HHIL  0.4199
* 
(0.2367) 4.03% 
HHIH  0.0828 (0.0952) 1.05% 
Observations  1754 
Wald χ2  244.98*** 
Log Likelihood  -489.73 
Peseudo R2  21.32% 
Predicted Probability  93.47% 
(Table 3-6 presents the Probit regressions for the determinants of getting the most recent 
loan application approved. The dependent variable is SWITCHBORROW. Control variables 
including industrial and regional dummies are not reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand 
for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF for all regressions have been 
calculated, no multicollinearity problem has been found. The Chi2 statistic indicates a good 
model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are used.) 
 
It is shown in the Probit regression that if a small firm borrows from a non-
primary source of finance, the approval rate would decrease (coefficient = -0.3303 
with a marginal effect of -4.57%). Also as disclosed in section 3.3.4.1, smaller and 
financially riskier firms are more likely to switch the source of finance, consistent 
with Cole et al’s (2004) findings. Therefore, it could be drawn that, firstly, good 
borrowers tend to stay within the primary banking relationship to borrow, while bad 
borrowers are inclined to switch the source of finance; therefore, those applications 
made outside the primary financial institutions suffer from lower approval rate due to 
the poor quality of the borrowers. 
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In terms of other explanatory variables, it is found that the loan approval rate 
is higher for larger firms31 (coefficient=0.1714; marginal effect = 2.18%), elder firms 
(coefficient = 0.2194; marginal effect = 2.79%) and corporations (coefficient = 
0.2120; marginal effect = 2.89%). The findings is consistent with relationship 
banking theories (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995) and the existing empirical 
research (Cole et al, 2004), as these firms are of better informational transparency 
and thus the loan approval rate is higher. It is also found that less financially risky 
firms (coefficient = -0.3174; marginal effect = -4.04%) are benefited with higher 
loan approval rate. Family firms suffer from higher agency cost because of self-
control and risk-shifting problem (Schulze et al, 2003; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 
2009) and therefore, the loan application approval rate is lower (coefficient = -
0.3298; marginal effect = -3.65%).  
Referring to relationship characters, it is confirmed in the result that if the 
firm has checking or savings accounts in the primary financial institutions, the loan 
approval rate would increase (coefficient = 0.3642; marginal effect = 5.80%). 
According to signalling theories (Wu and Chua, 2012), a pre-existing bank account 
effectively signals the creditworthiness of the small business and therefore, the 
asymmetric information problem is less severe and therefore, the loan approval rate 
rises up. Table 3-6 also confirms that banking market competition increases the loan 
approval rate (coefficient of HHIL = 0.4199, marginal effect = 4.03%), which might 
be attributed to more credit supply in competitive banking market (Ryan et al, 2014). 
 
                                                 
31 Larger firms are more likely to be better borrowers as there is a negative association between firm 
size and its default risks for borrowing (Molina, 2005). Larger firms are less likely to be self-
discouraged when they are in need of finance which is also a signal of good quality as the good 
borrowers (Han et al, 2009a) 
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3.3.4.3 Does the behaviour of borrowing from non-primary financial institution 
increase the borrowing cost? 
Further to the loan approval rate analysis, I have conducted the analysis on 
the borrowing cost (measured by the spread between loan interest rate and prime rate) 
associated with “switching behaviour”. The proposed empirical model is as the 
follows: 
SPREADi = 𝛼0  + β × SWITCHBORROWi + 𝛼1  × Firm and Owner 
Characters (X1i) + 𝛼2  × Most Recent Loan Application Characters (X2i) + 𝛼3  × 
Banking Relationship Characters (X3i) + 𝛼4  × Banking Market Concentration 
Characters (X4i) +  𝛼5 × Base Rate (X5i) + εi 
                                            ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-3) 
Where SPREADi stands for the continuous proxies of the difference between 
loan interest rate and prime rate, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. ‘i’ indicates the ‘ith’ firm in 
the dataset. The OLS regression results are presented in Table 3-7. 
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Table 3-7 Determinants of Most Recent Loan Interest Rate (SPREAD) 
  OLS  
  Coe(S.E)  
Constant  7.3233
*** 
(1.1587)  
SWITCHBORRO
W  
0.4243*** 
(0.1583)  
YEAR98DUMMY  -0.8151
*** 
(0.1913)  
Industry Dummies  YES  
Region Dummies  YES  
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
LOGTOTEM  -0.0964
* 
(0.0580)  
CORPORAT  -0.1112 (0.1846)  
LOGFAGE  -0.2276
** 
(0.1029)  
STARTUP  0.3101 (0.5177)  
INDYEARROA  -0.0019 (0.0027)  
RISKYSCORE  0.1339 (0.0933)  
OWNERMANAG
ED  
-0.0128 
(0.1596)  
FAMILY  0.1212 (0.1690)  
FEMALE  -0.0571 (0.1700)  
EDUBA  -0.2515
* 
(0.1431)  
Loan Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE  -0.3512
*** 
(0.0509)  
LOCDUM  0.2547
* 
(0.1431)  
Banking Relationship Characteristics 
LOGPRIMEREL  0.0400 (0.0634)  
LOGPRIMEDIST  0.0408 (0.0512)  
PIRMEBANK  0.0122 (0.3104)  
PRIMESAVE  -0.5612 (0.5006)  
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Banking Market Concentration 
Characteristics 
HHIL  0.5259
* 
(0.3186)  
HHIH  0.1236 (0.1394)  
Observations  1123  
F-statistic  4.19***  
R2  17.63%  
Predicted SPREAD  2.33  
(Table 3-7 presents the results of OLS regression for the determinants of Most 
Recent Loan Application (MRLA) Interest Rate spread. The dependent variable is the spread 
between loan interest rate and the prime rate (SPREAD). Control variables including 
industrial and regional dummies are not reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the 
confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIFs have been checked and no 
multicollinearity problem has been found. The F-statistic indicates a good model fitness. 
Robust Standard Errors are used.) 
 
According to Table 3-7, the results show that if a firm borrow from a non-
primary financial institution, the borrowing cost is higher (coefficient = 0.4243). 
Such findings are consistent with Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) theoretical 
predictions that banking relationship is beneficial to overcome the asymmetric 
information problem and lower the borrowing cost for small business, and as 
referenced in the earlier section, primary financial institution usually offers 
relationship lending while non-primary financial institution often adopts 
transactional lending (Ono et al, 2014). Considering the findings in Section 3.3.4.2 
together, financially risky and smaller firms prefer to borrow from an alternative 
financial institution and they suffer from lower approval rate and higher borrowing 
costs. 
In terms of firm and owner characteristics, firstly, it is found that elder firms 
pay less interest for the loans (coefficient = -0.2276).  Longevity is a signal of the 
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survival ability and the accumulation of reputation. In general, the information 
opacity problem is less severe as the firm age increases as the tracking records are 
more ample (Drakos, 2013). Similarly, larger firm size, as another form of signal of 
reputation and informational transparency, works significantly to reduce the 
borrowing costs (coefficient=-0.0964). Secondly, it is found that if the owners have 
better educational background32, the loan interest would be lower (coefficient = -
0.2515), as owners with better education are assumed to be more able to deal with 
financial risks. 
As for the other variables, Table 3-7 also confirms that the interest rate for the 
loans with larger size is lower (coefficient = -0.3512). While comparing with other 
types of loans, the interest rate for lines of credit is higher (coefficient = 0.2547). 
Finally, it shows that comparing with other types of banking markets, firms in 
competitive banking market suffer from a higher interest rate for the loan deals 
(coefficient = 0.5259), which is consistent with Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) 
theoretical predictions and empirical findings. 
 
 
                                                 
32 It has been widely accepted that better education of the business owners facilitates entrepreneurial 
ventures (Schiller and Crewson, 1997), e.g. it increases the survival rate of the firms (Hogarth-Scott & 
Wilson, 1998); it enhances the business owner’s income (Honig, 1998); it speeds up the growth rates 
of the firms (Peña, 2002), etc. Therefore, many scholars believe that better educational background of 
the business owners benefits the borrowing for the firms and this has been supported empirically in 
terms of better loan terms, e.g. better education of the business owners helps reduce the loan interest 
rate (Wu and Chua, 2012); it helps the firm to obtain the loans with larger size (Bates, 1990), etc. 
Obviously, better education helps the firm to obtain a better loan contract. Education is an important 
element for the banks to consider for assigning an internal credit rating associated with the loan 
application. The loan officer will seriously consider such information at the negotiation with small 
businesses (Kirschenmann and Norden, 2012). The result in this chapter supports this point of view. 
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3.3.4.4 Does the behaviour of borrowing from non-primary financial institution 
affect loan maturities? 
In this section, I aim to investigate, whether the maturity is different between 
the borrowers within primary banking relationship or outside primary banking 
relationship. As indicated in the pre-existing literatures, shorter maturity gives 
advantages to the lenders to better explore the information from the borrowers 
periods by periods and therefore the lenders obtain greater flexibility and control. 
The borrowers with a loan with shorter maturity are forced to renegotiate with the 
lenders and therefore the lenders are empowered to monitor the risks of the 
borrowers and they are able to cease to continue by the end of the maturity if any 
emerging severe default risks are observed to arise. However, for the borrowers, 
loans with shorter maturity suffer from a lower degree of flexibility for investment 
opportunities with longer life cycle (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). Therefore, it is 
concluded that loans with shorter maturity are more likely to be issued to the 
borrowers with higher degree of informational opacity. As indicated in Section 
3.3.4.1, since smaller firms and more financially risky firms are more probably to 
borrow from a non-primary financial institution, it is hypothesised  that such kinds of 
firms are more likely to get loans issued with shorter maturity. 
To investigate the relationship between the loan maturity and “switching 
behaviour”, the regression model is set as follows: 
MATURITYi  = 𝛼0 + β × SWITCHBORROWi + 𝛼1 × Firm and Owner 
Characters (X1i) + 𝛼2 × Most Recent Loan Application Characters (X2i) + 𝛼3 × 
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Banking Relationship Characters (X3i) + 𝛼4 × Banking Market Concentration 
Characters (X4i) + εi                                  
                                                 ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-4) 
Where MATURITY stands for the continuous proxies of the maturity of the 
loan deals, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. ‘i’ indicates the ‘ith’ firm in the dataset. The OLS 
regression results are presented in Table 3-8. 
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Table 3-8 Determinants of Most Recent Loan Maturity 
  OLS 
  Coe(S.E) 
Constant  2.8102
*** 
(0.3054) 
SWITCHBORROW  0.2653
*** 
(0.0547) 
YEAR98DUMMY  -0.0919 (0.0668) 
Industry Dummies  YES 
Region Dummies  YES 
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
LOGTOTEM  -0.0647
*** 
(0.0219) 
CORPORAT  -0.0458 (0.0627) 
LOGFAGE  0.0099 (0.0364) 
STARTUP  0.0636 (0.1288) 
INDYEARROA  -0.0003 (0.0011) 
RISKYSCORE  -0.0567
* 
(0.0307) 
OWNERMANAGED  -0.0004 (0.0582) 
FAMILY  0.1449
*** 
(0.0513) 
FEMALE  0.0944
* 
(0.0557) 
EDUBA  -0.0096 (0.0437) 
Loan Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE  0.1001
*** 
(0.0158) 
LOCDUM  -1.1302
*** 
(0.0556) 
Banking Relationship Characteristics 
LOGPRIMEREL  -0.0006 (0.0224) 
LOGPRIMEDIST  -0.0038 (0.0186) 
PIRMEBANK  0.1800
** 
(0.0870) 
PRIMESAVE  0.0017 (0.1151) 
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Banking Market Concentration Characteristics 
HHIL  -0.0275 (0.0865) 
HHIH  -0.0183 (0.0460) 
Observations  1471 
F-statistic  24.69*** 
R2  34.81% 
Predicted SPREAD  3.23 
(Table 3-8 presents the results of OLS regression for the determinants of Most 
Recent Loan Application (MRLA) maturity. The dependent variable is the maturity of the 
loan deals issued most recently (MATURITY). Control variables including industrial and 
regional dummies are not reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIFs have been checked and no multicollinearity problem has 
been found. The F-statistic indicates a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are used.) 
 
Table 3-8 shows that if a firm borrow from a non-primary financial institution, 
the maturity is longer (coefficient = 0.2653), which is inconsistent with the 
theoretical predictions. This could be explained, as the advantages non-primary 
financial institution could offer to the small businesses who switch from its primary 
source of finance. As found from the previous sections, smaller and financially risker 
firms would borrow from non-primary source of finance and they suffer from lower 
approval rate and higher borrowing cost. Longer maturity might be a kind of 
financial flexibility non-primary financial institutions may offer to this kind of small 
businesses to attract potential borrowers and it would be one of the motivation of the 
“switching behaviour”.  
Another possible explanation to interpret the positive relationship between 
the switching behaviour and maturity would be, as confirmed by Scherr and Hulburt 
(2001), firms with intermediate level of risks are more likely to finance by long-term 
debt while firms with high or low level risks are more likely to finance with short-
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term debt. As indicated in Section 3.3.4.1, firms who turn to a non-primary financial 
institution are obviously less likely to be high-quality firms. However, if a firm could 
successfully secure a loan from a non-primary financial institution, it is also less 
likely to be a low-quality firm, which means, if a firm borrowed from a non-primary 
financial institution, it is very likely it is at intermediate level of risks and the 
maturity is longer. 
In terms of other variables, Table 3-9 shows that financial riskier firms suffer 
from shorter maturity (coefficient = -0.0567), as shorter maturity empowers the 
financial institution to set stronger control and better monitoring on the small firms, 
consistent with Ortiz-Molina and Penas’s (2008) findings. Loan size (coefficient = 
0.1001) and primary bank dummy (coefficient = 0.1800) are positively relevant with 
the maturity of the loans, as banks have stronger market power to explore the 
information from the firm. Lines of credit (coefficient = -1.1302) is usually in shorter 
form. 
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3.3.5 Robustness Check and Further Analysis33,34 
3.3.5.1 Most Recent Loan (MRL) Banking Relationship for “Switching 
behaviour” 
Table 3-5 in Section 3.3.4.1 presents the regression analysis with only 
primary banking relationship characteristics rather than the banking relationship 
between the firm and the financial institution to which the firm has made the most 
recent loan application (named MRL banking relationship).  In this section, I also 
consider the banking relationship characteristics for MRL banking relationship into 
the regression as reported by Table 3-9. Since the MRL banking relationship 
variables contain the information that which financial institution the firm has 
borrowed from, the analysis in Section 3.3.5.1 is ex-post analysis. 
Table 3-9 Model A reports the Probit regression with MRL banking 
relationship characteristics and primary banking relationship characteristics are 
excluded from Model A, while Model B includes both of the MRL and primary 
banking relationship characteristics. Comparing with the model and result in Table 3-
5 in Section 3.3.4.1, Pseudo R-square arises from 15.16% (Table 3-5) to 53.31% 
(Table 3-9, Model A) and 58.12% (Table 3-11, Model B). On one hand, it indicates 
the results in Table 3-9 has much stronger explanatory power than Table 3-5, 
                                                 
33 Models including an interaction term between firm size and financially risky firm have been tested 
for the models in Table 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-13, etc. The interaction itself is not 
significant for all of the models. Therefore, no interaction effects are captured. Results are available 
from the author on request. 
34  Models including an interaction between the length of the relation and if the firm uses 
checking/saving account have been tested for the models in Table 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 
3-13, etc. The coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant for the models in Table 3-6, 3-7, 3-8 . 
The coefficient of the interaction term is significant for the models in Table 3-5. The results for the 
models in Table 3-9, 3-10, 3-12 and 3-13 are mixed. Overall, the results do not change the main story 
established in the thesis. Results are available from the author on request. 
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however, on the other hand, the reason is attributed to the fact that Table 3-5 is Ex-
ant analysis while Table 3-9 stands for Ex-post analysis.  
With the existence of both of primary banking relationship and MRL banking 
relationship, it is revealed that the longer the firms stay within the primary banking 
relationship, the more likely the firms would like to borrow from a non-primary 
source of finance. If the primary financial institution is a bank, it is less likely for the 
firm to switch relationship.  
In terms of MRL banking relationship, firstly, firms would like to switch to a 
financial institution with which the firm has shorter banking relationship. Moreover, 
in Model A, it shows that firms would like to switch to the financial institutions 
where the firm has never got a bank account.  
Considering with the conclusion drawn from Table 3-5, smaller firms and 
financially riskier firms are more likely to borrow from a non-primary financial 
institution, the overall picture, would be, under primary banking relationship, firms 
with poor quality are better distinguished and pushed out of the primary financial 
institution. They are more likely to find a financial institution which knows little 
about them and borrow.  Together with Section 3.3.4.1, Table 3-9 reflects that 
primary banking relationship is an effective instrument to distinguish quality of the 
firms. 
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Table 3-9 Determinants for Most Recent Loan Application Choice from 
Firms’ Non-primary Financial Institutions (Ex-post Analysis) 
 Model A dy/dx Model B dy/dx 
Constant 4.2760
*** 
(0.5094)  
3.6655*** 
(0.5958)  
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Region Dummies YES YES YES YES 
YEAR98DUMMY -0.1033 (0.1142) -3.52% 
0.0500 
(0.1162) 1.83% 
Firm and Owner Characters 
LOGTOTEM 0.0017 (0.0428) 0.06% 
0.0247 
(0.0446) 0.90% 
CORPORAT 0.1198 (0.1071) 4.08% 
0.0962 
(0.1112) 3.48% 
LOGFAGE 0.1354
* 
(0.0762) 4.68% 
0.0943 
(0.0824) 3.44% 
STARTUP 0.0688 (0.2395) 2.41% 
0.1419 
(0.2624) 5.30% 
INDYEARROA -0.0004 (0.0017) -0.01% 
0.0009 
(0.0019) 0.03% 
RISKYSCORE -0.0110 (0.0586) -0.38% 
-0.0146 
(0.0596) -0.53% 
OWNERMANAGED -0.0565 (0.1378) -1.97% 
-0.0205 
(0.1469) -0.75% 
FAMILY -0.0897 (0.1102) -3.14% 
-0.0939 
(0.1210) -3.47% 
FEMALE 0.0165 (0.1066) 0.57% 
0.0023 
(0.1116) 0.08% 
EDUBA 0.1150 (0.0919) 3.97% 
0.1665* 
(0.0974) 6.07% 
Loan Deal Characters 
LOGMRLSIZE -0.1502
*** 
(0.0293) -5.19% 
-0.1705*** 
(0.0314) -6.22% 
LOCDUM -0.1171 (0.0956) -4.07% 
-0.0632 
(0.0985) -2.31% 
Banking Relationship Characters 
LOGPRIMEREL   0.4943
*** 
(0.0832) 18.04% 
LOGPRIMEDIST   -0.0489 (0.0532) -1.78% 
PIRMEBANK   -0.9645
*** 
(0.2135) -36.95% 
PRIMESAVE   0.5621
** 
(0.2434) 17.94% 
LOGMRLRELa -0.2834
*** 
(0.0386) -9.79% 
-0.5701*** 
(0.0747) -20.81% 
LOGMRLDISTb 0.0085 (0.0284) 0.29% 
0.0642 
(0.0430) 2.34% 
MRLBANKc -0.2420
** 
(0.1234) -8.63% 
0.2398 
(0.1903) 8.47% 
MRLSAVEd -2.1083
*** 
(0.1151) -70.45% 
-2.3320*** 
(0.1601) -75.61% 
Banking Market Conditions 
HHIL 0.1569 (0.1711) 5.61% 
0.1275 
(0.1810) 4.76% 
HHIH -0.1656
* 
(0.0909) -5.71% 
-0.1675* 
(0.0959) -6.10% 
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Observations 1766  1765  
Wald χ2 808.83***  606.75***  
Log Likelihhod -529.07  -474.38  
Pseudo R2 53.31%  58.12%  
Predicted probability 29.56%  33.67%  
a: Natural logarithm of the length of banking relationship with the financial institutions 
where the firm submitted the most recent loan applications. 
b: Natural logarithm of the distance between the firm and the financial institutions where the 
firm submitted the most recent loan applications. 
c: Dummy (1: if the financial institutions where the firm submitted the most recent loan 
applications is a bank; 0: otherwise) 
d: Dummy (1: if the firm has bank accounts in the financial institutions where the firm 
submitted the most recent loan applications is a bank; 0: otherwise) 
(Table 3-9 presents the Probit regressions for the determinants of Most Recent Loan 
Application (MRLA) Choice from Primary/Non-primary financial institutions. The 
dependent variable is SWITCHBORROW. Control variables including industrial and 
regional dummies are not reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF for all regressions have been calculated, no 
multicollinearity problem has been found. The Chi2 statistic indicates a good model fitness. 
Robust Standard Errors are used.) 
 
Furthermore, Table 3-10 represents the analysis complementary to the Loan 
Approval Model (as in Section 3.3.4.2), Loan Spread Model (as in Section 3.3.4.3) 
and Loan Maturity Model (as in Section 3.3.4.4) considering MRL banking 
relationship characteristics. 
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Table 3-10 Determinants of Most Recent Loan APPROVAL RATE/INTEREST SPREAD/Maturity (Ex-post Analysis) 
 
APPROVAL 
(MODEL 1) 
APPROVAL 
(MODEL 2) 
SPREAD 
(MODEL 3) 
SPREAD 
(MODEL 4) 
MATURITY 
(MODEL 5) 
MATURITY 
(MODEL 6) 
 Coe(S.E) dy/dx Coe(S.E) dy/dx Coe(S.E) Coe(S.E) Coe(S.E) Coe(S.E) 
Constant 
0.9133 
(0.6120) 
 
0.4624 
(0.6505) 
 
7.9618*** 
(1.0506) 
7.8743*** 
(1.1825) 
3.2008*** 
(0.2929) 
2.9428*** 
(0.3077) 
SWITCHBORROW 
-0.4593*** 
(0.1392) 
-6.31% 
-0.3779*** 
(0.1428) 
-5.07% 
-0.3447 
(0.2227) 
-0.3237 
(0.2243) 
0.1936** 
(0.0816) 
0.1752** 
(0.0832) 
YEAR98DUMMY 
-0.2184** 
(0.1086) 
-2.87% 
-0.2223** 
(0.1107) 
-2.92% 
-0.8528*** 
(0.1884) 
-0.8618*** 
(0.1908) 
-0.1188* 
(0.0679) 
-0.1146* 
(0.0678) 
Industry Dummies YES  YES  YES YES YES YES 
Region Dummies YES  YES  YES YES YES YES 
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
LOGTOTEM 
0.1613*** 
(0.0444) 
1.97% 
0.1492*** 
(0.0445) 
1.82% 
-0.0961* 
(0.0581) 
-0.0992* 
(0.0574) 
-0.0593*** 
(0.0218) 
-0.0524*** 
(0.0218) 
CORPORAT 0.2389** 3.16% 0.2082** 2.72% -0.1087 -0.1238 -0.0440 -0.0524 
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(0.1009) (0.1022) (0.1792) (0.1781) (0.0630) (0.0624) 
LOGFAGE 
0.2167*** 
(0.0765) 
2.64% 
0.2109*** 
(0.0775) 
2.57% 
-0.1773* 
(0.1011) 
-0.1950* 
(0.1019) 
0.0332 
(0.0361) 
0.0224 
(0.0363) 
STARTUP 
0.1281 
(0.1989) 
1.43% 
0.1036 
(0.2004) 
1.17% 
0.2372 
(0.5006) 
0.2437 
(0.4982) 
0.0556 
(0.1300) 
0.0641 
(0.1290) 
INDYEARROA 
-0.0009 
(0.0021) 
-0.01% 
-0.0008 
(0.0021) 
-0.01% 
-0.0019 
(0.0026) 
-0.0018 
(0.0026) 
-0.0002 
(0.0011) 
-0.0001 
(0.0011) 
RISKYSCORE 
-0.3165*** 
(0.0602) 
-3.86% 
-0.3207*** 
(0.0605) 
-3.90% 
0.1095 
(0.0917) 
0.1090 
(0.0918) 
-0.0633** 
(0.0309) 
-0.0625** 
(0.0309) 
OWNERMANAGED 
-0.0132 
(0.1531) 
-0.16% 
-0.0014 
(0.1542) 
-0.02% 
-0.0388 
(0.1628) 
-0.0250 
(0.1667) 
-0.0022 
(0.0581) 
0.0007 
(0.0582) 
FAMILY 
-0.3625*** 
(0.1360) 
-3.78% 
-0.3470** 
(0.1368) 
-3.64% 
0.0940 
(0.1673) 
0.1012 
(0.1645) 
0.1426*** 
(0.0511) 
0.1470*** 
(0.0511) 
FEMALE 
-0.0677 
(0.1029) 
-0.85% 
-0.0553 
(0.1032) 
-0.69% 
-0.0313 
(0.1641) 
-0.0433 
(0.1661) 
0.0930* 
(0.0559) 
0.0877 
(0.0559) 
EDUBA 
0.1879* 
(0.0971) 
2.29% 
0.1726* 
(0.0976) 
2.10% 
-0.2236 
(0.1390) 
-0.2247 
(0.1407) 
-0.0146 
(0.0443) 
-0.0136 
(0.0440) 
Loan Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE 0.0164 0.20% 0.0261 0.32% -0.3454*** -0.3472*** 0.0942*** 0.0981*** 
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(0.0316) (0.032) (0.0483) (0.0486) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
LOCDUM 
-0.0296 
(0.0987) 
-0.36% 
-0.0267 
(0.0986) 
-0.32% 
0.3766*** 
(0.1387) 
0.4021*** 
(0.1375) 
-1.1315*** 
(0.0573) 
-1.1243*** 
(0.0572) 
Banking Relationship Characteristics 
LOGPRIMEREL   
-0.0328 
(0.0538) 
-0.40%  
0.1153 
(0.1117) 
 
0.0564* 
(0.0302) 
LOGPRIMEDIST   
0.0118 
(0.0446) 
0.14%  
0.0163 
(0.0625) 
 
-0.0015 
(0.0231) 
PIRMEBANK   
0.2518 
(0.1642) 
3.52%  
0.5767 
(0.4077) 
 
0.2213** 
(0.1051) 
PRIMESAVE   
0.2720 
(0.1783) 
3.93%  
-0.5692 
(0.5254) 
 
-0.0165 
(0.1332) 
LOGMRLRELa 
0.1043*** 
(0.0402) 
1.27% 
0.1161** 
(0.0476) 
1.41% 
-0.0200 
(0.0564) 
-0.0815 
(0.0969) 
-0.0494** 
(0.0195) 
-0.0790*** 
(0.0260) 
LOGMRLDISTb 
0.0584** 
(0.0279) 
0.71% 
0.0567* 
(0.0329) 
0.69% 
0.0718 
(0.0568) 
0.0563 
(0.0670) 
0.0002 
(0.0157) 
-0.0014 
(0.0193) 
MRLBANKc 
-0.3697*** 
(0.1358) 
-3.85% 
-0.4280*** 
(0.1478) 
-4.35% 
-0.7875*** 
(0.2079) 
-1.0390*** 
(0.3036) 
0.0030 
(0.0691) 
-0.0939 
(0.0847) 
MRLSAVEd -0.0590 -0.71% -0.0534 -0.64% -0.5652** -0.3721 0.0026 0.0411 
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(0.1538) (0.1538) (0.2590) (0.2989) (0.0889) (0.1012) 
Banking Market Concentration Characteristics 
HHIL 
0.4146* 
(0.2379) 
3.80% 
0.4009* 
(0.2344) 
3.70% 
0.4998 
(0.3126) 
0.5064 
(0.3147) 
-0.0189 
(0.0870) 
-0.0299 
(0.0865) 
HHIH 
0.0657 
(0.0962) 
0.80% 
0.0733 
(0.0965) 
0.89% 
0.1252 
(0.1341) 
0.1300 
(0.1345) 
-0.0196 
(0.0460) 
-0.0208 
(0.0460) 
Observations 1,755  1,754  1,123 1,123 1,471 1,471 
F-statistic     4.34*** 3.93*** 25.34*** 24.18*** 
Wald Chi2 251.77***  262.11***      
(Pseudo) R2 22.66%  23.36%  20.46% 21.02% 34.77% 35.34% 
Predicted y 93.82%  93.84%  2.33 2.33 3.23 3.23 
a: Natural logarithm of the length of banking relationship with the financial institutions where the firm submitted the most recent loan applications. 
b: Natural logarithm of the distance between the firm and the financial institutions where the firm submitted the most recent loan applications. 
c: Dummy (1: if the financial institutions where the firm submitted the most recent loan applications is a bank; 0: otherwise) 
d: Dummy (1: if the firm has bank accounts in the financial institutions where the firm submitted the most recent loan applications is a bank; 0: otherwise) 
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Table 3-10 presents the results of Probit regression for the determinants of 
Most Recent Loan Application (MRLA) approval rate (Model 1 and Model 2; 
dependent variable: APPROVAL), and OLS regression for the determinants of Most 
Recent Loan interest spread (Model 3 and Model 4; dependent variable: SPREAD) 
and Most Recent Loan maturity (Model 5 and 6; dependent variable: MATURITY). 
Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are not reported in the 
table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VIFs have been checked and no multicollinearity problem has been found. The Chi2 
statistic or F-statistic indicates a good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are 
used.) 
Table 3-10 shows the results for the models employing MRL banking 
relationship variables. Model 1, 2, 5, 6 convey very similar results as in Table 3-6 
and Table 3-8, where if firms borrow from a non-primary financial institution, the 
application approval rate will drop and the maturity increases. The coefficients of 
“SWITCHBORROW” are negative but not significant in Model 3 and 4. Indeed, the 
p-values of the coefficients are 1.122 and 0.149 respectively, very close to 
significance at 0.1 confidence level. Certainly, one of the possible reason would still 
be that as MRL banking relationship variables contain the information on how the 
small business has made the choice on which financial institution to have chosen. 
Cohabitation with the dummy of SWITCHBORROW may lead to potential bias. To 
illustrate, I present Table 3-11 showing the regression result excluding all banking 
relationship variables for Model (Equation) 3-1, 3-2, 3-3 and 3-4. 
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The results in Table 3-11 are consistent with the main regression results in 
Table 3-5, 3-6, 3-7 and 3-8. In particular, Table 3-11 concludes that the “switching 
behaviour” may leads to a lower approval rate for loan applications, a higher loan 
interest spread and a longer maturity.  
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Table 3-11 Determinants of Switching Behaviour/Most Recent Loan APPROVAL RATE/INTEREST SPREAD/MATURITY 
(excluding Banking Relationship Characteristics) 
 SWITCHING 
(MODEL 1) 
 
APPROVAL 
(MODEL 2) 
 
SPREAD 
(MODEL 3) 
MATURITY 
(MODEL 4) 
 Coe(S.E) dy/dx Coe(S.E) dy/dx Coe(S.E) Coe(S.E) 
Constant 
1.8730*** 
(0.3736) 
 
1.3526** 
(0.5615) 
 
6.8509*** 
(0.9267) 
2.9882*** 
(0.2711) 
SWITCHBORROW   
-0.3684*** 
(0.0959) 
-5.19% 
0.4603*** 
(0.1539) 
0.2488*** 
(0.055) 
YEAR98DUMMY 
0.3434*** 
(0.0802) 
12.60% 
-0.2917*** 
(0.1048) 
-4.14% 
-0.8104*** 
(0.1811) 
-0.0837 
(0.0655) 
Industry Dummies YES  YES  YES YES 
Region Dummies YES  YES  YES YES 
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
LOGTOTEM 
-0.0867*** 
(0.0332) 
-3.09% 
0.1840*** 
(0.0436) 
2.36% 
-0.1044* 
(0.0587) 
-0.0615*** 
(0.0218) 
CORPORAT 
0.0352 
(0.0824) 
1.25% 
0.2376** 
(0.101) 
3.30% 
-0.1157 
(0.1848) 
-0.0405 
(0.0630) 
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LOGFAGE 
-0.0661 
(0.0541) 
-2.35% 
0.2469*** 
(0.0728) 
3.17% 
-0.2259** 
(0.0982) 
0.0119 
(0.0357) 
STARTUP 
0.1144 
(0.1552) 
4.17% 
0.1810 
(0.1974) 
2.06% 
0.3206 
(0.5221) 
0.0547 
(0.1298) 
INDYEARROA 
-0.0011 
(0.0013) 
-0.04% 
-0.0008 
(0.0020) 
-0.01% 
-0.0018 
(0.0026) 
-0.0003 
(0.0011) 
RISKYSCORE 
0.0823* 
(0.0445) 
2.93% 
-0.3183*** 
(0.0592) 
-4.09% 
0.1352 
(0.0926) 
-0.0581* 
(0.0308) 
OWNERMANAGED 
-0.1215 
(0.1047) 
-4.42% 
-0.0083 
(0.1515) 
-0.11% 
-0.0266 
(0.1579) 
-0.0015 
(0.0577) 
FAMILY 
0.0101 
(0.0863) 
0.36% 
-0.3400** 
(0.1334) 
-3.78% 
0.1362 
(0.1688) 
0.1424*** 
(0.0509) 
FEMALE 
0.0016 
(0.0820) 
0.06% 
-0.0672 
(0.1022) 
-0.89% 
-0.0479 
(0.1682) 
0.0943* 
(0.0558) 
EDUBA 
0.1338* 
(0.0705) 
4.77% 
0.1606* 
(0.0963) 
2.06% 
-0.2530* 
(0.1423) 
-0.0083 
(0.0440) 
Loan Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE 
-0.1185*** 
(0.0231) 
-4.22% 
-0.0069 
(0.0303) 
-0.09% 
-0.3334*** 
(0.0499) 
0.0966*** 
(0.0155) 
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LOCDUM 
-0.4985*** 
(0.0700) 
-18.02% 
-0.1265 
(0.0966) 
-1.59% 
0.2249 
(0.1469) 
-1.1271*** 
(0.0559) 
Banking Market Concentration Characteristics 
HHIL 
0.0454 
(0.1458) 
1.63% 
0.4394* 
(0.2393) 
4.20% 
0.4879 
(0.3157) 
-0.0202 
(0.0866) 
HHIH 
-0.1359* 
(0.0705) 
-4.83% 
0.0713 
(0.0950) 
0.91% 
0.1148 
(0.1373) 
-0.0183 
(0.0460) 
Observations 1,766  1,755  1,123 1,471 
F-statistic     4.67*** 27.09*** 
Wald Chi2 282.32***  244.90***    
(Pseudo) R2 12.66  20.74%  17.11% 34.48% 
Predicted y 31.72%  93.39%  2.33 3.23 
(Table 3-11 presents the results of Probit regression for the determinants of Switching Behaviour (Model 1; dependent variable: 
SWITCHBORROW), Most Recent Loan Application (MRLA) approval rate (Model 2; dependent variable: APPROVAL), and OLS regression for the 
determinants of Most Recent Loan interest spread (Model 3; dependent variable: SPREAD) and Most Recent Loan maturity (Model 4; dependent variable: 
MATURITY). Control variables including industrial and regional dummies are not reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. VIFs have been checked and no multicollinearity problem has been found. The F-statistic or Chi2 statistic indicates a good 
model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are used.) 
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In summary, Section 3.3.5.1 provides a comprehensive analysis taking MRL 
banking relationship characteristics into consideration. The results are generally 
robust but still slightly different from the main analysis in previous sections. One of 
the reasons could be that MRL banking relationship revealed the information on how 
the firms have made a decision on which financial institution to choose and therefore, 
it is ex-post analysis. When analysing the APPROVAL mode, SPREAD model or 
MATURITY model, there might be some bias due to the cohabitation of MRL 
banking relationship characteristics and switching behaviour. Such kind of 
conjecture has been further supported by the evidence that the results of the analysis 
excluding any banking relationship characteristics are very similar to the main 
analysis in the previous sections. In other words, by eliminating the MRL banking 
relationship characteristics from Table 3-9 and Table 3-10, the results change slightly; 
while by deleting the primary banking relationship characteristics, the results are 
very robust to the main tests in the previous sections. It indicates, the models in the 
main tests are less likely to be biased comparing with the models in Table 3-9 and 
Table 3-10. 
 
3.3.5.2 Endogeneity Control 
So far, in all of the analysis in previous sections, I treat the switching variable 
– “SWITCHBORROW” as exogenous. However, there might be potential concern of 
this variable in model 3-2, 3-3 and 3-4 that it might be endogenously determined by 
the other variables in each model together with other unobservable variables. 
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Therefore, this section aims to control the potential endogeneity problem by 
employing 2-strage regressions and propensity score matching analysis. 
 
3.3.5.2.1 Endogeneity Control by Regressions 
A) Loan Application Approval Rate and “switching” behaviour 
In section 3.3.4.2, Model 3-2 has been set as follows 
Prob(APPROVALi=1) = 𝛼0 + β × SWITCHBORROWi + 𝛼1 × Firm and 
Owner Characters (X1i) + 𝛼2 × Most Recent Loan Application Characters (X2i) + 𝛼3 
× Primary Relationship Characters (X3i) + 𝛼4 × Banking Market Concentration 
Characters (X4i) + εi                                  
                                               ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-2) 
And Model 3-1 in Section 3.3.4.1 is structured as follows 
Prob(SWITCHBORROWi=1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 × Firm and Owner Characters (X1i) + 𝛼2 
× Most Recent Loan Application Characters (X2i) + 𝛼3  × Primary Relationship 
Characters (X3i) + 𝛼4 × Banking Market Concentration Characters (X4i) + εi                                  
                                             ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-1) 
SWITCHBORROWi in Eq. (3-2) might be endogenously determined and the 
economic reason could be that there are unobservable factors, such as the risk 
attitude of owners, affect business performance and the behaviour of borrowing from 
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non-primary sources simultaneously.  I have adopted recursive bivariate probit model 
to solve such problem. 
Considering Eq. (3-1) and Eq. (3-2) simultaneously as the following, 
SWITCHBORROWi* = 𝛾1𝑍1i  + 𝜀1i  (SWITCHBORROWi=1 if  
SWITCHBORROWi*>0; SWITCHBORROWi=0, otherwise) 
                                                          ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-5) 
APPROVALi* = 𝛾2𝑍2i  + ω SWITCHBORROWi + 𝜀2i  (APPROVALi=1 if  
APPROVALi*>0; APPROVALi=0, otherwise) 
                                                         ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-6) 
           �𝜀1𝜀2 |𝑍1,𝑍2� ~ N ��00� � 1𝜌 𝜌1 �� 
                                                         ….……………………….……..Eq..(3-7) 
            Where 𝑍1i  indicates the variables of Firm and Owner Characters, Most 
Recent Loan Application Characters, Primary Relationship Characters, Banking 
Market Concentration Characters; 𝑍2i  indicates the variables of Firm and Owner 
Characters, Most Recent Loan Application Characters, Primary Relationship 
Characters, Banking Market Concentration Characters and the instrument. ‘i’ 
indicates the ‘ith’ firm in the dataset.      
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If F(·,·)35 is adopted to denote the joint distribution function of (𝜀1, 𝜀2) and 
the two error terms of Eq (3-5) and Eq (3-6) have symmetric distributions, the 
expected probability distribution is  as the following: 
 P11𝑖= Prob(APPROVALi=1, SWITCHBORROWi =1) = F(𝛾2𝑍2i+ ω, 𝛾1𝑍1i, 
ρ) 
P10i= Prob(APPROVALi=1, SWITCHBORROWi =0) = F(𝛾2𝑍2i, -𝛾1𝑍1i, -ρ) 
P01i= Prob(APPROVALi=0, SWITCHBORROWi =1) = F(-𝛾2𝑍2i- ω, 𝛾1𝑍1i, -
ρ) 
P00i= Prob(APPROVALi=0 SWITCHBORROWi =0) = F(-𝛾2𝑍2i, -𝛾1𝑍1i, ρ) 
                                                                     ……………….……..Eq.  (3-8) 
 
The likelihood function to be maximized is 
L(ω, 𝛾1i, 𝛾2i)  = �𝑃11iQai𝑃10iQbi𝑃01iQci𝑃00iQdi 
Where Qai= APPROVALi *  SWITCHBORROWi 
            Qbi  = APPROVALi *  (1 - SWITCHBORROWi ) 
            Qci= (1 - APPROVALi ) *  SWITCHBORROWi 
                                                 
35 Here, F(𝑍1, 𝑍2, ρ) = 𝑒−0.5∗�𝑍12+𝑍22−2ρ𝑍1𝑍21−ρ2
2𝜋�1−ρ2
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            Qdi= (1 - APPROVALi ) *  (1 - SWITCHBORROWi ) 
                                                                    ………………….……..Eq. (3-9) 
By maximizing the loglikelihood function, unbiased result could be obtained 
(Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2012). And the result is presented in Table 3-12 as follows. 
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Table 3-12 Determinants of Most Recent Loan Application Approval 
Decision (2-stage Regression) 
 1st Stage Probit 2nd Stage RBP  
 Coe(S.E) Coe(S.E) dy/dx 
Constant 
3.0467*** 
(0.4596) 
1.6139** 
(0.6416) 
 
SWITCHBORROW  
-1.0071*** 
(0.2092) 
-6.93% 
YEAR98DUMMY 
0.2918*** 
(0.0868) 
-0.1563 
(0.1092) 
-4.31% 
Industry Dummies YES YES  
Region Dummies YES YES  
FINANTIE -0.6522
*** 
(0.0558) 
  
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
LOGTOTEM 
-0.0316 
(0.0341) 
0.1485*** 
(0.0472) 
2.45% 
CORPORAT 
0.0747 
(0.0859) 
0.2092** 
(0.1012) 
3.00% 
LOGFAGE 
-0.0135 
(0.0595) 
0.2063*** 
(0.0772) 
3.25% 
STARTUP 
0.1958 
(0.1734) 
0.1957 
(0.1866) 
1.80% 
INDYEARROA 
-0.0014 
(0.0014) 
-0.0008 
(0.0019) 
0.00% 
RISKYSCORE 
0.0629 
(0.0470) 
-0.2895*** 
(0.0608) 
-4.79% 
OWNERMANAGED 
-0.1292 
(0.1122) 
-0.0192 
(0.1545) 
0.40% 
FAMILY 
0.0031 
(0.0917) 
-0.3289** 
(0.1336) 
-4.39% 
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FEMALE 
-0.0131 
(0.0846) 
-0.0641 
(0.1022) 
-0.94% 
EDUBA 
0.1543** 
(0.0736) 
0.1720* 
(0.0930) 
1.82% 
Loan Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE 
-0.1077*** 
(0.0246) 
-0.0299 
(0.0330) 
0.12% 
LOCDUM 
-0.5567*** 
(0.0739) 
-0.2251** 
(0.0967) 
-0.50% 
Banking Relationship Characteristics 
LOGPRIMEREL 
0.0805** 
(0.0377) 
0.0335 
(0.0484) 
0.08% 
LOGPRIMEDIST 
0.0012 
(0.0272) 
0.0417 
(0.0341) 
0.63% 
PRIMEBANK 
-0.6494*** 
(0.1137) 
-0.0229 
(0.1435) 
3.29% 
PRIMESAVE 
-0.0381 
(0.1452) 
0.2868* 
(0.1661) 
5.58% 
Banking Market Concentration Characteristics 
HHIL 
0.0230 
(0.1602) 
0.4390* 
(0.2586) 
4.89% 
HHIH 
-0.1257* 
(0.0741) 
0.0524 
(0.0926) 
1.48% 
Observations  1765  
Wald χ2  685.49***  
Log Likelihood  -1369.85  
LR test (χ2)  9.65***  
Predicted 
Probability  92.52%  
 
(Table 3-12 presents the results of Recursive Bivariate Probit regression for the determinants 
of Most Recent Loan Application (MRLA) Approval Decision. The dependent variable is 
APPROVAL. 1st Stage regression of the RBP model has been reported in the 1st Stage Probit 
column; 2nd Stage regression of the RBP model has been reported in the 2nd Stage RBP 
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column. Marginal effect of the RBP regression is shown in the dy/dx column. The dependent 
variable of 1st Stage Regression is SWITCHBORROW. FINANTIE is a continuous variable 
indicating on average, how many ties of service each bank has for each company. Control 
variables including industrial, regional dummies are not reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” 
stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIFs have been checked and 
no Multicollinearity problem has been found. The Chi2 statistic indicates a good model 
fitness. Regressions using Robust Standard Errors are also conducted, the results are 
extremely similar and available on request.) 
 
Table 3-12 shows very similar result comparing with Table 3-6. In particular, 
it presents a negative relationship between switching behaviour and loan application 
approval rate, which concludes similarly as the findings in section 3.3.4.2. The LR 
test (Chi-2 statistic = 9.65) shows a significant result at 1% level, indicating the 
existence and clearance of the simultaneity problem by the RBP model.  
 
B) Loan Interest Spread and “switching” behaviour 
In Section 3.3.4.3, the Loan Interest Spread Model has been set as follows: 
SPREADi = 𝛼0  + β × SWITCHBORROWi + 𝛼1  × Firm and Owner 
Characters (X1i) + 𝛼2  × Most Recent Loan Application Characters (X2i) + 𝛼3  × 
Banking Relationship Characters (X3i) + 𝛼4  × Banking Market Concentration 
Characters (X4i) +  𝛼5 × Base Rate (X5i) + εi 
                                          \      ….……………………….……..Eq..(3-3) 
SWITCHBORROWi in Eq. (3-3) could be endogenously determined and the 
economic reason could be that there are unobservable factors, such as the risk 
attitude of owners, affect business performance and the behaviour of borrowing from 
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non-primary sources simultaneously.  I have adopted treatment analysis to solve such 
problem. 
For Eq. (3-3), I compress all of the control variables, firm and owner 
characteristics variables, loan characteristics variables, banking relationship 
characteristics variables and banking market variables as the vector of 𝑋′  for short. 
In this way, Eq. (3-3) could be transformed as  SPREAD𝑖 = α𝑋𝑖′+β𝐒𝐖𝐈𝐓𝐂𝐇𝐁𝐎𝐑𝐑𝐎𝐖𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖               
   ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-10) 
Where 𝑆PREAD𝑖 stands for the continuous proxies of the difference between 
loan interest rate and prime rate, 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
In Treatment Regression, the first stage model could be: SWITCHBORROW𝑖∗  = 𝜔𝑖′ γ+ 𝑢𝑖   (3-11) where 𝜔𝑖′  stands for the vectors of 
independent variables and 𝑢𝑖 is the error term. 
Moreover, SWITCHBORROWi = 1 if SWITCHBORROW𝑖∗  > 0; SWITCHBORROW𝑖 = 0 otherwise. 
E[𝑆PREAD𝑖︱SWITCHBORROW𝑖 = 1, 𝑥𝑖, 𝜔𝑖] =α𝑋𝑖′ + β+ E[𝜀𝑖︱SWITCHBORROW𝑖 
= 1, 𝑥𝑖, 𝜔𝑖]  
              = α𝑋𝑖′ + β+ ρ𝜎𝜀 
𝜑(−𝜔𝑖′γ)
1−Ф(−𝜔𝑖′γ) 
….……………………….……..Eq. (3-12) 
Similarly, E[ 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖︱ SWITCHBORROW𝑖  = 0, 𝑥𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖 ] = α𝑋𝑖′  + ρ𝜎𝜀 
−𝜑(−𝜔𝑖′γ)
Ф(−𝜔𝑖′γ)  
….……………………….……..Eq. (3-13) 
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The difference between the expected loan interest rate between primary 
financial institution and non-financial institution is as follows: 
Difference=E[𝑆PREAD𝑖︱SWITCHBORROW𝑖  = 1, 𝑥𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖 ]-E[𝑆PREAD𝑖︱SWITCHBORROW𝑖 = 0, 𝑥𝑖, 𝜔𝑖] =β+ρ𝜎𝜀 𝜑(𝜔𝑖′γ)Ф(𝜔𝑖′γ)[1−Ф�𝜔𝑖′γ�] 
….……………………….……..Eq. (3-14) 
Treatment effect will be captured by testing the hypothesis of “ρ=0” (Greene, 
2012). 
The regression analysis is based on the samples with most recent successful 
loan applications. Moreover, if the spread is not a positive number, the corresponding 
observation is dropped. Table 3-13 reports the results of Treatment Regression 
analysis. 
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Table 3-13 Determinants of Most Recent Loan Interest Rate (2-stage 
Regression on SPREAD) 
  1st Stage Probit 2nd Stage Treatment Analysis 
  Coe(S.E) Coe(S.E)  
dy/dx 
(with 
treatment 
Effect) 
dy/dx 
(without 
treatment 
Effect) 
Constant  3.1914
*** 
(0.6074) 
6.7895*** 
(0.9120)    
SWITCHBORR
OW   
0.8293*** 
(0.2759)    
YEAR98DUMM
Y  
0.2724** 
(0.1148) 
-0.8729*** 
(0.1780)  -0.8112 -0.8472 
Industry 
Dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
Region Dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
FINTIERATIO  -0.5710
*** 
(0.0747)     
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
LOGTOTEM  -0.1235
*** 
(0.0456) 
-0.0899 
(0.0644)  -0.1181 -0.1008 
CORPORAT  0.1162 (0.1138) 
-0.1239 
(0.1638)  -0.0973 -0.1139 
LOGFAGE  0.0124 (0.0777) 
-0.2255** 
(0.1099)  -0.2227 -0.2244 
STARTUP  0.2071 (0.2355) 
0.3043 
(0.3326)  0.3511 0.3242 
INDYEARROA  -0.0004 (0.0019) 
-0.0020 
(0.0028)  -0.0021 -0.0020 
RISKYSCORE  0.0576 (0.0615) 
0.1258 
(0.0884)  0.1389 0.1309 
OWNERMANA
GED  
-0.1445 
(0.1496) 
-0.0034 
(0.2067)  -0.0362 -0.0169 
FAMILY  0.0192 (0.1157) 
0.1222 
(0.1626)  0.1266 0.1239 
FEMALE  -0.0020 (0.1114) 
-0.0567 
(0.1601)  -0.2227 -0.2244 
EDUBA  0.1664
* 
(0.0964) 
-0.2735** 
(0.1375)  0.3511 0.3242 
Loan Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE  -0.1439
*** 
(0.0327) 
-
0.3344*** 
(0.0470) 
 -0.3673 -0.3471 
LOCDUM  -0.5209
*** 
(0.0964) 
0.3099** 
(0.1442)  0.1917 0.2617 
Banking Relationship Characteristics 
LOGPRIMERE
L  
0.0232 
(0.0485) 
0.0411 
(0.0692)  0.0464 0.0431 
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LOGPRIMEDIS
T  
-0.0570 
(0.0367) 
0.0459 
(0.0526)  0.0329 0.0409 
PIRMEBANK  -0.5711
*** 
(0.1544) 
0.0696 
(0.2272)  -0.0570 0.0091 
PRIMESAVE  -0.2134 (0.2005) 
-0.5029* 
(0.3102)  -0.5511 -0.5234 
Banking Market Concentration Characteristics 
HHIL  0.0637 (0.2053) 
0.5153* 
(0.2820)  0.5298 0.5210 
HHIH  -0.0451 (0.0965) 
0.1331 
(0.1357)  0.1228 0.1291 
Observations   1123    
Wald χ2   239.29***    
Log Likelihood   -2952.86    
LR test (χ2)   2.71*    
Predicted 
SPREAD     2.43 2.13 
 
(Table 3-13 presents the results of Treatment regression for the determinants of Most Recent 
Loan Application (MRLA) Interest Spread. The dependent variable is SPREAD. 1st Stage 
regression of the Treatment Regression model has been reported in the 1st Stage Probit 
column; 2nd Stage regression of the Treatment Regression model has been reported in the 2nd 
Stage Treatment Regression column. Marginal effect of the Treatment Regression is shown 
in the dy/dx column. The dependent variable of 1st Stage Regression is SWITCHBORROW. 
FINTIERATIO is a continuous variable indicating the squared ratio of the number that, on 
average, how many ties of service each bank has for each company, differentiated by the 
total number of banks. Control variables including industrial, regional dummies are not 
reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. VIFs have been checked and no Multicollinearity problem has been found. 
Chi2 statistics indicates a good fitness. Regressions with Robust Standard Errors are also 
conducted and the results are not significantly changed.) 
Table 3-13 shows very similar result comparing with Table 3-7. In particular, 
it presents a positive relationship between switching behaviour and loan application 
interest spread, which concludes similarly as the findings in section 3.3.4.3. The LR 
test (Chi-2 statistic = 2.71) shows a significant result at 10% level, indicating the 
existence and clearance of the endogeneity problem by the Treatment Regression. 
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C) Loan Maturity and “switching” behaviour 
In Section 3.3.4.4, the Loan Maturity Model has been set as follows: 
MATURITYi  = 𝛼0 + β × SWITCHBORROWi + 𝛼1 × Firm and Owner 
Characters (X1i) + 𝛼2 × Most Recent Loan Application Characters (X2i) + 𝛼3 × 
Banking Relationship Characters (X3i) + 𝛼4 × Banking Market Concentration 
Characters (X4i) + εi                                  
                                                         ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-4) 
SWITCHBORROWi in Eq. (3-4) could be endogenously determined and the 
economic reason could be that there are unobservable factors, such as the risk 
attitude of owners, affect business performance and the behaviour of borrowing from 
non-primary sources simultaneously.  I have adopted treatment analysis to overcome 
such problem. The rationales on how treatment regression works to eliminate 
endogeneity problem has been addressed in Section 3.3.5.2.1 Part B. The results of 
treatment analysis for loan maturity are presented in Table 3-14.  
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Table 3-14 Determinants of Most Recent Loan Maturity (2-stage Regression) 
  1st Stage Probit 2nd Stage Treatment Analysis 
  Coe(S.E) Coe(S.E)  
dy/dx 
(with 
treatment 
Effect) 
dy/dx 
(without 
treatmen
t 
Effect) 
Constant  5.4830
*** 
(0.6135) 
2.9524*** 
(0.2976)    
SWITCHBORRO
W   
0.1548* 
(0.0798)    
YEAR98DUMMY  0.1767 (0.1120) 
-0.0801 
(0.0581)  -0.0929 -0.0868 
Industry Dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
Region Dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
SERCONRATIO  -0.0005
*** 
(0.0000)     
Firm and Owner Characteristics 
LOGTOTEM  -0.2437
*** 
(0.0423) 
-0.0670*** 
(0.0208)  -0.0492 -0.0579 
CORPORAT  -0.0588 (0.1105) 
-0.0456 
(0.0553)  -0.0413 -0.0433 
LOGFAGE  -0.0611 (0.0763) 
0.0088 
(0.0362)  0.0133 0.0111 
STARTUP  0.2383 (0.2364) 
0.0694 
(0.1149)  0.0523 0.0599 
INDYEARROA  -0.0037
** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0004 
(0.0009)  -0.0001 -0.0002 
RISKYSCORE  -0.0017 (0.0597) 
-0.0558* 
(0.0292)  -0.0557 -0.0558 
OWNERMANAGE
D  
-0.1464 
(0.1374) 
-0.0032 
(0.0658)  0.0074 0.0025 
FAMILY  -0.0945 (0.1119) 
0.1440*** 
(0.0531)  0.1508 0.1475 
FEMALE  0.0607 (0.1084) 
0.0951* 
(0.0542)  0.0907 0.0928 
EDUBA  0.2344
** 
(0.0926) 
-0.0038 
(0.0451)  -0.0209 -0.0125 
Loan Characteristics 
LOGMRLSIZE  -0.1985
*** 
(0.0314) 
0.0955*** 
(0.0154)  0.1100 0.1029 
LOCDUM  -0.5539
*** 
(0.0954) 
-1.1486*** 
(0.0495)  -1.1086 -1.1273 
Banking Relationship Characteristics 
LOGPRIMEREL  0.0587 (0.0467) 
-0.0007 
(0.0227)  -0.005 -0.0029 
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LOGPRIMEDIST  -0.027 (0.0343) 
-0.0035 
(0.0173)  -0.0015 -0.0025 
PIRMEBANK  -0.4296
*** 
(0.1523) 
0.1637** 
(0.0769)  0.1942 0.1815 
PRIMESAVE  -0.0422 (0.1985) 
-0.0036 
(0.1054)  -0.0006 -0.0020 
Banking Market Concentration Characteristics 
HHIL  -0.1181 (0.1951) 
-0.0254 
(0.0926)  -0.0168 -0.0212 
HHIH  -0.1316 (0.0933) 
-0.0224 
(0.0453)  -0.0128 -0.0175 
Observations   1471    
Wald χ2   758.09***    
F-statistic       
Log Likelihood   -2307.95    
LR test (χ2)   3.05*    
Predicted SPREAD     3.47 3.15 
 
(Table 3-14 presents the results of Treatment regression for the determinants of Most Recent 
Loan Application (MRLA) Maturity. The dependent variable is MATURITY. 1st Stage 
regression of the Treatment Regression model has been reported in the 1st Stage Probit 
column; 2nd Stage regression of the Treatment Regression model has been reported in the 2nd 
Stage Treatment Regression column. Marginal effect of the Treatment Regression is shown 
in the dy/dx column. The dependent variable of 1st Stage Regression is SWITCHBORROW. 
SERCONRATIO is a continuous variable indicating the concentration ratio (HHI) of the 
services the firms used among all of their banks. Control variables including industrial, 
regional dummies are not reported in the table. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIFs have been checked and no Multicollinearity problem 
has been found. Chi2 statistics indicates a good fitness. Regressions with Robust Standard 
Errors are also conducted and the results are not significantly changed.) 
 
Table 3-14 shows very similar result comparing with Table 3-8. In particular, 
it presents a positive relationship between switching behaviour and loan application 
interest spread, which concludes similarly as the findings in section 3.3.4.4. The LR 
test (Chi-2 statistic = 3.05) shows a significant result at 10% level, indicating the 
existence and clearance of the endogeneity problem by the Treatment Regression. 
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D) Other Endogeneity Issues36 
Apart from the endogenous variables discussed in the former sections, the 
investigations on the possible endogeneity issues on the variable regarding the 
educational background of the owners of the small businesses have also been 
considered. 
Firstly, I have investigated the Equation (3-1) for the endogeneity problem of 
education variables. The outcome dependent variable is the dummy of ‘switching’ 
behaviour. Education dummy has been considered of being endogenous. Therefore, 
treatment regression has been adopted to solve the endogeneity problem. A variety of 
instruments has been experimented, e.g. the likelihood of owning a bachelor degree 
among the regional business owners, the gross domestic product growth rate, etc. 
However, all of the LR tests show that the endogeneity problem does not exist. 
Moreover, by taking the approach suggested by Craig and Hardee (2007), if the 
educational background dummy variable is removed, the results of the regression are 
fairly the same as before in terms of the signs, significance and the magnitude. 
Therefore, the educational background dummy variable is not considered being 
endogenous in the ‘switching’ behaviour model (Equation 3-1). 
In the same way, I have carried out the investigation on the Loan Approval 
Model (Equation 3-2), Loan Spread Model (Equation 3-3) and Loan Maturity Model 
(3-4). Both of the two independent variables, ‘SWITCHBORROW’ and ‘EDUBA’ 
are considered being endogenous. Therefore, 2-stage regression with 2 endogenous 
variables has been employed for the analysis. Overall, the endogeneity issues have 
                                                 
36 All of the regression results in this section are available on request from the author. 
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been captured in these three models by Chi2 statistics. EDUBA becomes 
insignificant in these three models. However, all of the other variables, including the 
key variables of SWITCHBORROW, have not been affected37. The main story has 
never changed. 
Moreover, the financially riskier firms variable may be endogenous in the 
loan maturity model (Equation 3-4). Therefore, for both of the two independent 
variables, ‘SWITCHBORROW’ and ‘RISKYSCORE’ are considered being 
endogenous. 2-stage regression with 2 endogenous variables has been employed for 
the analysis. Overall, the endogeneity issues have been captured by Chi2 statistics. 
RISKYSCORE becomes insignificant. However, all of the other variables, including 
the key variables of SWITCHBORROW, have not been affected. The main story has 
never changed. 
Additionally, experiments such as treating ‘EDUBA’, ‘SWITCHBORROW’, 
and ‘RISKYSCORE’ as endogenous together for the Loan Maturity model, the main 
story did not change. The results are fairly the same. Results are available on request. 
In summary, for the endogeneity issue for some explanatory variables, may 
exist as the case for owner’s educational background or risky score for the business. 
However, when controlling the endogeneity issues by 2-stage regressions, the main 
story never changed. Except the suspiciously endogenous variables, all other 
variables have not been largely affected. It indicates, the possible existence of 
endogeneity problem, would not change the main findings of this chapter. In other 
words, the results reported in the original version of the thesis, are robust.  
                                                 
37 Only in the Loan Approval Model, in the 2nd stage, the coefficient of ‘HHIL’ has changed from 
being significant at 10% confidence level to being insignificant (p-value = 0.12). Indeed, the changes 
of the p-value are very small. It is almost significant. 
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E) Summary 
Overall, Section 3.3.5.2.1 tries to consider Recursive Bivariate Probit Model 
and Treatment Regression to control the potential endogeneity problem. LR tests 
show that endogeneity has been captured and such a problem has been solved. 
Therefore, in general, whether the 2 stage regression fits to the analysis, depends on 
the validity of the instruments.  This could be one the limitation of 2 stage 
regressions to solve the endogeneity problems, as to what extent the instrument is 
exogenous, is difficult to quantify. 
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3.3.5.2.2 Propensity Score Matching 
In this section, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) analysis will be employed 
to investigate the relationship between switching behaviour and Loan Application 
Approval Rate/Loan Interest Spread/Loan Maturity. Comparing with regressions, 
PSM has its advantages as follows: firstly, PSM allows the researchers to reconstruct 
counterfactuals employing observational data. Secondly, regressions sometimes 
produce biased estimators which derives from the weakness that the two groups lack 
distribution overlap. Thirdly, endogeneity might be one of the major concerns to 
affect the accuracy of the regression analysis. The accuracy of regressions largely 
relies on the validity of the instruments while the exogeneity of a single instrument 
would be hard to identify. Although to calculate propensity score is parametric, the 
later procedure for the matching is largely nonparametric. Therefore, PSM avoids the 
weakness of the regression analysis and becomes comparatively advantageous (Li, 
2013).   
PSM was developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) with the aims of 
replacing the confounding covariates with one function of these covariates. If X is 
denoted as a vector of the observed covariates, the balancing score b(X) needs to 
satisfy X┴T|b(X). And the finest balancing score is b(X)=X. And given the strongly 
ignorable assumption, which means the unconfoundedness and overlap conditions 
are met, the average treatment effect on the treated group (ATT) could be captured as 
follows: 
ATT = E{Y|T=1, e(x)} – E{Y|T=0, e(x)} 
                                 ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-15) 
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A) Loan Application Approval Rate and “switching” behaviour 
In this section, I will employ PSM to investigate the relationship between 
Loan Application Approval Rate and “switching” behaviour. Nearest neighbour 
within caliper (0.01) matching has been adopted. Figure 3 -1 shows the kernel 
densities of the control group and treatment group before PSM (Figure 3 -1A) and 
after PSM (Figure 3 -1B), where the treatment variable is “SWITCHBORROW”. 
The outcome variable for the PSM analysis is “APPROVAL”. Figure 3 -1 shows that 
PSM effectively reduces the skewness of the kernel density of the control group and 
the kernel densities of both of treatment group and control group are comparable. 
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Figure 3 -1A Kernel Density of Treatment and Control Groups before 
PSM (APPROVAL) 
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Figure 3 -1B Kernel Density of Treatment and Control Groups after 
PSM (APPROVAL) 
 
The balancing test of PSM is reported in Table 3-15. The comparison of the 
means of the corresponding variables and the standardized percentage bias before 
PSM are reported in Table 3-15 Panel A. It shows that before PSM, all of these 
variables except ‘PRIMEBANK’, are unbalanced because the p-values are 
significant; whereas after PSM, p-values for these variables change to be 
insignificant which means the variables are balanced. Moreover, the absolute values 
of the standardized percentage bias (as in %Bias column) become much smaller after 
matching.  
In Table 3-15 Panel B, the Pseudo R2 dropped dramatically from 0.139 to 
0.003. LR Chi2 test decreases from 320.68, significant at 1% confidence level, to 
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4.96, which is insignificant, indicating the overall satisfactory fitness of the 
balancing. Both of the mean and median bias decrease sharply. Overall, the 
balancing test for the PSM is satisfactory. 
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Table 3-15 Balancing Test of PSM for the Loan Approval Decision 
Panel A: Balancing Test for Individual Variables 
Variable Samples 
Mean %Bias %Reduction in |bias| p-value Treated Control 
YEAR98DUMMY Pre-matching 0.4175 0.1980 48.9 94.8 0.000 Post-matching 0.3731 0.3617 2.5 0.695 
LOGTOTEM Pre-matching 2.5818 3.2218 -45.4 89.3 0.000 Post-matching 2.7159 2.6472 4.9 0.655 
CORPORAT Pre-matching 0.6320 0.7602 -28.1 91.1 0.000 Post-matching 0.6761 0.6648 2.5 0.713 
LOGFAGE Pre-matching 2.4539 2.6933 -31.2 91.2 0.017 Post-matching 2.5234 2.5446 -2.8 0.786 
STARTUP Pre-matching 0.0891 0.0434 18.4 87.6 0.000 Post-matching 0.0701 0.0644 2.3 0.372 
INDYEARROA Pre-matching -9.0524 -5.5636 -11.3 82.8 0.001 Post-matching -8.7112 -9.3101 1.9 0.478 
RISKYSCORE Pre-matching 1.9835 1.8154 21.8 74.1 0.000 Post-matching 1.9621 1.9186 5.7 0.647 
FAMILY Pre-matching 0.8185 0.7460 17.6 76.5 0.000 Post-matching 0.8049 0.8220 -4.1 0.758 
LOGMRLSIZE Pre-matching 11.0220 12.1050 -58.1 95.5 0.001 Post-matching 11.1780 11.1300 2.6 0.945 
LOCDUM Pre-matching 0.4406 0.6867 -51.2 96.2 0.000 Post-matching 0.4773 0.4678 2.0 0.545 
LOGPRIMEREL Pre-matching 4.2066 4.3851 -17.4 97.5 0.000 Post-matching 4.2615 4.2571 0.4 0.294 
PRIMEBANK Pre-matching 0.7805 0.9081 -35.7 89.6 0.626 Post-matching 0.8447 0.8580 -3.7 0.787 
PRIMESAVE Pre-matching 0.8564 0.9490 -31.6 79.5 0.000 Post-matching 0.8958 0.9148 -6.5 0.695 
HHIL Pre-matching 0.0545 0.0602 -2.4 33.5 0.000 Post-matching 0.0568 0.0530 1.6 0.655 
Panel B: Balancing Test for Full Model Set 
 Pseudo R2 LR Chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Pre-matching 0.139 320.68*** 22.9 17.6 
Post-matching 0.003 4.96 2.6 2.3 
(Table 3-15 presents the results of balancing tests for the PSM on the outcome variable of 
“APPROVAL”. Control variables including industrial, regional dummies are not reported in 
the table and all of the industrial and regional dummies pass the balancing tests. “***”,”**”,”*” 
stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.) 
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Table 3-16 presents the average marginal effect for the treatments before and 
after PSM. Before PSM, the marginal effect would be -11.46%, significant at 1% 
level, indicating that if small firms choose to borrow from a non-primary source of 
finance, the approval rate would be 11.46% lower. However, according to PSM 
analysis, the approval rate would be about 5.87% lower for the firms borrow from a 
non-primary source of finance than a primary source of finance, still significant at 1% 
level. It means without PSM, the difference between a non-primary source of finance 
and a primary source of finance is exaggerated. 
 
Table 3-16 Impact of Switching Behaviour on Loan Approval Decision (PSM) 
Variable Sample 
Treate
d 
Contro
l 
Differenc
e S.E. 
t-
statistic 
APPROVA
L Unmatched 0.8119 0.9265 -0.1146 
0.015
5 -7.39
*** 
 
Matched(ATT
) 0.8314 0.8902 -0.0587 
0.021
2 -2.76
*** 
(Table 3-16 presents the results of ATT for the PSM on the outcome variable of 
“APPROVAL”. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.) 
 
Table 3-17 shows the sensitivity test for the PSM analysis on Loan Approval 
Decision. Suppose that there is a matched pair of loans a and b, and F is assumed to 
be the logistic distribution. The odds for the loans receiving treatment are 𝑃𝑎
1−𝑃𝑎
 and 
𝑃𝑏
1−𝑃𝑏
. Then, odds ratio should be 
Odds Ratio =  𝑃𝑎(1−𝑃𝑏)
𝑃𝑏(1−𝑃𝑎) =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑥𝑎+𝛾𝑢𝑎)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑥𝑏+𝛾𝑢𝑏) = exp{γ(𝑢𝑎 − 𝑢𝑏)}  
                                                 .……………………….……..Eq. (3-16) 
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where it is assumed that unobserved covariate is a dummy variable (𝑢𝑎 ∈ {0, 
1}). Rosenbaum (2002) addresses that it indicates the following bounds on the odds 
ratio which the matched pair of loans would receive the treatment: 
𝑒−𝛾 ≤
𝑃𝑎(1 − 𝑃𝑏)
𝑃𝑏(1 − 𝑃𝑎) ≤ 𝑒𝛾 
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-17) 
 𝑒𝛾, therefore, measures how far away the result is from hidden bias problem. 
Table 3-17 employs the test statistic of Mantel and Haenszel (1959). MH test 
is nonparametric and its Null Hypothesis is that there is no treatment effect. Suppose 
s is the stratum and N1s denotes the number of treated loans in s while N0s denotes 
the untreated loans in s. The total number of loans is Ns (=N1s + N0s). The MH 
statistics is constructed as  
 
𝑄𝑀𝐻  =  |𝑌1 − ∑ 𝐸(𝑌1𝑠)𝑆𝑆=1 | − 0.5
�∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌1𝑠)𝑆𝑆=1 =
|𝑌1 − ∑ 𝐸(𝑁1𝑠𝑌𝑠𝑁𝑠 )𝑆𝑆=1 | − 0.5
�∑
𝑁1𝑠𝑁0𝑠𝑌𝑠(𝑁𝑠 − 𝑌𝑠)
𝑁𝑠2(𝑁𝑠 − 1)𝑆𝑆=1  
                                                     ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-18) 
Two bounds are set to measure the bias on the estimation: 𝑄𝑀𝐻+ is to measure 
the overestimation of the treatment effect while 𝑄𝑀𝐻− is to measure the 
underestimation of the treatment effect, where 
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𝑄𝑀𝐻
+  = 
|𝑌1−∑ 𝐸�𝑆+𝑆𝑆=1 |−0.5
�∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐸�𝑆+)𝑆𝑆=1  
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-19) 
and  
𝑄𝑀𝐻
−  = 
|𝑌1−∑ 𝐸�𝑆−𝑆𝑆=1 |−0.5
�∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐸�𝑆−)𝑆𝑆=1  
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-20) 
For any given γ, and when u is binary, 𝐸�𝑆  denotes the large sample 
approximations to the expectation and Var( 𝐸�𝑆 ) denotes the large sample 
approximations to the variance. 
Table 3-17 reports the p-values of the sensitivity analysis. Table 3-17 shows 
that, the result is very robust and free from overestimation for treatment effect. When 
gamma moves upward from 1 to a value higher than 1.28, the result might be 
exposed to potential underestimation bias.  
 
Table 3-17 Sensitivity Analysis for PSM on Loan Approval Decision 
 
Gamma 𝑝𝑀𝐻+  𝑝𝑀𝐻−  
1.00 0.0038 0.0038 
1.05 0.0016 0.0084 
1.10 0.0007 0.0165 
1.15 0.0003 0.0297 
1.20 0.0001 0.0497 
1.25 0.0000 0.0777 
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1.28 0.0000 0.0987 
1.30 0.0000 0.1144 
1.35 0.0000 0.1601 
 
Overall, the results in this section robustly confirm the negative relationship 
between loan approval rate and small firms’ “switching” behaviour, supporting the 
conclusion drawn from the Probit regression or Recursive Bivariate Probit regression 
in previous sections. 
 
B) Loan Interest Spread and “switching” behaviour 
In this section, I will employ PSM to investigate the relationship between 
Loan Interest Spread and “switching” behaviour. Nearest neighbour within caliper 
(0.01) matching has been adopted. Figure 3 -2 shows the kernel densities of the 
control group and treatment group before PSM (Figure 3 -1A) and after PSM (Figure 
3 -1B), where the treatment variable is “SWITCHBORROW”. The outcome variable 
for the PSM analysis is “SPREAD”. Figure 3 -2 shows that PSM effectively reduces 
the skewness of the kernel density of the control group and the kernel densities of 
both of treatment group and control group are comparable. 
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Figure 3 -2A Kernel Density of Treatment and Control Groups before 
PSM (SPREAD) 
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Figure 3 -2B Kernel Density of Treatment and Control Groups after 
PSM (SPREAD) 
 
Table 3-18 presents the balancing test for the matching. Again, similar as in 
the previous section, we have obtained satisfactory results in the balancing test. The 
comparison of the means of all of the variables and the standardized percentage bias 
before PSM are reported in Table 3-18 Panel A. Except ‘HHIH’ and 
‘INDYEARROA’, the p-values for the mean comparisons are all significant at 1% 
confidence level. It indicates a strong unbalancing. After the matching, firstly, the p-
values for the mean comparisons for all of the variables are all insignificant; 
secondly, the standardized percentage bias for all of the variables is reduced largely. 
Panel A represents a good balancing after the matching. 
Table 3-18 Panel B shows the overall balancing test for the full model set. 
The Pseudo R2 drops from 0.109 to 0.002; LR Chi2 Statistics decreases sharply from 
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153.67 (significant at 1% confidence level) to 1.90 (insignificant). The overall mean 
bias goes down from 25.6 to 2.3 and the overall median bias falls down from 22.7 to 
2.0. All of the fitness tests represent a good balancing after the matching. It 
implicates that the PSM is less likely to suffer from unbalancing bias problem. 
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Table 3-18 Balancing Test of PSM for the Loan Interest Spread 
Panel A: Balancing Test for Individual Variables 
Variable Samples 
Mean %Bias %Reduction in |bias| p-value Treated Control 
YEAR98DUMMY Pre-matching 0.3729 0.1728 46.0 95.3 0.000 Post-matching 0.3270 0.3176 2.2 0.799 
LOGTOTEM Pre-matching 2.5778 3.0845 -37.3 95.0 0.000 Post-matching 2.6533 2.6280 1.9 0.813 
CORPORAT Pre-matching 0.6780 0.7624 -18.9 81.4 0.003 Post-matching 0.6855 0.7013 -3.5 0.668 
LOGFAGE Pre-matching 2.4937 2.6643 -22.7 91.0 0.000 Post-matching 2.5559 2.5406 2.0 0.793 
STARTUP Pre-matching 0.0735 0.0445 12.3 78.3 0.044 Post-matching 0.0598 0.0535 2.7 0.732 
INDYEARROA Pre-matching -7.4087 -5.1597 -8.4 49.0 0.182 Post-matching -7.4788 -8.6264 4.3 0.652 
RISKYSCORE Pre-matching 1.9350 1.7992 17.7 90.7 0.005 Post-matching 1.8994 1.9119 -1.6 0.839 
LOGMRLSIZE Pre-matching 10.9570 11.8760 -51.9 98.2 0.000 Post-matching 11.1000 11.1170 -0.9 0.904 
LOCDUM Pre-matching 0.4322 0.6646 -48.0 98.6 0.000 Post-matching 0.4686 0.4654 0.6 0.937 
LOGPRIMEREL Pre-matching 4.2234 4.4068 -18.1 80.0 0.005 Post-matching 4.268 4.3046 -3.6 0.643 
PRIMEBANK Pre-matching 0.8136 0.9009 -25.1 96.4 0.000 Post-matching 0.8396 0.8428 -0.9 0.914 
PRIMESAVE Pre-matching 0.8842 0.9517 -24.8 76.7 0.000 Post-matching 0.8994 0.9151 -5.8 0.495 
HHIH Pre-matching 0.5000 0.4930 1.4 100.0 0.827 Post-matching 0.5000 0.5000 0.0 1.000 
Panel B: Balancing Test for Full Model Set 
 Pseudo R2 LR Chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Pre-matching 0.109 153.67*** 25.6 22.7 
Post-matching 0.002 1.90 2.3 2.0 
(Table 3-18 presents the results of balancing tests for the PSM on the outcome variable of 
“SPREAD”. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.) 
 
Table 3-19 presents the average marginal effect for the treatments before and 
after PSM. Before PSM, the marginal effect would be 0.7149, significant at 1% level, 
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indicating that if small firms choose to borrow from a non-primary source of finance, 
the loan interest spread would be 7,149 basis points higher. However, according to 
PSM analysis, the loan interest spread would be just about 3,651 basis points higher 
for the firms to borrow from a non-primary source of finance than a primary source 
of finance, significant at 5% level. It means without PSM, the difference between a 
non-primary source of finance and a primary source of finance is exaggerated. 
 
Table 3-19 Impact of Switching Behaviour on Loan Interest Spread (PSM) 
Variable Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. t-statistic 
SPREAD Unmatched 2.8050 2.0901 0.7149 0.1456 4.91*** 
 
Matched(ATT) 2.5464 2.1813 0.3651 0.1788 2.04** 
(Table 3-19 presents the results of ATT for the PSM on the outcome variable of “SPREAD”. 
“***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.) 
 
Table 3-20 shows the sensitivity test (Wilcoxon’s signed rank test) for the 
PSM analysis on Loan Approval Decision. Suppose that there is a matched pair of 
loans a and b. The odds for the loans receiving treatment are 𝑃𝑎
1−𝑃𝑎
 and 𝑃𝑏
1−𝑃𝑏
. Then, 
odds ratio should be  
Odds Ratio = 𝑃𝑎(1−𝑃𝑏)
𝑃𝑏(1−𝑃𝑎) =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑥𝑎+𝛾𝑢𝑎)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑥𝑏+𝛾𝑢𝑏) = exp{γ(𝑢𝑎 − 𝑢𝑏)}, 
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-21) 
 where it is assumed that unobserved covariate is a dummy variable (𝑢𝑎 ∈ {0, 
1}). Rosenbaum (2002) addresses that it indicates the following bounds on the odds 
ratio which the matched pair of loans would receive the treatment: 
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𝑒−𝛾 ≤
𝑃𝑎(1 − 𝑃𝑏)
𝑃𝑏(1 − 𝑃𝑎) ≤ 𝑒𝛾 
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-22) 
 𝑒𝛾, therefore, measures how far away the result is from hidden bias problem. 
Suppose s is the stratum with ns units in s, and there are S strata. Assume ms 
received the treatment (ns =2; 1= ms = Zs1+Zs2). Therefore, the treatment assignment 
Z= (Z11, …, ZS,ns), follows the below distribution 
Prob(Z=z|m)=∏ [ 𝑒𝛾𝑢𝑠1
𝑒𝛾𝑢𝑠1+𝑒𝛾𝑢𝑠2
]𝑧𝑠1𝑆𝑠=1 [ 𝑒𝛾𝑢𝑠2𝑒𝛾𝑢𝑠1+𝑒𝛾𝑢𝑠2]1−𝑧𝑠1 
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-23) 
The Wilconxon’s signed rank statistic is constructed as follows 
T=t(Z,r)=∑ 𝑑𝑠𝑆𝑠=1 ∑ 𝑐𝑠𝑖2𝑖=1 𝑍𝑠𝑖 
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-24) 
Where csi is dichotomous, with a value of 1 or 0. ds is non-negative. The 
statistic t(Z, r) is the sum of S independent random variables. The probability of the 
sth variable equals ds is 
ps = 
𝑐𝑠1 exp(𝛾𝑢𝑠1)+𝑐𝑠2 exp(𝛾𝑢𝑠2)
exp(𝛾𝑢𝑠1)+exp(𝛾𝑢𝑠2)  
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-25) 
The upper bound 𝑝𝑠+ and lower bound 𝑝𝑠− are defined in the following way: 
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𝑝𝑠
+ = �
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑠1 = 𝑐𝑠2 = 00 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑠1 = 𝑐𝑠2 = 1
exp (𝛾)
1+exp (𝛾)  𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑠1 ≠ 𝑐𝑠2 and  𝑝𝑠− = �
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑠1 = 𝑐𝑠2 = 00 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑠1 = 𝑐𝑠2 = 1
1
1+exp (𝛾)  𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑠1 ≠ 𝑐𝑠2 
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-26) 
Therefore, for 
 T+ = 𝐸(𝑇+)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇+) = ∑ 𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑠+𝑆𝑠=1𝑑𝑠2𝑝𝑠+(1−𝑝𝑠+)  
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-27) 
and  
T- = 𝐸(𝑇−)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇−) = ∑ 𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑠−𝑆𝑠=1𝑑𝑠2𝑝𝑠+(1−𝑝𝑠−)  
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-28) 
They are the upper bound and lower bound statistics respectively. They 
follow normal distribution. 
Table 3-20 reports the p-values of the senstitivity analysis. Table 3-20 shows 
that, the result is robust and free from underestimation for treatment effect. When 
gamma moves upward from 1 to a value higher than 1.07, the result might be 
exposed to potential overestimation bias.  
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Table 3-20 Sensitivity Analysis for PSM on Loan Interest Spread  
(Wilcoxon’s signed rank test) 
 
Gamma p+ p- 
1.00 0.038 0.038 
1.01 0.045 0.032 
1.02 0.053 0.027 
1.03 0.062 0.023 
1.04 0.071 0.019 
1.05 0.082 0.016 
1.06 0.093 0.013 
1.07 0.106 0.011 
1.08 0.120 0.009 
1.09 0.134 0.007 
1.10 0.150 0.006 
 
 
Overall, the results in this section robustly confirm the positive relationship 
between loan interest spread and small firms’ “switching” behaviour, supporting the 
conclusion drawn from the OLS regression or Treatment regression in the previous 
sections. 
 
 
C) Loan Maturity and “switching” behaviour 
In this section, I will employ PSM to investigate the relationship between 
Loan Maturity and “switching” behaviour. Nearest neighbour within caliper (0.01) 
matching has been adopted. Figure 3 -3 shows the kernel densities of the control 
group and treatment group before PSM (Figure 3 -3A) and after PSM (Figure 3 -3B), 
where the treatment variable is “SWITCHBORROW”. The outcome variable for the 
PSM analysis is “MATURITY”. Figure 3 -3 shows that PSM effectively reduces the 
skewness of the kernel density of the control group and the kernel densities of both 
of treatment group and control group are comparable. 
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Figure 3 -3A Kernel Density of Treatment and Control Groups before 
PSM (MATURITY) 
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Figure 3 -3B Kernel Density of Treatment and Control Groups after 
PSM (MATURITY) 
 
Table 3-21 shows the balancing test of PSM. Table 3-21 Panel A reports the 
comparison of the means of all of the variables. Before PSM, except ‘HHIL’, 
‘OWNERMANAGED’, ‘LOGPRIMEREL’ and ‘FEMALE’, the p-values of the 
mean comparison tests are all significant at 1% confidence level, which means the 
panel of the data is strongly unbalanced. After the matching, the p-values for all of 
these variables are insignificant. Moreover, the standardized percentage bias has 
reduced greatly after the matching. Overall, Panel A shows the good balancing for 
every individual independent variable in the set. 
Table 3-21 Panel B reports the overall balancing test for the full model set. 
The Pseudo R2 drops from 0.142 to 0.007 after matching; LR Chi2 Statistics 
decreases from 257.09 (significant at 1% confidence level) to 8.22 (insignificant). 
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Moreover, the Mean Bias and Median Bias both fall down dramatically. These 
results, confirm that a satisfactory balancing has been archived after the matching. 
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Table 3-21 Balancing Test of PSM for the Loan Maturity 
Panel A: Balancing Test for Individual Variables 
Variable 
Samples 
Mean 
%Bias %Reduction in |bias| p-value Treated Control 
YEAR98DUMMY 
Pre-matching 0.4004 0.1835 49.1 
87.4 
0.000 
Post-matching 0.3713 0.3441 6.2 0.420 
LOGTOTEM 
Pre-matching 2.7272 3.3232 -42.5 
96.8 
0.000 
Post-matching 2.8230 2.8419 -1.3 0.847 
CORPORAT 
Pre-matching 0.6726 0.7900 -26.7 
87.4 
0.000 
Post-matching 0.6906 0.7055 -3.4 0.646 
LOGFAGE 
Pre-matching 2.5293 2.7241 -25.9 
89.0 
0.000 
Post-matching 2.5820 2.5606 2.8 0.688 
STARTUP 
Pre-matching 0.0774 0.0363 17.8 
88.0 
0.001 
Post-matching 0.0619 0.0569 2.1 0.766 
INDYEARROA 
Pre-matching -10.9640 -4.8910 -19.6 
61.1 
0.000 
Post-matching -10.6220 -8.2612 -7.6 0.334 
RISKYSCORE 
Pre-matching 1.8960 1.7861 14.3 
41.5 
0.010 
Post-matching 1.8540 1.9183 -8.4 0.239 
OWNERMANAGED Pre-matching 0.8894 0.8734 4.9 
53.5 
0.388 
 Post-matching 0.8936 0.9010 -2.3 0.729 
FAMILY 
Pre-matching 0.8031 0.7507 12.6 
76.4 
0.028 
Post-matching 0.7946 0.8069 -3.0 0.660 
FEMALE 
Pre-matching 0.2212 0.1982 5.6 
35.4 
0.314 
Post-matching 0.2277 0.2129 3.6 0.611 
LOGMRLSIZE 
Pre-matching 11.1220 12.2390 -61.9 
95.4 
0.000 
Post-matching 11.2540 11.3050 -2.8 0.671 
LOCDUM 
Pre-matching 0.3938 0.6860 -61.3 
97.5 
0.000 
Post-matching 0.4257 0.4332 -1.6 0.831 
LOGPRIMEREL 
Pre-matching 4.2371 4.4175 -17.8 
67.5 
0.002 
Post-matching 4.2709 4.3295 -5.8 0.410 
LOGPRIMEDIST 
Pre-matching 1.7355 1.6444 6.1 
88.5 
0.255 
Post-matching 1.6411 1.6307 0.7 0.918 
PRIMEBANK 
Pre-matching 0.8252 0.9078 -24.4 
85.0 
0.000 
Post-matching 0.8639 0.8515 3.7 0.615 
PRIMESAVE 
Pre-matching 0.8982 0.9539 -21.4 
91.1 
0.000 
Post-matching 0.9208 0.9158 1.9 0.798 
HHIL 
Pre-matching 0.0575 0.0667 -3.8 
100.0 
0.506 
Post-matching 0.0594 0.0594 0.0 1.000 
Panel B: Balancing Test for Full Model Set 
 Pseudo R2 LR Chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Pre-matching 0.142 257.09*** 20.7 14.1 
Post-matching 0.007 8.22 3.6 3.3 
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(Table 3-21 presents the results of balancing tests for the PSM on the outcome variable of 
“MATURITY”. Control variables including industrial, regional dummies are not reported in 
the table and all of the industrial and regional dummies pass the balancing tests. “***”,”**”,”*” 
stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.) 
 
Table 3-22 presents the average marginal effect for the treatments before and 
after PSM. Before PSM, the marginal effect would be 0.5162, significant at 1% level, 
indicating that if small firms choose to borrow from a non-primary source of finance, 
the loan maturity would be longer by 0.5162 in logarithm value. However, according 
to PSM analysis, the loan maturity would be just about 0.2884 longer in logarithm 
value for the firms to borrow from a non-primary source of finance than a primary 
source of finance, significant at 1% level. It means without PSM, the difference 
between a non-primary source of finance and a primary source of finance is 
exaggerated. 
 
Table 3-22 Impact of Switching Behaviour on Loan Maturity (PSM) 
Variable Sample 
Treate
d 
Contro
l 
Differenc
e S.E. 
t-
statistic 
MATURIT
Y Unmatched 3.5860 3.0698 0.5162 
0.054
3 9.51
*** 
 
Matched(ATT
) 3.5802 3.2918 0.2884 
0.074
0 3.90
*** 
(Table 3-16 presents the results of ATT for the PSM on the outcome variable of 
“MATURITY”. “***”,”**”,”*” stand for the confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.) 
 
Table 3-23 reports the p-values of the sensitivity analysis. Table 3-23 shows 
the sensitivity test (Wilcoxon’s signed rank test) for the PSM analysis on Loan 
Maturity. The rationale applied for the Wilcoxon’s signed rank test in this section is 
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the same as in previous section. Table 3-20 reports that, the result is very robust and 
free from underestimation for treatment effect. When gamma moves upward from 1 
to a value higher than 1.37, the result might be exposed to potential overestimation 
bias. 
 
Table 3-23 Sensitivity Analysis for PSM on Loan Maturity (Wilcoxon’s signed 
rank test) 
Gamma p+ p- 
1.00 0.000 0.000 
1.10 0.001 0.000 
1.20 0.008 0.000 
1.25 0.019 0.000 
1.30 0.040 0.000 
1.35 0.076 0.000 
1.37 0.094 0.000 
1.38 0.105 0.000 
1.40 0.128 0.000 
1.45 0.199 0.000 
1.50 0.286 0.000 
 
 
Overall, the results in this section robustly confirm the positive relationship 
between loan maturity and small firms’ “switching” behaviour, supporting the 
conclusion drawn from the OLS regression or Treatment regression in the previous 
sections. 
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3.3.5.3 Summary of the Main Tests and Robustness Checks 
Overall, to investigate the impacts of small businesses’ “switching 
behaviour”on the loan application approval, loan interest spread and loan maturity, 
this chapter employs a variety of different analysis as shown in Table 3-24, including 
Univariate Analysis, Probit/OLS, 2-stage regressions and PSM. 
 
Table 3-24 Marginal Effects of “switching behaviour” on Loan 
Approval/Interest/Maturity 
Dependent 
Vairable 
Univariate 
Analysis 
Probit/OLS 
2-stage 
regressions 
PSM 
APPROVAL -0.1173 -0.0457 -0.0693 -0.0587 
SPREAD 0.7094 0.4243 0.3000 0.3651 
MATURITY 0.5247 0.2653 0.3200 0.2884 
 
Table 3-24 shows that univariate analysis (t-test or z-test) would be the most 
biased comparing with the other three methods. In general, the univariate analysis 
exaggerates the difference between the treatment group and the control group. The 
marginal effects derived from PSM would always be a value between Probit/OLS 
and 2-stage regressions for all of these three dependent variables (indeed, it is more 
like a mean value of the two). From this point of view, PSM seems to be a more safe 
choice. Taking the sensitivity tests of PSM into consideration, for APPROVAL, 
PSM is more sensitive to underestimation of treatment effect, therefore, the actual 
marginal effect might be nearer to the marginal effect from 2-stage regressions. For 
SPREAD, as PSM is sensitive to overestimation of treatment effect, the actual 
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marginal effect might be a value more close to 2-stage regression marginal effect. 
For MATURITY, as PSM is sensitive to overestimation of treatment effect, the 
actual marginal effect would be a value more close to OLS regression coefficient.  
Overall, the difference between a 2 stage regression and propensity score 
matching could be summarized as follows: 
2 Stage Regression usually includes 2 equations: an outcome equation and a 
first stage equation. 
Outcome Equation: Yi = 𝛼0 + βxi + γwi + εi 
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-29) 
1st-stage Equation: wi = 𝛼0’+ β’xi + θzi + εi’ 
                                                      ….……………………….……..Eq. (3-30) 
Where Cor (z, ε) = 0 and Cor (z, w) ≠  0; Yi and wi are dependent 
variables, xi, wi and zi are independent variables (Wooldridge, 2016). 
For different types of the dependent variables of both the outcome equation 
and 1st stage equation, there are different corresponding methods of estimation for 2 
stage regressions as follows: 
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Table 3-25 Different Types of 2 Stage Regressions and Their Characteristics 
Type of 2 Stage 
Regressions 
Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Type 
1st Stage Equation 
Dependent Variable Type 
Method of Estimation Highlights 
A Continuous Continuous Instrumental Variables 2 
Stage Least Squares 
Propensity Score Matching could 
NOT be a supplement/alternative 
method for this. 
B Binary Continuous Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (2 stage) 
Propensity Score Matching could 
NOT be a supplement/alternative 
method for this. 
C Continuous Binary Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation with 
Treatment Effect 
Propensity Score Matching might be a 
supplement/alternative method for 
this. 
D Binary Binary Recursive Bivariate 
Probit Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation 
Propensity Score Matching might be a 
supplement/alternative method for 
this. 
(Peel, 2014) 
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The rationale for propensity score matching is that, at the initial stage, a Logit 
or Probit model is needed to be carried out taking all of the control variables as the 
independent variable and the Binary variable in description of the treatment is the 
dependent variable. The propensity scores, therefore, are predicted based on the 
Logit or Probit regression. Then matching is conducted for the treatment group and 
control group. One of the very common methods of the matching, is pairwise nearest 
neighbour matching. A caliper might be considered to ensure the accuracy of the 
nearest neighbour matching (Guo and Fraser). Since propensity score matching is to 
deal with the treated group and the untreated group, it means, the treatment variable 
is a binary variable (grouping variable), which is only allied with Type C and D 2-
stage regression as in Table 3-25. PSM could not solve the situation where Type A 
and B 2-stage regressions are applied as in Table 3-25 because the endogenous 
variable there is continuous.   
 
In terms of Type C and D in Table 3-25, both of 2-stage regression and PSM 
could deal with such type of circumstances. In particular, if used properly, the 
treatment effect/endogeneity problem could be solved by both of 2-stage regression 
and PSM. The rationales of the 2-stage regressions for Type C (Treatment 
regression) and Type D (Recursive Bivariate Probit) are demonstrated in Section 
3.3.5.2.1 in the thesis. 2-stage regression and PSM aim to solve the problem that the 
treatment binary variable is also endogenously determined. In other words, they aim 
to eliminate the potential selection bias for treatment: a set of independent variables 
could affect the rate of getting treated and further affect the outcomes. A simple 
Probit/Logit regression may exaggerate the treatment effect. 
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The differences between Type C and D 2-stage regressions and PSM could be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Rationales: For Type C 2-stage regression, the rationale is that we 
consider the inverse mills ratio or mills ratio for the treated group and untreated 
group. After that, we compare whether the difference between these two groups is 
significantly different from zero or not. For Type D 2-stage regression, we check 
whether the covariance of the error terms of both of the two equations is zero or not. 
While PSM is to firstly calculate the predicted probability of getting treated, and then 
match the nearest neighbour (one of the most common ways) within certain calipers 
for comparison. Such kind of matching could eliminate the selection bias on getting 
being treated (Li, 2013).   
2. Observation (Disadvantage for PSM; Advantage for 2-stage 
regressions): One of the very important assumptions of PSM is that all of the factors 
are observable. Therefore, PSM could not deal with unobservable proxies or 
selections. However, 2-stage regressions, e.g. treatment regression, Heckman 
selection regression, etc., could well eliminate the bias generated by the 
unobservable/latent variables (Guo and Fraser, 2015; Greene, 2012). 
3. Instruments (Advantage for PSM; Disadvantage for 2-stage 
regressions): PSM does not require an instrument in the analysis; whereas it is 
compulsory to include at least a valid instrument in 2-stage regressions. In particular, 
there are many restrictions that the instruments have to follow: 1) all of the 
instruments should be exogenous; 2) the covariance between the error term of the 
outcome equation and the instruments needs to be zero; 3) There should be no weak 
instrument problem, which means the covariance between the instruments and the 
endogenous variable should not be zero; 4) there should not be any identification 
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problem (including both over or under identification) , which means the number of 
the instruments should be appropriate. Such restrictions usually make the selection of 
the instruments very difficult, or even impossible under certain circumstances 
(Wooldridge, 2016; Guo and Fraser, 2015). 
4. Sensitivity Analysis (Disadvantages for PSM; Advantages for 2-stage 
regressions): For the purpose of accuracy, sensitivity analysis is necessary to be 
carried out for PSM, including checking the balancing of the subgroups, the selection 
odds of the treatment, etc. If the  balancing after the matching could not be archived, 
or if the selection odds of the treatment could not stand in the sensitivity tests, the 
accuracy of the PSM is severely affected. Balancing and odds ratio of the treatment 
are not required by 2-stage regressions (Guo and Fraser, 2015). 
5. Non-Liner Effect (Advantage for PSM; Disadvantage for 2 stage 
regressions): PSM is less sensitive to the functional form of the relationship of a 
certain covariate with the outcome variable, either linear or quadratic, etc. 
(Rosenbaum PR, Rubin DB. The central role of the propensity score in observational 
studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70:41–55, 1983.)  
6. Type of analysis(Advantage for PSM; Disadvantage for 2 stage 
regressions): 2 stage regression is parametric; In terms of PSM, although the 
procedure of calculating the propensity score is parametric, the matching process is 
largely non-parametric, which is less sensitive to the violation of the model 
assumptions (Li, 2013).  
Overall, 2 stage regressions and PSM are not competing with each other, 
indeed, they are complementary for each other. 
Theoretically, the instrument(s) need to following the below rationales 
(Wooldridge, 2016): 
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1. Exogeneity: the instrument should not correlate with the error term in 
the outcome equation. 
2. Validity: The instrument needs to correlate with the endogenous 
variable. The correlation should be sufficiently strong, neither poor or weak. 
3. Identification: The total number of the instruments, should be 
identical with or more than the number of endogenous variables in the equations. 
Moreover, over-identification problem should be avoided, which means, the rule for 
the selection of the instruments, is not the more the better. 
In practice, the selection of the instrument is the most difficult step of 2 stage 
regressions as it is often hard to find the appropriate instruments satisfying all of the 
above criteria. Also there is less convincing method to econometrically test the 
correlation between the instrument and the error term of the outcome equation. 
Research relies on theoretical justification. For instance, Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
investigate the determinants of the distance between the firm and its relational bank, 
considering the independent variables including firm-aspect characteristics, bank-
aspect characteristics, loan contract characteristics and relationship characteristics. It 
means the distance between the firm and its relational banks is viewed as 
endogenously determined by these variables. Moreover, Degryse and Ongena (2005) 
found that the distance between the firm and its relational bank is a determinant of 
borrowing costs for the small businesses. While Bharath et al (2011) adopted 2 stage 
regressions to investigate the determinants of borrowing costs for small business. 
They consider the strength of banking relationship to be an endogenous determinant. 
And the instrument they have chosen is the distance between the firm and the 
relational bank, which means that it is considered to be exogenous for the borrowing 
costs. Such cases reflect that although the criteria 2 and 3 could be econometrically 
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tested and satisfied, the criteria 1 could only be theoretically justified. Sometimes, 
debates may arise for the justification of the selection of the instruments regarding 
criteria 1 as the cases raised above. 
The following table demonstrates how the instruments fit the criteria 
correspondingly in this thesis: 
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Table 3-26 The Fitness of the Criteria for the Selection of the Instruments for 2-stage Regressions 
 Table 3-12 Table 3-13 Table 3-14 
Criteria 1 
The instrument is a continuous 
variable indicating on average how 
many ties of service each bank has for 
each company. It is considered that it 
directly associates the ‘switching’ 
behavior and therefore, affects the 
loan approval rate. 
The instrument is a continuous variable 
indicating the squared ratio of the 
number that, on average, how many ties 
of service each bank has for each 
company, differentiated by the total 
number of banks. It is considered that it 
directly associates the ‘switching’ 
behavior and therefore, affects the 
borrowing cost of the firm. 
The instrument is a continuous variable 
indicating the concentration ratio (HHI) 
of the services the firms used among all 
of their banks. It is considered that it 
directly associates the ‘switching’ 
behavior and therefore, affects the loan 
maturity of the firm. 
Criteria 2 
LR test (χ2=9.65***) 
Endogeneity confirmed and solved 
LR test (χ2=2.71*) 
Endogeneity confirmed and solved 
LR test (χ2=3.05) 
Endogeneity confirmed and solved 
Criteria 3 
Only one endogenous variable and 
one instrument; no over-identification 
problem 
Only one endogenous variable and one 
instrument; no over-identification 
problem 
Only one endogenous variable and one 
instrument; no over-identification 
problem 
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3.4 Discussions and Conclusions 
Literatures put incremental emphasize on firm’s switching behaviour to its 
relational banks. In particular, “lock-in” effect has been captured in some empirical 
research (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010; Farinha and Santos, 2002). However, the 
research in this field is usually based on large or medium size firms. In this chapter, I 
have carried out the investigation on small businesses from US to find the answers to 
the following two research questions: 1) What kinds of firms would borrow from 
non-primary financial institution (“changing” behaviour)? And 2) Does “changing” 
behaviour affect the approval, costs and maturity of the loan deals? SSBF 1998 and 
2003 dataset has been employed in this study, including 1823 most recent loan deal 
applications made by the firm in the survey. To the author’s best knowledge, it is the 
first research to investigate the impacts of “switching behaviour” on the loan deals. 
Firstly, the answer to the first question, is that smaller firms and financially 
more risky firms are more likely to borrow from a non-primary financial institution. 
It indicates that the primary banking relationship is empowered to distinguish the 
quality of the firm and maintain the good borrowers within the banking relationship 
to borrow. Moreover, firms are more probably to borrow larger size loans and lines 
of credits within the primary source of finance. Banks have unique power to retain 
the firms to stay in the relationship to borrow, possibly due to the stronger market 
power. This is also been confirmed that in concentrated banking market, where 
financial institution has stronger market power, firms are unlikely to switch to 
borrow. Overall, all of the empirical findings for this research question, support 
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Petersen and Rajan’s (1994 and 1995) relationship banking theories. No “lock-in” 
effect has been captured. 
Secondly, it is found that comparing with primary financial institution, if a 
small business borrows from a non-primary financial institution, it suffers from a 
lower application approval rate, with a higher loan interest rate. However, the 
maturity of the loan is usually longer. As the asymmetric information problem is 
severe for the firms borrowing from non-primary financial institutions, particular 
they are more likely to be smaller firms and financial riskier firms, reasonably 
financial institutions would be cautious to issue the credits and charge a higher 
interest rate to compensate the default risk, supporting Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) 
credit rationing theories. In terms of the maturity, one of the explanations would be 
that longer maturity is some offers by a non-primary financial institution to attract 
the small business customers. Certainly, according to Scherr and Hulburt’s (2001) 
theoretical models, firms with intermediate level of risks are more likely to be 
financed by long-term debt. 
Overall, this study confirms that information asymmetry and adverse 
selection issues play a vital role to determine the “changing” behaviour. Traditional 
theories, including the credit rationing theories (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), and 
relationship banking theories (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995), work 
functionally to affect the small businesses on from which financial institution to 
borrow. In general, “Lock-in” effect of banking relationship (von Thadden, 2004) 
would not be a concern captured in the analysis, implicating that primary banking 
relationship works to squeeze out the “poor quality” borrowers rather than to explore 
extra rents (Rajan, 1992, von Thadden, 2004) for its own borrowers.  
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This study sets some insights on the policy perspective, as it suggests that 
banking relationship is a powerful instrument to distinguish the quality of the 
borrowers and good borrowers enjoy the cost advantages and greater availability. 
Poor quality firms are easily to get financially constrained. It also indicates that bank 
consolidation might be meaningful for small businesses where banking relationship 
is easier to be fostered (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006), in particular, the 
concentration of banking market is getting stronger because of mergers and 
acquisitions happening after the financial crisis.  
In general, there are some limitations for this piece of research and directions 
of future research to be highlighted. First, covenants play an important role in 
mitigating the conflicts between the borrowers and lenders (Smith and Warner, 
1979). The beneficial effects of covenants include enhancing the flexibility and 
efficiency of financial contracting (Park, 1994) and monitoring (Rajan and Winton, 
1995). Covenant works as a vital component of the non-pricing terms in the loan 
contract (Bae et al, 2016). Since relationship banking improves the availability of the 
external finance for small firms, it is reasonable to assume that relationship banking 
could loosen the covenant requirements. Indeed, Ivashina and Kovner (2011) 
empirically found that pre-existing banking relationship loosens the requirements on 
debt to EBITDA ratio. Therefore, it would be valuable in the future research to 
investigate the impacts of banking relationship switching on covenants. It is a pity 
that SSBF does not include any information regarding covenants. This is one of the 
major limitations of this research and we call for future surveys to consider this issue. 
Second, collateral also plays a major function in the loan contracts. Indeed, 
collateral could effectively mitigate the adverse selection problem in the loan 
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markets (Bester, 1985). The association between relationship banking and collateral 
requirements have been investigated in depth by both of theoretical modelling (Boot 
and Thakor, 1994) and empirical testing (Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and 
Korting, 1998; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004 and 2006). Therefore, it is valuable to 
investigate whether relational bank switching could affect the collateral requirements 
in the future research, and this is feasible by using SSBF data. 
Third, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is yet not available to 
track the long-term effect of banking relationship switching behaviour: for example, 
it would be very interesting to find out, in 3 to 5 years’ time frame after the 
switching, what would be impacts of banking relationship switching behaviour on 
the future borrowing costs, availability of finance, future firm performance, growth, 
business failure rate or even the probability of going public, etc. SSBF does not 
provide such information and therefore, it is called for that in future surveys, the 
designer of the surveys could consider these issues. 
Fourth, the financial crisis in 2008 hurts small business sector greatly. It is 
observed that 5 years after the crisis, the total employments and the total payroll 
provided by small business segment in the U.S., have decreased significantly. SSBF 
stopped by the year of 2003 and therefore, after the financial crisis, it is unclear 
whether the banking relationship switching, still plays similar function as captured in 
this thesis or not. This is an extra limitation of this chapter and surveys after the crisis 
like SSBF are desired. 
Fifth, SSBF does not report the initial contact with the bank. This limits me to 
investiage cumulative effect of information transmission approach. Also, it limits me 
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to make clear whether the change of the contact approach, could affect the relational 
bank switching behaviour. I call for future surveys to pay attention to this issue. 
Last but not least, there are some common limitations as the previous chapter. 
For instance, SSBF is not available for the research on the non-linear effect of 
banking market concentration (Chong et al, 2013) because the measurements for the 
banking market in SSBF are ordinal variable with only 2 or 3 scales; the banks, are 
also hidden in the SSBF surveys, which leads to the shortage that only very limited 
information regarding the supply side of the credit could be found in the survey; etc. 
If U.S. Federal Reserve Board, or any other institutions or organizations would like 
to carry on future surveys like SSBF, it would be very beneficial to include such 
information in the survey. 
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Chapter Four: Is Contact in Person Important in Small Business 
Finance? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
With the development of advanced information technologies, financial services for 
small businesses have been significantly changed (Han, 2008) and the advanced technology, 
especially Internet banking, has realised geographic liberalisation for banks and benefited 
both banks and firms (Han, 2008; Corrocher, 2006; DeYoung, 2004). Empirical studies have 
shown evidence that in recent decades, impersonal communication between the banks and 
their customers has been widely adopted and significantly improved (Marinč, 2015), 
including the application of online banking and electronic commerce (Han and Greene, 2007; 
Aladwani, 2001), telephone banking (Sundarraj and Wu, 2005) and ATM banking (Chandio, 
2013). For example, according to Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), small 
businesses tended to use impersonal banking technologies more often, with 21.86% in 1993 
rising up to 25.63%. Since there has been a very fast development of impersonal banking in 
recent decades, questions may emerge such as: is communication in person important for 
small businesses with their banks? And who are more likely to adopt communication in 
person with their banks?  
As highlighted in the extant literature, the problem of information asymmetries is one 
of the major obstacles for small businesses in obtaining bank credit (Ang, 1991). Amongst 
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the lending technologies, such as financial statement lending, asset-based lending and fixed-
asset lending, the important role played by relationship banking seems not to have been 
affected by the dramatic change in information technology innovation (DeYoung et al, 2004; 
Berger and Udell, 2006), and relationship banking is still an important approach for small 
businesses in obtaining external finance (Uchida et al, 2012), whilst soft information 
transmission to financial institutions is also important in the development of relationships for 
both small businesses and banks (Stein, 2002).  
Earlier empirical evidence recognised the importance of relationship banking in small 
business finance and the importance of personal communication was also addressed 
theoretically by Stein (2002), and relationship banking could efficiently overcome the 
problem of asymmetric information between “decentralised firms”38 and their lenders. Such 
firms borrow with a heavy reliance on the transmission of “soft information”, which “cannot 
be directly verified by anyone other than the agent who produce it” (Stein, 2002:p.1892), and 
such information is transferred to a lender via multiple interactions with the borrower over 
time (Boot, 2000). “Soft information” is described as information that cannot be completely 
quantified and easily transmitted, such as the owner’s personal characteristics, attitudes 
toward risks, etc. (Petersen, 2004; Alam et al, 2014). In contrast, “hard information” can be 
easily quantified and transmitted, such as financial ratios and credit scores (Udell, 2008), and 
can be easily conveyed by advanced technologies, such as Internet banking (Han, 2008; 
Hertzberg et al, 2010; Berger et al, 2005; Stein, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Moreover, 
besides non-verifiable information, verifiable information, such as cash flows, financial 
leverage and collateral value, can also be communicated by regular personal contact between 
loan managers and small business borrowers (Hertzberg et al, 2010). Hence, informationally 
                                                 
38 Stein (2002) groups firms into two types: decentralised and hierarchical firms. Decentralised firms are those 
with a single manager, such as small firms, and hierarchical firms are referred to as those with multiple layers of 
management, such as large firms. 
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transparent firms are able to provide “hard” information to the financial institutions whilst 
informationally opaque firms (e.g. small businesses) rely more heavily on “soft” information 
transmission to their proposed lenders (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Petersen, 2004; Gropp et al, 
2013). The major distinctive feature between “hard” and “soft” information is that “hard” 
information can be easily transformed as numbers and “personal contact” is not essential for 
“hard” information transmission between firms and banks because the transmission could be 
accomplished via the telephone, the Internet, posting, etc. In contrast, “soft” information 
cannot be conveyed without personal contact (Petersen, 2004; Berger and Udell, 2002). In 
general, the ability of a small business to access external capital depends on the extent of the 
informational transparency of the small business. For better transmission of information, 
many lending technologies have been developed, as explained in a later session. Relationship 
banking is based on “soft” information transmission whilst almost all of the other lending 
technologies rely on “hard” information transmission. “Soft” information transmission is 
commonly used amongst small businesses since it is more difficult for them to produce 
standardised “hard” information. Personal communication, as a distinctive medium for the 
transmission of “soft” information in relationship banking, hence becomes vital for small 
business lending (Berger and Udell, 2002, 2006). 
There have been very few empirical studies examining the determination and the 
impact of contact approaches in relationship banking, apart from Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
and Berger et al. (2005) who suggest that both firm and bank characteristics determine the 
contact approaches in relationship banking. For example, firms located in rural areas and 
firms without any checking account with a bank are more likely to contact the financial 
institution in person. It has also been found that personal contact is more likely to happen in 
smaller banks with a higher branch and employee density.  
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In contributing to the limited existing literature in this area, the current study explores 
the determination and the impact of personal contact behaviour on relationship banking, by 
analysing data derived from three rounds of SSBF surveys by Federal Reserve (1993, 1998 
and 2003). Specifically, I take an overview of personal contacting communication approaches 
in relationship banking from the data set over 10 years in the US (although the usage of a 
personal contact approach in 2003 was 4% less common than that in 1993) and capture the 
favourable effects of personal contacting behaviour on both small businesses and banks. The 
results suggest that personal contact strengthens the primary banking relationship, supporting 
the relationship banking theories proposed by Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995) and Boot 
(2000). In this chapter, the results show that personal contact could also reduce the 
probability of firms being discouraged, especially for good borrowers, if they adopt personal 
contacts, indicating a self-rationing mechanism and supporting the discouraged borrowing 
theories proposed by Han et al (2009). Moreover, personal communication has been found to 
enable financial institutions to attract their small business customers to use financial services 
within the financial institution exclusively.  
Secondly, although there are theoretical models (e.g. Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; 
Boot and Thakor, 2000) on the positive relationship between banking market concentration 
and soft information acquisition, very little empirical research on these theoretical models has 
been conducted. To the author’s best knowledge, only one empirical research paper has tested 
the association between bank mergers and soft information acquisition using the bank 
competition hypothesis on this topic (Ogura and Uchida, 2014). Their findings, contrary to 
the Efficient Structure Hypothesis or Information Hypothesis, confirm that merger and 
acquisition of relational banks would worsen the soft information transmission from small 
businesses to their banks, whilst the results in this chapter that in concentrated banking 
market, small businesses are more prone to communicate soft information, support the 
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arguments of the Information Hypothesis in a more concentrated banking market. Indeed, a 
variety of investigations on the impacts of bank consolidation have been carried out on the 
credit availability or performance of the borrowers, e.g. the research by Degryse et al  (2011), 
Di Patti and Gobbi  (2007), etc. It is an important issue, especially for small business, because 
the existing business borrowers have to suffer from the re-evaluation and many firms have to 
receive a reduction of the amount of the lending or even they have to terminate the banking 
relationship. One of the possible theories for the explanation is that the soft information 
produced and accumulated by the merged bank is partly or even completely lost. By 
definition, soft information is the type of information which is hard to be quantified and 
transferred to a third person (Petersen, 2004). Loan officer is the repository of soft 
information (Berger and Udell, 2002) and therefore, during the consolidation, the soft 
information could be easily lost due to the changes of the loan officers. Ogura and Uchida 
(2014) have empirically found that the soft information storage in a bank without merger 
experience, is significantly greater than a bank with merger experience. Therefore, bank 
consolidation could indeed, largely affect small business finance as most of the small 
business rely on relationship lending where soft information could be transmitted. Taking the 
fact that contact in person is the unique way of soft information transmission, contact in 
person severely affect the small business finance under bank consolidation. Small firms 
which do not rely on contact in person, would not that seriously affected if their banks are 
taking mergers and acquisitions. 
Thirdly, in this chapter, I introduce a novel instrument, the primary bank service 
concentration ratio, to measure the strength of a banking relationship, additional to the 
existing measures such as length of relationship and exclusivity of relationship, etc. (Berger 
et al, 2005). On the one hand, the proportion of all services a firm obtains from its primary 
bank reflects the extent of the importance of the primary bank amongst all the relational 
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banks; on the other hand, it also measures the benefits the primary bank may obtain from 
serving its small business customers. This is because, firstly, there might be more potential 
profits associated with higher service concentration ratio; and secondly, a higher service 
concentration ratio provides more channels for the banks to acquire private information from 
small businesses. The results show that the service concentration ratio is 10.45% higher for 
firms adopting a personal communication approach than for those using any other 
communication approaches. 
Fourthly, this chapter is a unique study investigating the relationships between 
personal contacting behaviour and borrowing cost (interest rates) or financial availability 
(discouraged borrowing). The interest rate charged on loans reflects the monitoring costs and 
information acquisition costs for the banks and the small businesses. A discouraged 
borrowing experience, based on a self-selection mechanism, is an appropriate measurement 
of the financial availability of external finance for small businesses. It is also a measure of the 
lending efficiency of the financial institutions (Han et al, 2009). Both the loan interest rate 
and discouragement are heavily affected by the problem of asymmetric information (Han et 
al, 2009; Kon and Storey, 2003). This chapter finds that communicating in person decreases 
the loan interest and the probability of being discouraged for all small businesses. In 
particular, a personal communication approach effectively decreases the discouragement for 
good borrowers.  
Fifthly, it is confirmed that information revolution has affected the banking for 
business greatly nowadays (DeYoung et al, 2011). However, in the small business lending 
sector, the online loan application does not increase largely as it is expected. According to the 
empirical studies, only 4.1% of the small businesses once adopted online application in 1998 
in United States (Han and Greene, 2007); this ratio increased to 10.2% according to Survey 
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of Small Business Finances 2003 in United States. There is little statistics on the online loan 
application rate in more recent times and definitely it is worthy of investigation. It is 
demonstrated that during the borrowing-lending process, the banks may acquire hard 
information and soft information from the small businesses (Berger and Udell, 2006). For 
smaller size firms, start-up firms, etc., they suffer from high fixed costs (which is relatively 
lower to large firms or older firms) to produce standardized financial statements or reports for 
hard information transmission purpose to the banks. Also because there are fewer repeated 
transactions for small businesses, and usually small businesses are not responsible to produce 
the annual reports, it is very difficult to signal their creditworthiness by hard information 
transmission to the banks. Soft information transmission by contacts with the banks/loan 
officers over time, pre-existing bank account record, knowledge from the small business’ 
customers or suppliers or even the neighbours may be very helpful for the loan officers to 
observe the credit worthiness for the small businesses (Ang, 1991; Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Therefore, soft information transmission is important for small business, especially for 
smaller firms, younger firms and any other informationally opaque firms to signal their 
creditworthiness to borrow from the banks. Such soft information transmission, is extremely 
difficult to be done by online loan application (Petersen, 2004). Therefore, although the 
information revolution affects the banking industry enormously, it is not easy for online 
application to replace the traditional application in person for more informationally opaque 
firms as there are still huge demands for soft information transmission among these types of 
small businesses. Thus, the investigation on the application in person would be still important 
until the time online loan application could solve the soft information transmission problem. 
Apart from this, when the amount of the loan in the application is large, it is very likely that 
banks would require the application to be made in person. There might be in-depth interviews 
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between the small business and the loan officer for risk control purpose (Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2010).   
Overall, this chapter provides additional empirical evidence in the research area of 
small business finance, especially related to the relationship banking theory and asymmetric 
information theory. It also empirically examines the role played by banking market 
concentration in “soft information” transmission and financial availability for small 
businesses. It is found that in a concentrated banking market, firms are more likely to adopt a 
personal communication approach with their financial institutions. Moreover, such a 
communication approach enables small businesses to lengthen their banking relationships, 
increases the concentration of banking relationships and banking services, reduces the 
borrowing cost and enhances the efficiency of the self-selection mechanism of discouraged 
borrowing. The empirical evidence from this chapter strongly supports the Information 
Hypothesis regarding the effect of banking market concentration on small business finance. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses and Section 3 
introduces the data, variables and empirical models. Empirical results are interpreted in 
Section 4. Section 5 provides robustness tests and Section 6 concludes this chapter.  
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4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In both the academic and practical perspectives, the heart of lending to small business 
borrowers is the primary information sourcing and screening, loan contract underwriting and 
monitoring. Eight key lending technologies have been developed as shown in Table 4-1 for 
small business lending activities. According to the nature of the information transmission 
process, the lending technologies could be classified as transaction-based lending and 
relationship lending. Transaction-based lending relies on “hard” information transmission 
whilst relationship lending relies heavily on “soft” information transmission (Berger and 
Udell, 2006; Udell, 2008). Table 4-1 indicates that if a small business would like to borrow 
based on hard information, it has to prepare professionally verified standardised information. 
Alternatively, it has to pledge collateral or give up the ownership of certain underlying assets 
to its lenders. If the small business has built any banking relationship, it could be able to 
signal its creditworthiness to the lenders by soft information transmission (Berger and Udell, 
2002, 2006). As listed in Table 4-2, soft information is not easily observed, verified or 
transmitted to others rather than the agents who produce it. By transmitting soft information 
to the lenders, the enormity of the information opacity problem for the small business could 
be ameliorated. This is because on the one hand, those smaller and younger firms lack a track 
record in the lender’s view; on the other hand, it is relatively more costly to produce hard 
information for smaller businesses because of higher fixed costs, a smaller amount of 
repeated transactions and fewer ways of signalling creditworthiness (Petersen, 2004). Since 
personal contact is viewed as essential for soft information transmission, contact in person is 
more likely to happen amongst firms with a severe asymmetric information problem (Ang, 
1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995, 2002; Stein, 2002; Udell, 2008). In summary, 
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according to the Information Hypothesis proposed by Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), a 
firm’s informational opacity is strongly linked to the contact approaches between a small 
business and its financial institution. 
In contrast, evidence against the Information Hypothesis supporting market power 
inefficiencies has also been found. For example, a small business may suffer severe financial 
constraint problems in a concentrated banking market (Ryan et al, 2014). The effect of “soft” 
information has not been captured in a concentrated banking market. This empirical result 
implies that information transmission plays an insignificant role between firms and banks, 
and therefore a “soft” information pathway would not be more preferable to informationally 
opaque firms.  
Taking the above arguments into consideration, Hypothesis One  is set as follows: 
H1: More informationally opaque businesses are more likely to contact their lenders 
in person. 
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Table 4-1 Classification and Characteristics of Lending Technologies 
Lending technologies Descriptor Nature Information Characteristics 
Relationship Lending Based on borrower-lender relationship Relationship-based Soft “Soft” information transmission over time. 
Financial Statement 
Lending Based on financial statements Transaction-based Hard 
Should be audited by a CPA and provide 
informative financial statements; suitable for 
transparent firms 
Asset-based Lending Secured by receivables and inventories Transaction-based Hard High monitoring costs 
Factoring Secured by receivables Transaction-based Hard Lender’s ownership of receivables 
Leasing Based on the assets purchased by the lender Transaction-based Hard Lender’s ownership of the assets 
Credit Scoring For micro businesses Transaction-based Hard Small loan size 
Equipment Lending Collateral Transaction-based Hard Based on the value of the collaterals 
Real Estate-based 
Lending Collateral Transaction-based Hard Based on the value of the collaterals 
(Source: Berger and Udell, 2006; Udell, 2008)
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Table 4-2 Classification and Characteristics of Information 
 Hard Information Soft Information 
Nature Quantitative: always recorded as numbers Qualitative: communicated in text 
Content Financial ratios, numbers, etc. Opinions, rumours, market commentary, etc. 
Media for 
Collection 
Could be collected, stored electronically, 
e.g. by computers, database, etc. Personal 
and impersonal transmission  
Generally speaking, in person is essential 
Standardisation Standardised Flexible 
Third Party Easily transmitted to a third party Costly to be transmitted to a third party 
(Source: Stein, 2002; Berger and Udell, 2002; Petersen, 2004) 
From the perspective of both banks and firms, local banking market concentration 
may affect the communication approach between a small business and its banks. Banks, in a 
competitive banking market, have less incentive to invest in private information acquisition 
from firms due to the decreasing marginal reward of the private information acquisition 
(Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). In particular, “sector specialisation”, i.e. soft information 
acquisition (Ogura and Uchida, 2014), plays a very important role in relationship banking, 
and as banking competition becomes stronger, “sector specialisation” would be less attractive 
to the banks. Since personal contact is the unique medium by which “soft” information is 
transmitted (Petersen, 2004; Berger and Udell, 2002), in a more competitive banking market, 
the probability of contacting the primary bank in person would be lower. 
From the perspective of small businesses, the nature of “soft” information and “hard” 
information makes a small business less prone to using “soft” information in a competitive 
banking market. Although the standardisation of information leads to a higher cost of 
producing “hard” information for small businesses, it results in lower transaction costs39. In 
particular, in a competitive banking market, firms have more banking resources than in a 
                                                 
39 This is reflected by the lower cost of re-verification. 
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concentrated banking market (Ongena and Smith, 2001) and hard information is reverifiable 
by a third bank in contrast to soft information (Petersen, 2004; Stein, 2002). This indicates 
that “hard” information might be preferable in a competitive banking market since it could be 
transferred among the dispersed financial institutions with low transaction costs. In contrast, 
“soft” information is preferable in a concentrated banking market for small business, because 
small businesses have less incentive with regard to reverification by other financial 
institutions. 
Therefore, based on the views of both small businesses and banks, Hypothesis Two is 
developed as follows: 
H2: Small businesses located in a more concentrated banking market are more likely 
to contact their banks in person than those located in a competitive banking market. 
Amongst various lending technologies, such as financial statement lending, asset-
based lending, credit scoring and factoring, etc. (Berger and Udell, 2002, 2006), most of 
which are “hard” information oriented, relationship banking is therefore unique in terms of 
“soft” information transmission. To finance informationally opaque small businesses, lenders 
rely heavily on relationship banking for private information collection and decision-making 
(Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Hertzberg et al, 2010). Soft information transmission from 
small businesses to banks over time is vital for developing the banking relationship for small 
businesses that makes relationship banking distinctive from the other lending technologies. 
Along with soft information acquisition over time, loan officers may better know about a 
small business customers and this information advantage could reduce the monitoring and 
application costs for both sides of the loans and facilitate the development of the relationship 
(Stein, 2002; Berger and Udell, 2002). The nature of soft information also makes 
reverification very expensive (Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004). Therefore, if a small business has 
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already transmitted a large amount of soft information to a bank, it is very likely that the 
small business will stay within the relationship rather than switch to a banking relationship. 
Switching implies that the value of the accumulated soft information with the previous 
financial institution has sunk because of the unreverifiable nature of soft information for a 
third party (Petersen, 2004; Hart, 1995). Thus, small businesses maintain longer relationships 
based on soft information transmission (by contact in person).  
H3: Small businesses that contact their primary banks frequently in person are more 
likely to build stronger primary banking relationships.  
As mentioned above, two types of information can be conveyed during 
communication between small businesses and their banks: hard information and soft 
information (Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004). Informationally opaque firms would not like to 
transmit hard information, which is verifiable and quantifiable, because the fixed cost of 
producing it is high, or sometimes it is not even possible (Ang, 1991). Soft information would 
be a better form to convey to lenders and could be accumulated via the historical contacts 
between small businesses and loan officers, and therefore, on the one hand, it saves the 
information acquisition cost and monitoring cost for the banks, while on the other hand, it 
saves the small business from producing standardised quantified information and signalling 
to the lenders (Berger and Udell, 1998). Thus, small firms with better soft information 
transmission may save a certain amount of borrowing cost. Since contact in person is a 
unique medium for conveying soft information (Petersen, 2004), small businesses that 
contact their banks more frequently in person may get their loan application approved with a 
lower rate. 
H4: Small businesses that contact their primary banks frequently in person could be 
able to borrow at a lower rate. 
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Informational opacity is the essential driver of different types of small business 
borrowing behaviour and this problem is the cause of credit rationing or banks’ offer of a 
menu of contracts to small businesses (Ang, 1991; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985). 
Because of the existence of information asymmetry, application costs and the lack of 
alternative finance, firms might be discouraged from borrowing because of fearing being 
rejected when in need of external finance. This behaviour is referred to as “discouraged 
borrowing”. There would be no discouragement if the banks and the borrowers were 
completely mutually informed or uninformed about each other (Chakravarty and Xiang, 
2013). The scale of discouragement rises up to the maximum if the banks and the borrowers 
partially informed about each other. In the real world, it is extremely difficult for lenders to 
know exactly the quality of the borrower40 (Kon and Storey, 2003; Han, 2009). This means 
that a communication approach may effectively affect discouraged borrowing behaviour 
because, as previously mentioned, personal communication and soft information transmission 
are highly relevant to the asymmetric information problem between the borrowers and the 
lenders. For small businesses, personal communication may efficiently reduce the 
informational asymmetry between the borrowers and the lenders. 
Moreover, research reveals that discouraged borrowing is a self-rationing mechanism 
(Han, 2009). In an efficient capital market, lenders prefer to issue finance to good-quality 
firms whilst poor-quality firms are discouraged. As informational transparency increases, 
more risky borrowers are more likely to be discouraged whilst less risky borrowers are less  
likely to be discouraged (Han, 2009). Additionally, information transparency between small 
businesses and banks could significantly decrease the application costs for the small 
businesses and reduce the screening error for the banks (Kon and Storey, 2003). 
                                                 
40 The quality of the borrowers in the empirical research is usually proxied by the Dun and Bradstreet Score or 
Volatility of Returns to Equity (Han, 2009). This reflects the risks of the borrowers. 
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Consolidating the conclusion that personal communication could mitigate the informational 
opacity between small businesses and financial institutions, it is sensible to draw the 
conclusion that firms adopting a personal communication approach are less likely to be 
discouraged. 
H5: Borrowers adopting a personal communication approach are less likely to be 
discouraged. 
 282 
 
4.3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
4.3.1 Data Source 
The empirical data are from the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), which 
aims to collect information on the financial issues of small businesses in the United States. 
Cross-sectional information was collected from sample firms with fewer than 500 
employees41 and there are 4,260 samples from 2003 (SSBF03), 3,561 from 1998 (SSBF98) 
and 4,637 from 1993 (NSSBF93), across nine local regions and eight SIC two-digit-coded 
industries. Agricultural businesses, not-for-profit organisations, government entities and 
subsidiaries are excluded. The SSBF enables us to identify the approaches most frequently 
used by small firms to communicate with their banks, such as in person, telephone etc. It also 
provides us with sufficient information to examine banking relationships, in terms of length, 
concentration, physical distance and so on. SSBF data provide a representative and 
comprehensive view of small business finance in the United States, and in particular, the 
SSBF measures the bank market structure to an accuracy of localities.  
Moreover, SSBF enables the chapter to capture the development and deregulation in 
the United States in 1990s. United States suffered from the geographical restrictions on bank 
expansion since 19th century. Before 1994, interstate branching is strictly restricted in most 
the states in the United States. Therefore, banks outside the state are difficult to be involved 
in the competition in the local banking market in the state. In 1994, the Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) passed and it permits unrestricted interstate banking 
                                                 
41 Please see the methodology report for more detailed information on sampling. The methodology report is 
available from SSBF website, in particular, the methodology report for SSBF03 is available from 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/ssbf03/ssbf03home.html#ssbf03results  
The methodology report for SSBF98 is available from 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/ssbf98/ssbf98home.html#ssbf98results  
The methodology report for SSBF93 is available from 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/nssbf93/nssbf93home.html#nssbf93results  
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which was effective in 1995 and interstate branching which was effective in 1997. There are 
very strong implications for the effectiveness of IBBEA as since then, the local banking 
market in each individual state, has changed enormously because of the increase of the 
competition among the banks (Rice and Strahan, 2010).  
Taking consideration of the dataset employed from Survey of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF) in this chapter, 3 rounds of the surveys have been done by SSBF in the year 
of 1993, 1998 and 2003. This is just the time before the effectiveness of IBBEA, immediately 
after the effective of IBBEA and 5 years after the effective of IBBEA. Therefore, by the 
observation of the year dummies, it enables this chapter to capture the immediate effect of 
IBBEA and long term effect of IBBEA (5-years scale) on small business finance. In the year 
of 1998 and 2003, the competition in the local banking market was significantly higher than 
the year of 1993. 
 
4.3.2 Variables 
This chapter aims to test the hypotheses developed earlier and more specifically to 
answer two empirical questions: (1) who is more likely to communicate with their primary 
financial institutions in person? And (2), what are the impacts of making contact in person 
regarding small business finance? Various aspects of relationship banking have been 
investigated, e.g. the length of the relationship, and this chapter focuses on the manner of 
communication between a small business and its primary financial institution. According to 
the survey, a “primary” financial institution is defined as the most important financial service 
provider recognised by a sample firm and all other institutions from which small firms obtain 
financial services or products are defined as “non-primary” financial institutions. Indeed, the 
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relationship with the primary financial institution has been widely used in the investigation of 
relationship banking in existing empirical research such as that by Berger and Udell (1998) 
and Berger et al (2001). It has been accepted that the “primary” relation is less likely to be 
transaction oriented (Ono et al, 2014) and it possesses an advantage in private information 
collection compared with non-primary relationships. I define “contactinperson” as 1 if a 
sample firm communicates with its primary financial institution in person as the most 
frequently used approach, and 0 otherwise, for example by mail, Internet, telephone, ATM 
and others. Table 4-3 shows that 77% of sample firms communicate with their primary banks 
in person. It has been hypothesised in earlier sections that there would be a less serious 
asymmetric information problem if a small firm communicated with its primary bank in 
person and such behaviour would strengthen the banking relationship and improve the 
availability of finance.  
The strength of the primary banking relationship is captured by five variables. The 
variable “primrelalenth” measures the length, “numrlat measures the total number of banking 
relationships, “exclusivity” is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if a sample firm has only 
one banking relationship (0 otherwise), “bank” is a dummy that is coded as 1 if the primary 
financial institution is a bank (0 otherwise), and finally, “primconcervs” measures the 
concentration of financial services used from the primary bank and is defined as the ratio 
between the number of financial services from the primary bank and the total number of 
financial services used. Table 4-3 shows that the average length of a primary banking 
relationship is about 114 months, and on average, a sample firm has 2.5 banking relationship 
ties. Thirty-one per cent of samples have only one banking relationship, 86% of the primary 
financial institutions are banks, and on average, 68% of the financial services used by small 
firms are from their primary banks. 
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As a measure of access to external finance, I follow Han et al. (2009) and define a 
sample firm as a discouraged borrower (“discouraer”=1, 0 otherwise) when it has a demand 
for external finance but does not apply for it because of the fear of being rejected. Table 4-3 
shows that 21% of the sample firms with a demand for external finance were discouraged 
borrowers. In the following hypothesis tests, I also control for firm characteristics, owner 
demographics and banking market concentration, which is measured by the Herfindahl Index, 
and HHI is coded as 1 if a sample firm is located in a highly concentrated banking market 
with a Herfindahl Index greater than 1800. Around 49% of the sample firms are located in a 
highly concentrated banking market. Table 4-3 reports the variable definitions and descriptive 
statistics. 
 286 
 
Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics for All the Variables 
(Statistics for industry, region and year dummies are not reported here, but are available on request.) 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 In the analysis, Ln(1+totem) has been used and is named logtotem. 
43 Descriptive statistics for capital seekers. 
Variable Name Definition Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 1
st Quartile 3
rd 
Quartile 
Owner Characteristics 
female =1 if female owners take equal or more than 50% of the total ownership; 0 otherwise 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 0 1 
eduba =1 if the principal owner has bachelor degree or above; 0 otherwise 0.51 0.50 1 0 1 0 1 
oage Owner’s age in years 51.05 11.74 51.00 0.00 95.00 43.00 58.00 
logoage =Ln(1+oage) 3.91 0.35 3.95 0.00 4.56 3.78 4.08 
Firm Characteristics 
totem42 Total number of employees 29.81 58.58 5.50 0.00 495.00 2.00 28.50 
corporat =1 if the firm is in corporation; 0 otherwise 0.57 0.49 1 0 1 0 1 
totassets =ln(1+total assets in dollars) 11.92 2.44 11.88 2.40 19.29 10.31 13.72 
startup =1 if firm age is no more than 2 years old; 0 otherwise 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 0 0 
bankrup =1 if firm owner declared bankruptcy in last 7 years; 0 otherwise 0.03 0.16 0 0 1 0 0 
delinqueb =1 if firm owner has business delinquent history lasting for longer than 60 days in last 3 years; 0 otherwise 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 0 0 
mrlint Interest rate on the most recent loan in percentage 7.23 3.06 7.50 0 32.00 5.50 9.00 
discouraer43 
=1 if firm was in need of finance in last 3 years but not a 
finance seeker because of fearing being turned down; 0 
otherwise if the firm is in need of finance. 
0.21 0.41 0 0 1 0 0 
Banking Market Characters 
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44 Since the Herfindahl Index of the banking market concentration in SSBF 1993 is recorded as a binary variable, I use a dummy as the measurement of the banking market 
concentration. The dummy is coded as 1 when the HHI is over 1800. Otherwise, I code this variable as 0. 
HHI44 =1 if firm’s local banking market is highly concentrated (measured by market shares of bank deposits); 0 otherwise 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 0 1 
finenviro The proportion of businesses in the same region and industry to contact their banks in person most frequently 0.75 0.09 0.77 0 1 0.72 0.80 
Relationship Characters 
primrelalenth Length of relationship with primary bank in months 113.86 112.00 72.00 0.00 1156.02 36.00 155.99 
logprimlenth =Ln(1+primrelalenth) 4.28 1.07 4.29 0.00 7.05 3.61 5.06 
numrlat Total number of banking relationships  2.54 1.80 2.00 0.00 20.00 1.00 3.00 
primconcervs =total number of services used in primary bank/total number of services used in all banks 0.68 0.27 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 
contactinperson =1 if contact with primary bank is most frequently in person; 0 otherwise 0.77 0.42 1 0 1 1 1 
bank =1 if the primary financial institution is a bank; 0 otherwise. 0.86 0.35 1 0 1 1 1 
exclusivity 
=1 if the firm has only one banking relationship tie with its 
banks; 0 if the firm maintains multiple relationships with the 
banks. 
0.31 0.46 0 0 1 0 1 
Year Dummies         
Year98Dum =1 if it is from SSBF98 dataset; 0 otherwise 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 0 1 
Year03Dum =1 if it is from SSBF03 dataset; 0 otherwise 0.34 0.47 0 0 1 0 1 
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4.3.3 Empirical Approaches 
This chapter aims to investigate the determinants of contacting relational bank in 
person method and its impact on the small business’ banking relationship, costs and 
availability of finance. Therefore, at the first stage, Probit regression will be carried out for 
the dependent variable of ‘contactinperson’. And then in the second stage, further analysis 
will be carried out on the impacts of ‘contactinperson’ on the length of primary banking 
relationship, total ties of banking relationships, primary banking service concentration, cost 
of borrowing and the probability of discouraged borrowing. As the variable of 
‘contactinperson’ might be endogenous at the second stage, Treatment Regression or 
Recursive Bivariate Probit Regression will be applied. The rationales for Treatment 
Regression and Recursive Bivariate Probit Regression have been demonstrated in Chapter 
Three, Section 3.3.5.2.1 in this thesis correspondingly (pp. 213-215 and pp. 207-210). 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 The determinants of contacting relational bank in person. 
First, Probit models are employed to examine a sample firm’s propensity to contact its 
primary financial institution in person and the results are shown in Table 4-4. By controlling 
for year, industry and region, Model 1 considers firm demographics only and Model 2 
considers both owner and firm characteristics.  
Table 4-4 shows that in a highly concentrated banking market, the probability of a 
small business contacting its primary bank in person is around 3.55% higher than in other 
banking markets, thereby supporting the Information Hypothesis. Firstly, this may be due to 
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the stronger motivation of the banks in private information collection in a more concentrated 
banking market (Carbó-Valverde et al, 2009) and in investing in “sector specialisation” to 
add value to the relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Secondly, the re-verification 
cost of hard information for outsiders is significantly lower than that of soft information 
(Petersen, 2004; Hart, 1995). Therefore, in a competitive banking market where there are 
more alternative financial resources available for small businesses (Ongena and Smith, 2001), 
small businesses have a stronger incentive to transmit hard information that might be 
available to a third party (bank), thus the incentive for a small business to transmit hard 
information in a competitive banking market is stronger. H2 is supported based on Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4 also indicates that informationally opaque firms, such as smaller (logtotemp) firms, 
are more likely to contact their primary banks in person, thereby supporting H1. This might 
be because for such firms, the fixed cost of producing hard information is relatively high and 
soft information transmission is more economically efficient and plausible for signalling the 
creditworthiness of a small business to the banks (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Petersen, 2004; 
Ang, 1991).  
Model 2 confirms the results in Model 1, and in addition, it also shows that female, 
less educated and older owner/managers are more likely to communicate with primary banks 
in person. For instance, the probability of a small business choosing a personal 
communication approach being run by female owners is 2.63% higher than the probablilty of 
such a business being run by male owners. This rate is 7.14% higher for owners without a 
bachelor degree than for owners with a bachelor degree. This is consistent with the age and 
gender effect on people’s preference in terms of communication approaches: male and 
younger people prefer an impersonal communication approach (Ilie et al, 2005; Zenger and 
Lawrence, 1989). Moreover, since better educated people tend to adopt challenging 
technologies (e.g. information technologies) in their work (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1985), 
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less educated owners in this research are more likely to adopt personal communication. As 
indicated by existing literature (Han et al, 2009), institutional type affects the communication 
approach in that the contact with banks is more likely to be in person than with other 
financial institutions, such as venture capitalists. Hereby, the results reflect the dominant 
position of banks in providing financial services for small firms and their stronger motivation 
in collecting soft information from small firms. By adding owner characteristics into the 
regression, the pseudo R2 increased from 5.50 to 9.29 %, indicating a stronger explanatory 
power.   
Table 4-4 shows that in the round of 2003 survey, the probability of contacting the 
banks significantly falls by 3.7% comparing with the round of 1998 or 1993. It confirms that 
in a competitive banking market, the probability of contacting in person decrease because 
there would be more transactional lending which does not require soft information 
transmission.
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Table 4-4: Determination of Contact in Person 
(This table presents the probit regression for contacting methods of sample firms with their primary 
banks. The dependent variable is contactinperson. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. “***”,“**” 
and “*”  stand for a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. The highest Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) is 1.64 indicating that no multicollinearity problem has been detected. The Chi2 indicate 
good model fitness. Robust Standard Error are used.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) dy/dx 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) dy/dx 
HHI 0.1197
*** 
(0.0264) 3.55% 
0.1063*** 
(0.0271) 3.06% 
logtotem -0.1962
*** 
(0.0105) -5.82% 
-0.2089*** 
(0.0111) -6.03% 
corporat 0.0252 (0.0308) 0.75% 
0.0123 
(0.0318) 0.37% 
startup -0.0572 (0.0559) -1.73% 
0.0188 
(0.0583) 0.54% 
delinqueb 0.0085 (0.0343) 0.25% 
0.0168 
(0.0352) 0.48% 
female   0.0928
*** 
(0.0318) 2.63% 
eduba   -0.2486
*** 
(0.0277) -7.14% 
logoage   0.1910
*** 
(0.0635) 5.51% 
bank   0.7132
*** 
(0.0359) 24.09% 
Year98Dum 0.0172 (0.0342) 0.51% 
0.0152 
(0.0349) 0.44% 
Year03Dum -0.1121
*** 
(0.0314) -3.37% 
-0.1278*** 
(0.326) -3.75% 
Constant 1.0257
*** 
(0.0479)  
-0.1191 
(0.2508)  
Industry Yes  Yes  
Region Yes  Yes  
Observations 12111 12044 
Wald χ2 686.00*** 1082.53*** 
Log Likelihood -6208.1817 -5905.5254 
Pseudo R2 5.50% 9.29% 
Predicted 
Pr(contactinperson) 77.89% 78.95% 
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4.4.2 Personal Contacting Behaviour and Length of Relationship 
Length of banking relationship has been widely accepted as a good measure of the 
strength of a relationship. To empirically test H3, this section investigates the effects of 
personal contact on the length of a primary banking relationship. I run both OLS and 
Treatment Regression Analysis (TRA) to eliminate the possible endogeneity problem where 
the independent dummy variable “contacting in person (contactinperson)” is possibly 
endogenously determined because there could be unobserved variables affecting both contact 
in person (contactinperson) and length of relationship, such as the size of financial 
institutions. Both the inverse mills ratio (IMR) and the Chi2 of LR Test of Endogeneity are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating the existence of endogeneity in OLS and 
the unbiased results from TRA (Greene, 2003). By adopting TRA, the causality issue 
between length of relationship and communication approach is considered. As indicated in 
H3, soft information transmission maintains the small business within the existing 
relationship and lengthens it. Table 4-5 reports the empirical results from both OLS and TRA 
for comparison purposes with marginal effects on the length of relationship in months.  
The positive coefficient of “contacting in person” (contactinperson) suggests that 
communication in person between a small firm and its primary financial institution facilitates 
the development of a longer primary banking relationship, thereby partially supporting H3. 
After controlling for all other factors at the mean value, the length of the primary banking 
relationship in months for firms contacting their primary banks in person is 76 months, 
compared with 58 months for that of firms conducting communication with their primary 
banks in other formats. The results also show that there would be longer primary banking 
relationships in a concentrated banking market than in a competitive market. Furthermore, the 
marginal effect of banking market concentration on length of banking relationship is larger 
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for a small business that has chosen an impersonal communication approach than for a small 
business that has chosen communication in person. This finding confirms that the functions 
played by soft information transmission and banking market concentration (accumulated 
information over time) are very similar to some extent. Overall, the empirical results in this 
section partially support H3, where firms using personal contact approaches would have a 
longer primary banking relationship. 
The distinctive nature of soft information makes it difficult to verify (Bertomeu and 
Marinovic, 2014). There are severe adverse selection problems in the small business loan 
market, particularly when a small business knows exactly its own quality while the lender 
only knows the distribution of the quality of firms (Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2014; Rice and 
Strahan, 2010). Once a small business has chosen soft information transmission, it is very 
likely to commit to the relationship because of the high verification cost of soft information 
for a third party. Therefore, the banking relationship will be maintained longer. This research 
confirms these theoretical predictions. 
Table 4-5 reports that the length of banking relationship was significantly shorter in 
1998 and significantly longer in 2003. This, firstly, captures the dramatic change of the local 
banking market due to the entrance of the banks outside the states in the year 1997 or 1998 
and therefore, small businesses may have to switch their banking relationships. In 2003, 
banking relationship gets longer for the firms. It might be due to the effectiveness of Gramm
－Leach－Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999 which gives the commercial banks more power 
(Akhigbe and Whyte, 2004). 
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Table 4-5: Contact in Person and Primary Banking Relationship 
(This table presents the results of the determination of length of primary banking relationship. 
Treatment Regression Analysis is conducted using a two-stage approach with a dependent variable of 
length of primary banking relationship by controlling for the treatment effect, and the dependent 
variable in the first stage is contactinperson. Column I reports the second stage result and Column II 
and Column III report the marginal effects. IMR stands for the Inverse Mills ratio and control 
variables include industrial and regional dummies. athrho is reported as the coefficient of the Inverse 
Mills ratio as sigma is always positive in the treatment model. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’  stand for a significance 
level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The highest VIF is 1.64 indicating that no multicollinearity 
problem has been detected. 1st-stage regression is reported in Column IV. LR test χ2 =8.33***, 
confirming the elimination of endogeneity.) 
 
 OLS  TRA   
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Column I: 
2nd Stage 
(primrela1) 
Column II: 
dy/dx for 
treatment = 1 
Column 
III: 
dy/dx for 
treatment 
= 0 
Column IV: 
1st Stage 
(contactinperson) 
contactinperson 0.2838
*** 
(0.0237) 
0.6705*** 
(0.1427)   
 
eduba     -0.2537
*** 
(0.0278) 
HHI 0.0792
*** 
(0.0185) 
0.0664** 
(0.0194) 0.0766 0.0849 
0.1095*** 
(0.0271) 
logtotem 0.0534
*** 
(0.0077) 
0.0765*** 
(0.0122) 0.0565 0.0403 
-0.2082*** 
(0.0107) 
corporat -0.0382
* 
(0.0214) 
-0.0347 
(0.0216) -0.0333 -0.0321 
0.0142 
(0.0319) 
startup -1.1764
*** 
(0.0365) 
-1.1764*** 
(0.0388) -1.1763 -1.1762 
-0.0057 
(0.0571) 
delinqueb -0.2239
*** 
(0.0244) 
-0.2265*** 
(0.0243) -0.2258 -0.2252 
0.0119 
(0.0349) 
bank 0.2958
*** 
(0.0295) 
0.2111*** 
(0.0409) 0.2928 0.3314 
0.7168*** 
(0.0352) 
Y98Dum -0.0829
*** 
(0.0241) 
-0.0854*** 
(0.0241) -0.0827 -0.0804 
0.0207 
(0.0348) 
Y03Dum 0.2994
*** 
(0.0228) 
0.3048*** 
(0.0230) 0.2946 0.2866 
-0.1107*** 
(0.0322) 
Constant 3.7245
*** 
(0.0488) 
3.4643*** 
(0.1054)   
0.6525*** 
(0.0571) 
Industry YES YES   YES 
Region YES YES   YES 
IMR  -0.2251
*** 
(0.0825)   
 
Observations 12103 12044   12044 
Log Likelihood  -22867.19    
χ2  712.68***   1073.63*** 
F 75.35***     
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LR Test of Endogeneity 
(χ2)  8.33
***    
Predicted y 4.2843  4.35 4.07  
 
 
4.4.3 Personal Contacting Behaviour and Concentration of Banking Relationships  
As mentioned earlier, banking relationship concentration could be used as a measure 
of the strength of a specific banking tie, and indeed it is expected that the primary banking 
relationship is stronger when a small firm has more concentrated (or exclusive) banking ties 
and firms contacting their primary bank in person are more likely to have a stronger primary 
banking relationship (H3) (Degryse and van Cayseele, 2000). Indeed, the scope of the 
banking relationship could be either described by the number of the total ties of banking 
relationships (Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2007; Han et al, 2008) or a dummy 
of whether a firm has a sole banking relationship or not to measure the exclusivity of the 
banking relationships (Berger et al, 2008; Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2006; 
Elsas, 2005). Therefore, the banking relationship concentration in this section is measured by 
two variables. First, “numrlat” measures the value of the total number of banking 
relationships that a sample firm has, and second, “exclusivity” is coded as 1 if a sample firm 
has only one banking relationship and 0 if a sample firm has multiple banking relationships. 
Accordingly, I run Treatment Effect Regression (TRA) on “numrlat” and bivariate probit 
analysis (Biprobit) on “exclusivity” to control for the endogeneity problem. The empirical 
results and marginal effects of estimates are reported in Table 4-6.  
Table 4-6 shows that, although OLS and TRA models, or probit and Biprobit, 
conclude very similarly, both TRA and Biprobit models are appropriate for reducing 
endogeneity issues with the proof of significance of the LR tests of endogeneity. The TRA 
 296 
 
model indicates that small firms that contact their primary banks in person have fewer 
banking ties (0.3 ties) than those small firms that do not communicate with the banks in 
person. The Biprobit model states that those firms that contact their primary banks in person 
are 20.57% more likely to develop a sole banking tie than those that do not contact their 
primary banks in person. Therefore, H3 is supported, implying that soft information 
transmission via personal contact encourages small firms to maintain fewer banking 
relationships. The possible explanations for this are firstly that the marginal value for the 
firms which frequently transmit soft information to their banks to develop more ties of 
relationship is small, as better soft information may work well for the small firms’ financing 
demands. Secondly, soft information is more difficult to transfer to a third party (Elsas, 2005), 
which means that if the firm chooses soft information communication, it is very likely that 
the small business will stay within this relationship. Thirdly, soft information transmission 
makes the reverification of it by a third part expensive (Petersen, 2004; Hart, 1995), and 
therefore it is more likely for the small business to maintain only one banking relationship tie. 
Table 4-6 also shows that more informationally transparent firms, such as larger firms 
and corporations, are more likely to have multiple more dispersed banking relationships, 
where the asymmetric information problem is less serious, supporting the empirical findings 
of Ongena and Smith (2001). Such firms rely greatly on hard information transmission. On 
the other hand, firms with poor credit history, e.g. those small firms with a delinquent history 
in Table 4-6, are more likely to maintain multiple banking relationship ties.  
Table 4-6 presents that in 2003, small firms built more ties of banking relationships 
and the banking relationship exclusivity fell down. And the increase of the local banking 
market competition could give rise to such phenomenon. 
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Table 4-6: Contact in Person and the Concentration of Banking Relationships 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of total relationship ties between firms and all banks. OLS, Treatment Regression Analysis (TRA) 
and Biprobit analysis have been listed in the table. For OLS and TRA, the dependent variable is the number of relationship ties between small businesses and 
banks. The Biprobit regression dependent variable is a dummy coded 0 as multiple relationship ties and 1 as a single relationship tie. TRA analysis and 
Biprobit analysis are conducted by two-stage regression, respectively, and the dependent variable of first-stage regression is contactinperson. Column II and 
Column III list the marginal effect of each independent variable for the dependent variable of numrlat with or without treatment, respectively. Column IV and 
Column VI report the marginal effect of probit and Biprobit analysis, respectively. IMR is an abbreviation for the inverse Mills ratio. The marginal effect 
reported for Biprobit includes direct and indirect effects. Control variables including year, industrial and regional dummies are not reported in the table. 
“Athrho” is reported as the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio as sigma is always positive in the treatment model. “***”,“**” and “*” stand for a confidence 
level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The highest VIF is 1.64 indicating that no multicollinearity problem has been detected. 1st-stage regression for TRA is 
reported in Column TRA 1st Stage and the 1st stage regression for RBP is reported in Column RBP 1st Stage. The LR test χ2 for TRA is 2.63* and for RBP is 
3.42*, which indicate the elimination of the endogeneity problem.) 
 
 OLS  TRA   Probit (Exclusivity) Biprobit (Exclusivity)  
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Column 
I: 
2nd Stage  
Column II: 
dy/dx for 
treatment =1 
Column III: 
dy/dx for 
treatment = 0 
Column 
TRA 
1st Stage 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Column 
IV 
dy/dx 
Column 
V: 
2nd Stage 
Column 
VI: 
dy/dx 
Column RBP 1st 
Stage 
contactinperson -0.2946
*** 
(0.0387) 
-0.4503*** 
(0.1012)    
0.2385*** 
(0.0337) 7.66% 
0.7667*** 
(0.2542) 20.57% 
 
eduba     -0.2525
*** 
(0.028)     
 
finenviro     3.2822
*** 
(0.2205)     
 
female          0.1097
*** 
(0.0316) 
HHI -0.0337 (0.0288) 
-0.0304 
(0.0292) -0.0349 -0.0387 
0.1186*** 
(0.0274) 
0.0350 
(0.0260) 1.17% 
-0.0170 
(0.0276) 1.21% 
0.1214*** 
(0.027) 
logtotem 0.4990
*** 
(0.0141) 
0.4919*** 
(0.0136) 0.4998 0.5065 
-0.2094*** 
(0.0108) 
-0.3320*** 
(0.0125) -11.12% 
-0.2889*** 
(0.0288) -11.36% 
-0.2131*** 
(0.0109) 
corporat 0.1686
*** 
(0.0314) 
0.1698*** 
(0.0334) 0.1692 0.1687 
0.0163 
(0.0322) 
-0.2054*** 
(0.0289) -6.94% 
-0.2036*** 
(0.0291) -7.35% 
-0.0078 
(0.0317) 
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startup -0.0342 (0.0550) 
-0.0372 
(0.0601) -0.0374 -0.0377 
0.0079 
(0.0576) 
0.0373 
(0.0512) 1.26% 
0.0399 
(0.0514) 1.29% 
-0.0282 
(0.0572) 
delinqueb 0.5823
*** 
(0.0427) 
0.5824*** 
(0.0377) 0.5819 0.5814 
0.0162 
(0.0352) 
-0.3837*** 
(0.0358) -11.80% 
-0.3779*** 
(0.0365) -12.42% 
0.0154 
(0.035) 
bank -0.4018
*** 
(0.0409) 
-0.3681*** 
(0.0465) -0.4001 -0.4158 
0.7191*** 
(0.0355) 
0.3240*** 
(0.0374) 10.04% 
0.2014*** 
(0.0757) 10.54% 
0.7031*** 
(0.0357) 
Year98Dum 0.0469 (0.0366) 
0.0477 
(0.0373) 0.0484 0.0489 
-0.0161 
(0.0354) 
-0.0450 
(0.0329) -1.50% 
-0.0472 
(0.0325) -1.59% 
0.0168 
(0.0347) 
Year03Dum 0.2903
*** 
(0.0353) 
0.2889*** 
(0.0354) 0.2888 0.2888 
0.0014 
(0.0341) 
-0.2910*** 
(0.0320) -9.46% 
-0.2706*** 
(0.0344) -9.89% 
-0.1054*** 
(0.0321) 
Constant 1.6753
*** 
(0.0667) 
1.7795*** 
(0.0929)   
-1.6893*** 
(0.1673) 
0.0329 
(0.0595)  
-0.3369*** 
(0.1875)  
0.4811*** 
(0.0560) 
Region YES YES   YES YES  YES  YES 
Industry YES YES   YES YES  YES  YES 
IMR  0.1207
* 
(0.0658)   
      
Observations 12,103 12,044   12,044 12103  12,044  12,044 
Log Likelihood  -28174.40    -6512.75  -12446.3   
χ2  40.87***   1279.14*** 1600.28***  3131.36***  1011.21*** 
F 101.37***          
LR Test of Endogeneity (χ2)  2.63*      3.42*   
Predicted y 2.60  2.53 2.82  27.70%  30.18%   
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4.4.4 Personal Contacting Behaviour and Primary Banking Service Concentration 
In contrast to banking relationship concentration (Section 4.4.3), financial service 
concentration (primconcervs) measures the proportion of financial services provided by the 
primary institution out of the total number of financial services used by a sample firm. It is a 
new measure of the strength of a banking relationship and reflects the degree of importance 
of the primary financial institution to the business from the service concentration perspective. 
Table 4-1 shows that on average 68% of the financial services used by sample firms are 
provided by their primary institutions. In this section, I investigate the impacts of contact in 
person with a primary financial institution on the concentration of financial services. 
Similarly to Section 4.4.3, it is expected that small businesses would be more likely to 
concentrate their financial services with their primary bank because of the problem of 
asymmetric information when contact in person is weaker (H3). I firstly report on the OLS 
regression in Table 4-7, and then, since the dependent variable is censored between 0 and 1, I 
introduce a tobit model in Table 4-7 to deal with such censorship. Moreover, bearing in mind 
the possibly endogenous nature of the contact approach variable, I have adopted a two-stage 
tobit regression and report on it in Table 4-7. 
The empirical results in Table 4-7 show that, first, an endogeneity issue exists 
(supported by the significant Chi-2 statistics in the Wald Test), and therefore a two-stage 
tobit regression approach generates unbiased estimates. Second, H3 is supported by the 
positive significant coefficient of the contact approach variable (0.34, sd=0.03 in two-stage 
tobit model) and it shows that small firms would use more concentrated financial services 
from their primary institutions if they communicated with each other in person. This enforces 
the earlier finding that soft information transmission via personal contact would strengthen 
the primary banking relationship and small firms would have more concentrated sources of 
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financial services from their primary bank. Indeed, both small firms and banks would benefit 
from the concentrated services where the costs of private information transmission and 
collection might be relatively low (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). 
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Table 4-7: Contact in Person and Financial Service Concentration 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of small business service concentration from 
its primary bank. Two-stage tobit analysis is conducted as two-stage regression for the dependent 
variable of firms’ service concentration from primary banks (priconsv) taking into consideration the 
endogeneity issue. The dependent variable of first-stage regression is contactinperson. Control 
variables, including industrial and regional dummies, are not reported in the table. “***”,“**” and “*” 
stand for a confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The highest VIF is 1.64 indicating that 
no multicollinearity problem has been detected. 1st-stage regression is reported in Column 2-STAGE 
TOBIT 1st Stage. LR test χ2 is 16.20***, confirming the elimination of the endogeneity problem.) 
 
 OLS TOBIT 2-STAGE TOBIT 
2-STAGE 
TOBIT 1st 
Stage 
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
contactinperson 0.0550
*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0747*** 
(0.0081) 
0.3440*** 
(0.0286) 
 
logoage    0.0940
*** 
(0.0350) 
HHI 0.0112
** 
(0.0048) 
0.0153** 
(0.0071) 
0.0008 
(0.0054) 
0.1250*** 
(0.0269) 
logtotem -0. 0426
*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.06931*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0233*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.2176*** 
(0.0105) 
corporat -0.0357
*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0609*** 
(0.0086) 
-0.0357*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0142 
(0.0315) 
startup -0.0033 (0.0057) 
-0.0016 
(0.0158) 
-0.0010 
(0.0110) 
-0.0117 
(0.0570) 
delinqueb -0.0742
*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.1041*** 
(0.0086) 
-0.0763*** 
(0.0069) 
0.0234 
(0.0347) 
bank 0.1261
*** 
(0.0023) 
0.1631*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0641*** 
(0.0098) 
0.7005*** 
(0.035) 
Year98Dum 0.0118
* 
(0.0062) 
0.0107 
(0.0093) 
0.0101 
(0.0068) 
0.0156 
(0.0347) 
Year03Dum 0.0047
 
(0.0059) 
-0.0037 
(0.0086) 
0.0114* 
(0.0065) 
-0.1029*** 
(0.0269) 
Industry YES YES YES YES 
Region YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.6479
*** 
(0.0116) 
0.7640*** 
(0.1689) 
0.4494*** 
(0.0225) 
0.1571 
(0.1468) 
atanhrho   -0.6766
*** 
(0.0723) 
 
Observations 12094 12094 12103 12103 
Log Likelihood  -6868.1669 -6858.8746  
χ2   4249.28*** 1035.18*** 
F 71.27*** 73.56***   
Predicted y 67.57% 75.46% 67.54%  
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4.4.5 Personal Contacting Behaviour and Loan Interest Rate 
Further to the previous analysis, I investigate the impacts of contact in person on 
small businesses’ cost of finance: interest rate for the most recent loan. Loan interest is a 
direct measure of the benefits or cost of a contact in person approach in terms of the 
borrowing for a small business, and it is widely adopted in the empirical research as a 
measure of the borrowing cost (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Degryse and Cayseele, 
2000). The interest rate I employ in this section is the interest rate in percentage charged on 
the most recent loan for the firms in the survey. I have also added the prime rate in 
percentage in the regression when the loan application was made as an independent variable. 
Table 4-8A reports the analysis based on the OLS model and TRA model. The 
common dependent variable for these models is the interest rate for the most recent loans for 
small businesses. The LR test confirms that by adopting TRA regression, the endogeneity 
problem has been eliminated, implying TRA model is applied more appropriately. The TRA 
model concludes that firms that communicate with the banks in person would get the loans at 
a lower rate. Contact in person could be able to transmit more soft information to the banks 
that is not easily hardened, especially for small businesses for which the fixed cost of 
transmitting hard information is high. Therefore, the monitoring cost and information 
acquisition cost could be lower (Ang, 1991; Petersen, 2004). H4 is thereby supported. It can 
also be seen from Table 4-8A that informationally transparent firms, e.g. firms of a larger size, 
in the form of corporations, have got the loan issued at a lower interest rate, which confirms 
that the degree of the asymmetric information problem is positively associated with the banks’ 
monitoring cost and information acquisition cost. 
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Table 4-8A shows the decrease of the interest rate spread in 2003, where the banking 
market competition increased. The result is consistent with the findings by Rice and Strahan 
(2010). 
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Table 4-8A: Contact in Person and Most Recent Loan Interest Rate 
(This table presents the results of the determination of the most recent loan interest rate. The 
dependent variable of the OLS model is the most recent loan interest rate. Treatment Regression 
Analysis is conducted by using a two-stage approach with a dependent variable of most recent loan 
interest rate by controlling for the treatment effect, and the dependent variable in the first stage is 
contactinperson. Column I reports the second-stage result and Column II and Column III report the 
marginal effects. IMR stands for inverse Mills ratio and control variables include industrial and 
regional dummies. I report athrho as the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio as sigma is always 
positive in the treatment model. “***”,“**” and “*” stand for a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. The highest VIF is 5.67 indicating that no multicollinearity problem has been detected. 
1st-stage regression is reported in Column IV. ‘primetck’ is a dummy variable indicating whether 
firms have checking accounts in the primary bank or not. . LR test χ2 is 3.26*, confirming the 
elimination of the endogeneity problem.) 
 
 OLS  TRA   
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Column I: 
2nd Stage 
(primrela1) 
Column II: 
dy/dx for 
treatment = 
1 
Column 
III: 
dy/dx for 
treatment 
= 0 
Column IV: 1st 
Stage 
(contactinperson) 
contactinperson -0.1559
* 
(0.0926) 
-1.3058*** 
(0.4738)    
finenviro     2.8775
*** 
(0.3386) 
primetck     1.0547
*** 
(0.0856) 
HHI 0.1201
 
(0.0764) 
0.1709** 
(0.08010) 0.1245 0.0986 
0.1386*** 
(0.0440) 
primerate 0.3545
*** 
(0.0637) 
0.3550*** 
(0.0566) 0.3579 0.3595 
-0.0112 
(0.0313) 
logtotem -0.1842
*** 
(0.0451) 
-0.2124*** 
(0.0451) -0.1841 -0.1683 
-0.0820*** 
(0.0246) 
totasset -0.1630
*** 
(0.0343) 
-0.2165*** 
(0.0367) -0.1661 -0.1381 
-0.1459*** 
(0.0170) 
corporat -0.2192
** 
(0.1039) 
-0.2077** 
(0.0970) -0.2071 -0.2067 
0.0061 
(0.0565) 
startup 0.0046
 
(0.2339) 
-0.0293 
(0.1838) -0.0029 0.0107 
-0.0710 
(0.1073) 
delinqueb 0.0473
 
(0.0972) 
0.0603 
(0.0960) 0.0531 0.0490 
0.0162 
(0.0539) 
bank 0.0290 (0.1385) 
0.2931* 
(0.1616) 0.1902 0.1455 
0.2857*** 
(0.0712) 
Year98Dum -0.1947
 
(0.1456) 
-0.2038 
(0.1485) -0.2019 -0.2008 
-0.0145 
(0.0837) 
Year03Dum -2.2958
*** 
(0.1642) 
-2.2902*** 
(0.1509) -2.3022 -2.3089 
0.0244 
(0.0852) 
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Constant 9.3277
*** 
(0.5910) 
10.5917*** 
(0.7289)   
-0.6622* 
(0.3760) 
Industry YES YES   YES 
Region YES YES   YES 
IMR  0.2845
** 
(0.1121)    
Observations 4354 4354   4354 
Log Likelihood  -12368.84    
χ2  2189.67***   806.29*** 
F 87.91***     
LR Test of 
Endogeneity (χ2)  
3.20*    
Predicted y 7.2417  7.18 7.27  
  
A variable of ‘loansize’ 45  – the amount in US dollars of the most recent loan 
application – has been considered in the regressions. The transformation form of this variable 
– ‘logloansize’ is the natural logarithm for of ‘loansize’ and I have considered ‘logloansize’ 
in the regression. The results are reported in Table 4-8B. 
Table 4-8B: Contact in Person and Most Recent Loan Interest Rate (with Loan Size) 
(This table presents the results of the determination of the most recent loan interest rate. The 
dependent variable of the OLS model is the most recent loan interest rate. Treatment Regression 
Analysis is conducted by using a two-stage approach with a dependent variable of most recent loan 
interest rate by controlling for the treatment effect, and the dependent variable in the first stage is 
contactinperson. Column I reports the second-stage result and Column II and Column III report the 
marginal effects. IMR stands for inverse Mills ratio and control variables include industrial and 
regional dummies. I report athrho as the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio as sigma is always 
positive in the treatment model. “***”,“**” and “*” stand for a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. The highest VIF is 5.67 indicating that no multicollinearity problem has been detected. 
1st-stage regression is reported in Column IV. ‘primetck’ is a dummy variable indicating whether 
firms have checking accounts in the primary bank or not. . LR test χ2 is 20.90***, confirming the 
elimination of the endogeneity problem.) 
 
                                                 
45 Descriptive Statistics: Mean = 945350, Standard Deviation = 3876525, Minimum Value = 100, Maximum 
Value = 1.00e+08, Median = 100000, 25th Percentile = 25000, 75th Percentile = 500000. 
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 OLS  TRA   
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Column I: 
2nd Stage 
(primrela1) 
Column II: 
dy/dx for 
treatment = 
1 
Column 
III: 
dy/dx for 
treatment 
= 0 
Column IV: 1st 
Stage 
(contactinperson) 
contactinperson -0.1786
** 
(0.0861) 
-1.8908*** 
(0.2350)    
finenviro     2.8409
*** 
(0.3424) 
primetck     1.0654
*** 
(0.0879) 
HHI 0.0836
 
(0.0704) 
0.1568** 
(0.0749) 0.0896 0.0536 
0.1377*** 
(0.0447) 
primerate 0.3709
*** 
(0.0567) 
0.3671*** 
(0.0543) 0.3744 0.3783 
-0.0151 
(0.0324) 
logtotem -0.1428
*** 
(0.0408) 
-0.1745*** 
(0.0422) -0.1407 -0.1226 
-0.0676*** 
(0.0253) 
totasset -0.0997
*** 
(0.0358) 
-0.1540*** 
(0.0330) -0.0988 -0.0692 
-0.1103*** 
(0.0202) 
corporat -0.1734
** 
(0.0945) 
-0.1484 
(0.0925) -0.1496 -0.1502 
0.0175 
(0.0578) 
startup 0.1907
 
(0.2169) 
0.1517 
(0.0749) 0.1896 0.2084 
-0.0526 
(0.1112) 
delinqueb 0.2466
*** 
(0.0858) 
0.2558*** 
(0.0922) 0.2545 0.2538 
0.0021 
(0.0554) 
logloansize -0.2297
*** 
(0.0302) 
-0.2767*** 
(0.0286) -0.2394 -0.2195 
-0.0639*** 
(0.0167) 
bank -0.1398 (0.1252) 
0.2697** 
(0.1266) 0.1012 0.0327 
0.3133*** 
(0.0751) 
Year98Dum -0.3450
** 
(0.1372) 
-0.3653*** 
(0.1404) -0.3665 -0.3671 
-0.0299 
(0.0850) 
Year03Dum -1.7988
*** 
(0.1451) 
-1.8039*** 
(0.1446) -1.8138 -1.8192 
0.0026 
(0.0879) 
Constant 11.1271
*** 
(0.5660) 
13.2110*** 
(0.5714)   
-0.4225 
(0.3906) 
Industry YES YES   YES 
Region YES YES   YES 
IMR  0.4567
*** 
(0.0668)    
Observations 4221 4221   4221 
Log Likelihood  -11557.48    
χ2  2253.73***   818.63*** 
F 82.47***     
LR Test of 
Endogeneity (χ2) 
 20.90***    
Predicted y 7.47  7.40 7.48  
In Table 4-8B the coefficient of the loan size is significantly negative. It indicates, 
banks charge lower for larger size of the loans which is reasonable for the wholesale of the 
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credits. Comparing with the original regressions, the delinquency record dummy in the new 
regressions becomes significantly positive. The possible reason is that the amount of the loan, 
might be closely associated with the firms’ delinquency record.  
 
4.4.6 Personal Contacting Behaviour and Discouraged Borrowing 
Further to the previous analysis, I investigate the impacts of contact in person on 
financial availability for small businesses: the propensity of a small firm to be a discouraged 
borrower. “Discouraged borrowers” are defined as those firms that did not apply for loans 
even though they needed external finance over the last three years because they feared their 
applications would be rejected. Existing empirical evidence has suggested that discouraged 
borrowers are usually of higher operating risk and discouragement from borrowing could be 
viewed as a self-rationing mechanism (Han, 2009; Kon and Storey, 2003; Bhaird et al 2016; 
Ferrando and Mulier, 2014). It is expected that better soft information transmission, through 
contact in person with the primary bank, for instance, could well improve the informational 
transparency between a small business and its banks, and therefore affects the probability of 
being discouraged for good borrowers (Freel et al, 2012) (H5).  
I follow Han et al (2009) to investigate the probability of being self-discouraged when 
the small businesses are in need of external finance. There are 12,438 firms in total included 
in SSBF93, SSBF98 and SSBF03, among which, there are 5,604 capital seekers. 3,005 firms 
are discouraged and 2,599 not. Similarly as the former sessions, the variable of 
‘contactinperson’ might be endogenous and therefore, both of Probit Model and Bivariate 
Probit Model have been adopted.  The results are reported in Table 4-9. 
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Table 4-9: Contact in Person and the Probability of Being a Discouraged Borrower 
(This table presents the regressions for the dependent variable of being discouraged for a firm when it 
needs finance for all capital seekers (ACS). Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) regressions have 
been listed in the table. Both coefficients and marginal effect have been reported. Control variables, 
including industrial and regional dummies, are not reported in the table. “***”,“**” and “*” stand for a 
confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The highest VIF is 2.80 indicating that no 
multicollinearity problem has been detected. The marginal effect of contactinperson reported in all of 
the Biprobit models includes both the direct and indirect effect. 1st-stage regression is reported in the 
right Column in the table. LR test χ2 is 4.02**, confirming the elimination of the endogeneity problem.) 
 
 Probit (ACS) Biprobit (ACS) 
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) dy/dx 
2nd Stage: 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
dy/dx 
1st Stage: 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
contactinperson -0.0965
** 
(0.0463) -3.82% 
-0.5808** 
(0.2365) -23.13%  
finenyiro     3.2722
*** 
(0.2935) 
HHI -0.0691
* 
(0.0384) -2.73% 
-0.0536 
(0.0389) -2.74% 
0.1110*** 
(0.0398) 
Eduba -0.0755
* 
(0.0396) -2.98% 
-0.1067** 
(0.0419) -3.07% 
-0.2321*** 
(0.0413) 
Female 0.0629 (0.0449) 2.49% 
0.0716 
(0.044) 2.41% 
0.0848* 
(0.0484) 
logoage -0.3062
*** 
(0.0922) -1.21% 
-0.287*** 
(0.0906) -12.13% 
0.1229 
(0.0966) 
totasset -0.1994
*** 
(0.0139) -7.88% 
-0.2087*** 
(0.0137) -7.89% 
-0.0908*** 
(0.0144) 
logtotem -0.1025
*** 
(0.0219) -4.05% 
-0.1169*** 
(0.0221) -4.09% 
-0.1125*** 
(0.0222) 
corporat 0.0215 (0.0452) 0.85% 
0.0296 
(0.0444) 0.89% 
0.0592 
(0.0476) 
delinqueb 0.8805
*** 
(0.0437) 33.96% 
0.8722*** 
(0.0447) 34.03% 
0.0629 
(0.0445) 
startup 0.0285 (0.0778) 1.12% 
0.0146 
(0.078) 0.99% 
-0.0771 
(0.0821) 
bank -0.1841
*** 
(0.0545) -7.31% 
-0.0474 
(0.0876) -7.07% 
0.8218*** 
(0.0529) 
Year98Dum 0.1237
** 
(0.0484) 4.91% 
0.1180** 
(0.0480) 5.02% 
-0.0514 
(0.0513) 
Year03Dum -0.0872
* 
(0.0480) -3.43% 
-0.0950** 
(0.0480) -3.96% 
0.0337 
(0.0512) 
Constant 3.9735
*** 
(0.3780)  
4.2853*** 
(0.3857)  
-1.5122*** 
(0.4460) 
Region YES  YES  YES 
Industry YES  YES  YES 
IMR   0.2920
** 
(0.1412)   
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Observations 5,466  5,466  5466 
Log Likelihood -3004.55  -5759.27   
χ2 1220.83***  1979.84***  695.12*** 
LR Test of Endogeneity (χ2)   4.02**   
Predicted y 44.50%  43.10%   
 
Table 4-9 shows that contact in person with the primary bank is negatively related to 
the probability of being discouraged for all of the capital seekers. Therefore, H5 is supported, 
implying that personal contact does indeed improve the information quality between small 
firms and their primary banks.  
Concerns over endogeneity have been detected in all of the capital seekers and 
Biprobit models work more appropriately. Table 4-9 indicates that a contact in person 
approach significantly decreases the propensity to be discouraged among the overall samples. 
The marginal effect of a personal communication approach on reducing the discouragement 
is 23% for all of the samples. The predicted propensity to be discouraged of all capital 
seekers is 43%. 
Apart from this, I follow Han et al (2009) and make a distinction between good 
borrowers and bad borrowers by using the Dun and Bradstreet credit score. I use the 1998 
and 2003 surveys here only because the 1993 survey did not report the credit score. There are 
7801 sample firms in the 1998 and 2003 surveys, including 4843 firms without any need for 
external finance in the last three years before the surveys, and 2958 firms (capital seekers) 
with a demand for external finance, amongst which 2047 firms applied for external finance 
and 911 firms did not apply for external finance because they feared being turned down on 
their application. Hereby I categorise these capital seekers into three groups46: low risk (good 
borrowers), moderate risk (medium-risk borrowers) and high risk (bad borrowers). Taking 
                                                 
46 In the 2003 survey, the risk score varies from 1 to 6, where 6 indicates the least risky group and 1 indicates 
the most risky group. In the 1998 survey, the risk score varies from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating the least risky group 
and 5 indicating the most risky group. I define the firms with a risk score above 5 in SSBF03 and a risk score 
below 2 in SSBF98 as good borrowers and firms with a risk score above 3 in SSBF98 and a risk score below 3 
in SSBF03 as bad borrowers. The rest are grouped as capital seekers with moderate risks. 
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into consideration the endogeneity issues, I have conducted both probit and bivariate probit 
analysis as shown in Table 4-10, for good borrowers, moderately risky borrowers and bad 
borrowers, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4-10: Contact in Person and the Probability of Being a Discouraged Borrower  
(by grouping) 
(This table presents the regressions for the dependent variable of being discouraged for a firm when it 
needs finance good borrowers (GB), moderately risky borrowers (MRB) and bad borrowers (BB). 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) regressions have been listed in the table. Both coefficients 
and marginal effect have been reported. Control variables, including industrial and regional dummies, 
are not reported in the table. “***”,“**” and “*” stand for a confidence level of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. The highest VIF is 2.80 indicating that no multicollinearity problem has been detected. 
The marginal effect of contactinperson reported in all of the Biprobit models includes both the direct 
and indirect effect. 1st-stage regression is reported in the table. For good borrowers, LR test χ2 is 
4.24**, confirming the elimination of the endogeneity problem. LR test χ2 are not significant for MRB 
and BB, indicating that no endogeneity problem has been captured.) 
 
 
Table 4-10 Panel A (GB) 
 Probit (GB) Biprobit (GB) 
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) dy/dx 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) dy/dx 
1st Stage: 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
contactinperson -0.133 (0.1217) -4.37% 
-1.4251*** 
(0.2708) -59.51%  
finenyiro     2.9950
*** 
(0.8041) 
HHI -0.0879 (0.1069) -2.83% 
-0.0407 
(0.1002) -2.50% 
0.1087 
(0.1035) 
Eduba -0.3421
*** 
(0.1109) -11.05% 
-0.3972*** 
(0.1021) -9.99% 
-0.3298*** 
(0.1046) 
Female 0.0795 (0.1222) 2.59% 
0.0665 
(0.1135) 1.96% 
-0.0025 
(0.1281) 
logoage -0.0641 (0.263) -2.06% 
0.1383 
(0.2385) 0.23% 
0.4967* 
(0.2627) 
totasset -0.2322
*** 
(0.0381) -7.48% 
-0.2312*** 
(0.0344) -6.77% 
-0.0811** 
(0.0369) 
logtotem -0.0245 (0.0625) -0.79% 
-0.0552 
(0.0551) -0.75% 
-0.1192** 
(0.0557) 
corporat -0.0201 (0.1204) -0.65% 
-0.031 
(0.112) -0.92% 
-0.0209 
(0.1193) 
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delinqueb 0.7576
*** 
(0.1359) 27.44% 
0.6854*** 
(0.1324) 25.29% 
0.0930 
(0.1433) 
startup 0.4586
* 
(0.2358) 16.46% 
0.3976* 
(0.2283) 14.43% 
0.0369 
(0.2350) 
bank -0.2085 (0.1409) -7.03% 
0.0765 
(0.1511) -4.48% 
0.6476*** 
(0.1508) 
Year98Dum 0.3354
*** 
(0.1060) 10.77% 
0.3069*** 
(0.1020) 10.49% 
-0.0981 
(0.1099) 
Constant 3.2541
*** 
(1.0954)  
3.2374*** 
(0.9737)  
-2.5491** 
(1.1657) 
Region YES  YES  YES 
Industry YES  YES  YES 
IMR   0.7726
*** 
(0.1509)   
Observations 817  824  817 
Log Likelihood -391.03  -814.20   
χ2 188.27***  364.36***  82.82*** 
LR Test of Endogeneity (χ2)   4.24**   
Predicted y 25.67%  21.49%   
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Table 4-10 Panel B (MRB, BB) 
 Probit (MRB) Biprobit (MRB) Probit (BB) Biprobit (BB) 
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) dy/dx 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) dy/dx 
1st Stage: 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) dy/dx 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) dy/dx 
1st Stage: 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
contactinperson -0.0696 (0.1038) -2.76% 
-0.6371 
(0.5106) -25.35%  
-0.1887 
(0.1161) -6.85% 
-0.2346 
(0.6102) -8.42%  
finenyiro     2.8185
*** 
(0.6608)     
3.8134*** 
(0.8400) 
HHI 0.0265 (0.0857) 1.05% 
0.0389 
(0.0867) 1.10% 
0.0747 
(0.0892) 
0.0491 
(0.0968) 1.82% 
0.0489 
(0.0986) 1.85% 
-0.0195 
(0.1061) 
Eduba 0.0583 (0.0883) 2.31% 
-0.0134 
(0.1101) 2.13% 
-0.4135*** 
(0.0903) 
-0.2084** 
(0.0964) -7.72% 
-0.2102** 
(0.101) -7.86% 
-0.1462 
(0.1046) 
Female 0.0665 (0.0933) 2.64% 
0.0918 
(0.0956) 2.75% 
0.1662* 
(0.1012) 
0.0612 
(0.1089) 2.26% 
0.0633 
(0.1117) 2.29% 
0.2002* 
(0.1202) 
logoage -0.1726 (0.1963) -6.84% 
-0.1464 
(0.1992) -6.95% 
0.1726 
(0.2073) 
-0.3534 
(0.2321) -13.09% 
-0.3565 
(0.2297) -13.37% 
-0.1368 
(0.2599) 
totasset -0.1968
*** 
(0.0288) -7.80% 
-0.2049*** 
(0.0279) -7.79% 
-0.0821*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.1301*** 
(0.0314) -4.82% 
-0.1308*** 
(0.0339) -4.91% 
-0.0503 
(0.0343) 
logtotem -0.1631
*** 
(0.0495) -6.47% 
-0.1768*** 
(0.0503) -6.57% 
-0.088* 
(0.0504) 
-0.1357*** 
(0.0519) -5.03% 
-0.1384** 
(0.0628) -5.13% 
-0.1934*** 
(0.0552) 
corporat 0.0159 (0.0989) 0.63% 
0.0346 
(0.1008) 0.86% 
0.0912 
(0.1060) 
0.0142 
(0.1061) 0.53% 
0.0144 
(0.1057) 0.53% 
0.0404 
(0.1120) 
delinqueb 0.7558
*** 
(0.1047) 29.31% 
0.7482*** 
(0.1064) 29.28% 
0.0963 
(0.1085) 
0.7095*** 
(0.1018) 25.32% 
0.712*** 
(0.1063) 25.81% 
0.1902* 
(0.1045) 
startup 0.0468 (0.1431) 1.86% 
0.0344 
(0.1504) 1.55% 
-0.0271 
(0.1573) 
-0.0636 
(0.1484) -2.38% 
-0.0646 
(0.1549) -2.46% 
0.0068 
(0.1744) 
bank -0.1141 (0.1151) -4.54% 
0.0089 
(0.1581) -4.30% 
0.6483*** 
(0.1081) 
-0.0293 
(0.1291) -1.08% 
-0.0172 
(0.2059) -1.08% 
0.8277*** 
(0.1257) 
Year98Dum 0.1956
** 
(0.0866) 7.75% 
0.2063** 
(0.0863) 8.50% 
-0.0363 
(0.0956) 
0.0866 
(0.0989) 3.22% 
0.0874 
(0.1005) 3.35% 
-0.0988 
(0.1156) 
Constant 3.3207***  3.6179***  -1.4359 3.7559***  3.8039***  -1.1460 
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(0.7996) (0.8236) (0.9591) (0.9556) (1.1265) (1.2226) 
Region YES  YES   YES  YES   
Industry YES  YES   YES  YES   
IMR   0.3410 (0.3047)     
0.0276 
(0.3608)   
Observations 1,127  1,130  1130 891  891  891 
Log Likelihood -617.30  -1187.56   -498.99  -921.41   
χ2 266.04***  426.46***  153.64*** 158.62***  273.61***  126.91*** 
LR Test of Endogeneity (χ2)   1.12     0.01   
Predicted y 45.39%  43.53%   65.02%  63.25%   
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Table 4-10 shows that contact in person with the primary bank is negatively 
related to the probability of being discouraged for good borrowers group (in Panel A), 
implying that personal contact does indeed improve the information quality between 
small firms and their primary banks for small businesses of good quality.  
Concerns over endogeneity have been detected in good borrowers group and 
Biprobit models work for it more appropriately. The endogeneity problem has not 
been found in the analysis of moderately risky borrowers and bad borrowers groups, 
and therefore probit fits for the regression analysis of the MRB and BB groups. Table 
4-10 indicates that a contact in person approach significantly decreases the propensity 
to be discouraged among good borrowers group only. The marginal effect of a 
personal communication approach on reducing the discouragement is 60% for the 
good borrowers. These results confirm that, firstly, contact in person is a mechanism 
that works more effectively in signalling the good quality of small businesses and 
increases their financial availability. Secondly, a communication in person approach 
decreases the probability of being discouraged for all capital seekers but works 
insignificantly for non-good borrowers. On the one hand, as discussed before, 
informationally opaque firms have the ability to adopt this approach rather than 
impersonal communication, which requires hardened information for which the fixed 
cost of production is high; on the other hand, the banks may not be severely affected 
since the discouragement has not been reduced wrongly for firms of poor quality. The 
predicted propensity to be discouraged of all capital seekers, good borrowers, 
moderately risky borrowers and bad borrowers is 43% (Table 4-9), 21%, 45% and 
65%, respectively, thereby supporting Han et al’s (2009) findings that discouragement 
works as a self-selection mechanism to distinguish the quality of the borrowers: the 
more risky a borrower it is, the more likely it is to be discouraged. 
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The probability of being discouraged when for small business borrowing, 
reflects the equilibrium of the screening errors and application costs (Kon and Storey, 
2003). That is, in the small business loan markets, there is a severe adverse selection 
problem: certain amount of good borrowers could not be well signalled and therefore, 
they are rejected by the banks for their applications for loans due to screening errors. 
A second consideration is application costs: even a firm is rejected for its loan 
application, it could not get its application cost back. Therefore, some firms decide 
not to make the application because they feel they are likely to be turned down for the 
application and they have to pay for the application (Kon and Storey, 2003).  
Screening errors could be reduced if the information could be better 
transmitted, however, the application costs increase along with the amelioration of the 
information transmission. As stated in the thesis, contact in person – soft information 
transmission and accumulation over time – could reduce the screening error. For good 
borrows, by better soft information transmission, screening errors are significantly 
reduced and therefore, even with the same application cost, good borrowers are less 
likely to be turned down for their loan application. In this way, good borrowers with 
better soft information transmission are less likely to be discouraged. 
Due to the existence of adverse selection and credit rationing problem (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981), the screening errors by the bank may lead to the false rejection of 
the loan application from a good borrower. Better soft information transmission 
reduces the screening errors. For bad borrowers, without or with screening errors, 
they are very likely to be rejected. Therefore, there should be a very high rate among 
the bad borrowers that they fear their applications to be turned down (because in this 
way they have their application costs sunk) and they did not apply for loans even they 
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need finance. Soft information transmission, in other words, contact in person, may 
not be that efficient for bad borrowers than good borrowers.  
Consistent with existing literature, such as that of Han et al. (2009) and 
Chakravarty and Xiang (2013), I find firm-level characteristics and owner’s 
demographics, such as firm size, which is a measure of information transparency, 
credit history and educational background of the owner, have impacts on the 
probability of being discouraged. Total assets work for all of the four groups while 
total number of employers does not work for good borrowers.This may indicate the 
importance of fixed cost of hardened information production as a barrier to 
transparently transmitting information. When the assets of a firm are sufficiently large, 
it has the ability to harden the information to overcome the asymmetric information 
problem in which the fixed cost is high. 
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4.5 Robustness Check47 and Further Discussions 
4.5.1 Robustness Check 
 
Section 4.4.1 involves all of the firms in checking the determinants of a 
personal communication approach with the primary financial institutions. And 
relationship banking theories have been employed to interpret the results. There might 
be a concern over whether it is appropriate to apply relationship banking theories to 
firms that do not use any loan/credit services from the financial institutions. In light of 
this concern, I have picked out all of the firms using loan/credit services from their 
financial institutions for further analysis. There are 8031 firms in total using 
loan/credit services from their financial institutions. I have applied the same analysis 
as in Sections 4.4.2, 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 to these 8031 firms and the results are 
generally similar to those based on all of the firms for the key variables (as reported in 
Table 4-11, Table 4-12, Table 4-13 and Table 4-14). Such robustness confirms that 
relationship banking theories applies to general businesses, which does not limit to the 
businesses with borrowing relationship with the banks. 
Table 4-11: Determination of Contact in Person (Robustness Check) 
(This table presents the probit regression for contacting methods of sample firms with their 
primary banks. The dependent variable is contactinperson. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. “***”,“**” and “*” stand for a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Chi2 indicate good model fitness. Robust Standard Errors are used.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) dy/dx 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) dy/dx 
HHI 0.1251
*** 
(0.031) 4.02% 
0.1138*** 
(0.0320) 3.57% 
                                                 
47  SSBF enables the researcher to distinguish what types of contact among different banking 
relationships. In this section, I have picked out all of the firms using taking loan/credit services from 
their financial institutions for further analysis and the results are robust. Certainly, future research 
could focus on the relationship between the contact methods and any type of banking relationship, e.g. 
savings account service user, brokerage service user, cash management service user etc. The 
background theories may differ. 
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logtotem -0.2021
*** 
(0.0122) -6.50% 
-0.2182*** 
(0.0130) -6.86% 
corporat 0.0867
** 
(0.0373) 2.81% 
0.0675* 
(0.0387) 2.14% 
startup -0.0449 (0.0685) -1.46% 
0.0366 
(0.0716) 1.14% 
delinqueb 0.0427 (0.0385) 1.36% 
0.0554 
(0.0396) 1.72% 
female   0.0989
** 
(0.0389) 3.05% 
eduba   -0.2408
*** 
(0.0329) -7.53% 
logoage   0.1073 (0.0780) 3.37% 
bank   0.8119
*** 
(0.0431) 29.18% 
Constant 1.0004
*** 
(0.0605)  
0.1216 
(0.3058)  
Year Yes  Yes  
Industry Yes  Yes  
Region Yes  Yes  
Observations 8270 8218 
Wald χ2 500.35*** 832.32*** 
Log Likelihood -4529.3396 -4281.88 
Pseudo R2 5.61% 9.99% 
Predicted 
Pr(contactinperson) 74.42% 75.54% 
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Table 4-12: Contact in Person and Primary Banking Relationship  
(Robustness Check) 
(This table presents the results of the determination of length of primary banking relationship. 
Treatment Regression Analysis is conducted using a two-stage approach with a dependent 
variable of length of primary banking relationship by controlling for the treatment effect, and 
the dependent variable in the first stage is contactinperson. Column I reports the second stage 
result and Column II and Column III report the marginal effects. IMR stands for the Inverse 
Mills ratio and control variables include industrial and regional dummies. athrho is reported 
as the coefficient of the Inverse Mills ratio as sigma is always positive in the treatment model. 
“***”,“**” and “*” stand for a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Robust 
Standard Errors are used for OLS.) 
 OLS  TRA  
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Column I: 
2nd Stage 
(primrela1) 
Column II: 
dy/dx for 
treatment = 1 
Column III: 
dy/dx for 
treatment = 
0 
contactinperson 0.2941
*** 
(0.0273) 
0.8092*** 
(0.1476)   
HHI 0.0949
*** 
(0.0225) 
0.0758*** 
(0.0238) 0.0917 0.1021 
logtotem 0.0627
*** 
(0.0091) 
0.097*** 
(0.0141) 0.0667 0.0471 
corporat -0.0360 (0.0270) 
-0.0412 
(0.0275) -0.0313 -0.0249 
startup -1.1097
*** 
(0.0489) 
-1.1147*** 
(0.0495) -1.1088 -1.1049 
delinqueb -0.1988
*** 
(0.0284) 
-0.2077*** 
(0.0285) -0.2008 -0.1961 
bank 0.3342
*** 
(0.0373) 
0.1993*** 
(0.0505) 0.3346 0.3777 
Constant 3.5590
*** 
(0.0630) 
3.2274*** 
(0.1088)   
Industry YES YES   
Region YES YES   
Year YES YES   
IMR  -0.3027
*** 
(0.0862)   
Observations 8270 8218   
Log Likelihood  -15940.23   
χ2  1114.41***   
F 44.18***    
LR Test of Endogeneity 
(χ2) 
 10.63***   
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Predicted y 4.27  4.35 4.06 
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Table 4-13: Contact in Person and the Concentration of Banking Relationships (Robustness Check) 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of total relationship ties between firms and all banks. OLS, Treatment Regression Analysis (TRA) 
and Biprobit analysis have been listed in the table. For OLS and TRA, the dependent variable is the number of relationship ties between small businesses and 
banks. The Biprobit regression dependent variable is a dummy coded 0 as multiple relationship ties and 1 as a single relationship tie. TRA analysis and 
Biprobit analysis are conducted by two-stage regression, respectively, and the dependent variable of first-stage regression is contactinperson. Column II and 
Column III list the marginal effect of each independent variable for the dependent variable of numrlat with or without treatment, respectively. Column IV and 
Column VI report the marginal effect of probit and Biprobit analysis, respectively. IMR is an abbreviation for the inverse Mills ratio. The marginal effect 
reported for Biprobit includes direct and indirect effects. Control variables including year, industrial and regional dummies are not reported in the table. 
“Athrho” is reported as the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio as sigma is always positive in the treatment model. “***”,“**” and “*” stand for a confidence 
level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Robust Standard Errors are used for OLS and Probit.) 
 
 OLS  TRA  Probit (Exclusivity) Biprobit (Exclusivity) 
 
Coefficien
t 
(Std. Err.) 
Column 
I: 
2nd Stage  
Column II: 
dy/dx for 
treatment 
=1 
Column III: 
dy/dx for 
treatment = 
0 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Column 
IV 
dy/dx 
Column V: 
2nd Stage 
Column 
VI: 
dy/dx 
contactinper
son 
-0.2696*** 
(0.0479) 
-0.4937*** 
(0.1424)   
0.1733*** 
(0.0448) 3.49% 
1.2480*** 
(0.1634) 12.02% 
HHI -0.0306 (0.0378) 
-0.0225 
(0.0387) -0.0295 -0.0342 
0.0675* 
(0.0359) 1.43% 
0.0131 
(0.0353) 1.60% 
logtotem 0.4122
*** 
(0.0170) 
0.4018*** 
(0.0183) 0.4154 0.4245 
-0.1718*** 
(0.0154) -3.63% 
-0.0573* 
(0.0299) -3.82% 
corporat 0.1230
*** 
(0.0413) 
0.1232*** 
(0.0454) 0.1188 0.1160 
-0.1015** 
(0.0410) -2.18% 
-0.1131*** 
(0.0384) -2.49% 
startup -0.0130 (0.0768) 
-0.0163 
(0.0821) -0.0192 -0.0213 
-0.0585 
(0.0775) -1.20% 
-0.0543 
(0.0709) -1.33% 
delinqueb 0.5900
*** 
(0.0505) 
0.5921*** 
(0.0471) 0.5886 0.5861 
-0.3444*** 
(0.0483) -6.45% 
-0.3203*** 
(0.0465) -7.01% 
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bank -0.4235
*** 
(0.0533) 
-0.3650*** 
(0.0655) -0.4233 -0.4431 
0.3905*** 
(0.0569) 7.01% 
0.0108 
(0.0972) 7.77% 
Constant 2.2905
*** 
(0.0885) 
2.4305*** 
(0.1255)   
-0.9882*** 
(0.0877)  
-1.3993*** 
(0.2749)  
Year YES YES   YES  YES  
Region YES YES   YES  YES  
Industry YES YES   YES  YES  
IMR  0.1341
* 
(0.0820)       
Observation
s 8270 8218   8270  8218  
Log 
Likelihood  -20171.41   -3221.43  -7491.42  
χ2  1517.87
**
*   424.25
***  2064.89***  
F 48.39***        
LR Test of 
Endogeneity 
(χ2) 
 2.82*     12.57***  
Predicted y 3.12  3.05 3.31 12.95%  14.62%  
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Table 4-14: Contact in Person and Financial Service Concentration  
(Robustness Check) 
(This table presents the regressions for the determinants of small business service 
concentration from its primary bank. Two-stage tobit analysis is conducted as two-stage 
regression for the dependent variable of firms’ service concentration from primary banks 
(priconsv) taking into consideration the endogeneity issue. The dependent variable of first-
stage regression is contactinperson. Control variables, including industrial and regional 
dummies, are not reported in the table. “***”,“**” and “*” stand for a confidence level of 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. OLS uses Robust Standard Errors.) 
 
 OLS TOBIT 2-STAGE TOBIT 
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
contactinperson 0.0387
*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0441*** 
(0.0072) 
0.1325*** 
(0.0395) 
HHI 0.0143
*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0165*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0104* 
(0.0057) 
logtotem -0.0117
*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0171*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0049 
(0.0035) 
corporat -0.0101 (0.0066) 
-0.0140* 
(0.0078) 
-0.0117* 
(0.0065) 
startup -0.0181 (0.0117) 
-0.0215 
(0.0138) 
-0.0182 
(0.0118) 
delinqueb -0.0629
*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0726*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0647*** 
(0.0068) 
bank 0.1417
*** 
(0.0079) 
0.1556*** 
(0.0089) 
0.1180*** 
(0.0129) 
Year YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES 
Region YES YES YES 
Constant 0.4592
*** 
(0.0127) 
0.4795*** 
(0.0148) 
0.3975*** 
(0.0284) 
atanhrho   -0.2289
** 
(0.0932) 
Observations 8270 8270 8270 
Log Likelihood  -2552.22 -4249.46 
χ2   1703.03*** 
F 28.26*** 27.14***  
Predicted y 59.06% 61.12% 59.04% 
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4.5.2 The Role of Financial Intermediates 
 
In this chapter, the role of financial intermediates such as accountants, lawyers, 
is pending for further discussion. 
Accountancy service plays vital role for small businesses and it is popular. For 
instance, in Norway, two thirds of the small businesses use the external accountants 
for financial accounting services (Gooderham et al, 2004).  
As demonstrated by Gooderham et al (2004), the role of accountants is 
characterized as follows: 
First, the demands for external accountants are huge in small business sector. 
Secondly, small businesses would like to spend more on business advisory 
services rather than the accountancy services. 
Thirdly, like relationship banking, relationship accountancy services might be 
beneficial for small businesses. 
Fourthly, small firms prefer the accountants with connections and 
collaborations. 
For small business, accountants are important for the firm’s non-statutory 
work (Kirby and King, 1997), increasing the financial awareness for the small 
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business owner-managers (Marriot and Marriot, 2000), and providing advice on 
internal planning and control (Deakins et al, 2001). 
It is very interesting that although some small firms find that the accountancy 
services they have used are not satisfactory, they remain in the relationship with the 
accountants. One possible reason, might be that there might be numerous soft 
information transferred. If the small business switches the accountancy services, the 
value of the soft information transmitted in the past vanishes (Gooderham et al, 2004). 
This is in line with the relationship banking theories in this thesis. 
Certainly, on the other hand, there are some opposite opinions on this issue as 
some small businesses may find that there is no demand for receiving the external 
accountant service (Greene et al, 1998), especially for smaller firms (Bennett and 
Robson, 1999). This might be due to the reason that in the view of the business 
owners, autonomy and independence are more important for small businesses than the 
growth (Low and Macmillan, 1988).  
The lawyer service is also an important business service for small businesses. 
Empirical research found that the use of professional lawyer service is viewed as an 
efficient promoter and the only promoter among all kinds of business advisory 
services for firm’s employment growth, profitability and turnover growth (Robson 
and Bennett, 2000). The function of the lawyer service for the businesses, is embodied 
in the value that lawyers link the owners’ divergent expectations regarding returns on 
the assets converted by drafting the value. This ensures the price is contingent 
between the signing of any contracts and the closing of the deal. The lawyers could 
ameliorate the opaque information problem and provide the verification for the 
information (Dent Jr., 2009).  
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Overall, the services from financial intermediates, such as accountancy 
services, lawyer services, etc. are important for small businesses. For small business 
borrowing purpose, the accountancy services and lawyer services including producing 
the standardized financial statements, verification of the information, and so on, are 
essential. Certainly, the soft information may get lost from the financial intermediates. 
And that might be one of the reasons why small businesses prefer the professionals 
with connections with the banks. Moreover, that is also one of the reasons why the 
brokerage services offered by the banks are very popular among the small businesses. 
In particular, the bank support service small business users are much less likely to 
suffer from financial difficulty problem because of soft information transmission 
issues discussed in the thesis (Han et al, 2014). Due to the closer position between the 
borrowers (small business) and lenders (banks) if the small businesses use the support 
service from the bank, soft information could be better transmitted and the 
asymmetric information problem could be ameliorated. This supports the theory 
proposed by Stein (2002) that soft information transmits better if there are fewer 
intermediate layers. 
Certainly, this issue is not the focus of this thesis but it is very valuable for 
discussion in further research. 
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4.6 Implications and Conclusions 
Although there has been a variety of research on relationship banking and 
banking market concentration from both bank and small business perspectives, there 
has been little empirical research on the soft information communication between 
banks and their small business customers. This chapter carries out a series of 
empirical studies to investigate the determination of contact in person between these 
two parties and its impacts on small business finance, in terms of the strength of the 
banking relationship and external financial availability.  
This chapter is based on the premise of the characteristics of soft information 
that could uniquely be produced and communicated in person, rather than through 
any other communication approaches (Petersen, 2004). Soft information 
communication acts as a very important technology to ameliorate the asymmetric 
information problem for small businesses. Compared with soft information, the cost 
of the reverification ofhard information by a second financial institution is much 
lower than that of reverification of soft information. 
In an effort to examine these theories, I have carried out analysis on, firstly, 
what kinds of small businesses are more likely to communicate in person with 
financial institutions, and secondly, what the impacts are of such personal 
communication behaviour on external finance for small businesses. The key findings 
of this chapter lie in two aspects. Firstly, informationally opaque firms are more 
likely to conduct personal communication behaviour (H1 supported) and this soft 
information transmission has beneficial effects on lengthening and strengthening 
banking relationships (H3 supported). Contact in person could also reduce the 
borrowing cost (H4 supported) and improve the financial availability for small 
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businesses (H5 supported). Secondly, banking market concentration significantly 
facilitates soft information communication for small businesses (H2 supported) and 
therefore might affect external finance for small businesses. In combination with the 
emerging trend of using IT banking technologies in recent decades, a communication 
in person approach should never be underevaluated since it has great beneficial 
effects on small business finance (Han, 2008; Hertzberg et al, 2010). 
The results in this chapter have the following implications. Firstly, for small 
businesses, especially informationally opaque firms, contacting the primary bank in 
person is an effective way to overcome informational opacity. It could help small 
firms build stronger banking relationships, reduce borrowing cost and improve 
financial availability. On the other hand, for banks, although banking technologies 
based on “hard” information transmission such as Internet banking and telephone 
banking are developing very fast (Han, 2008; Hertzberg et al, 2010), setting enough 
channels to acquire as much “soft” information as possible is still very important. 
This is especially important for the banks in a more concentrated banking market with 
more personal communication with their customers.  
 Overall, there are some limitations for this chapter as well as the directions of 
future research to be highlighted. First, it is about the association between 
communication in person and soft information transmission. According to Stein 
(2002) and Petersen (2004), soft information could only be transmitted by 
communication in person, rather than other communication approaches. Hard 
information could be communicated either by contact in person or other 
communication approaches. From the perspectives of the banks, communication in 
person would be costly for them (Ogura and Uchida, 2014). Rationally speaking, if 
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there is a necessity for the banks and the small businesses to communicate hard 
information, communication in person is less likely to be adopted. Therefore, one of 
the important premises for this chapter, is that small businesses communicate with the 
banks in person in order to transmit soft information. In this way, contact in person 
could be viewed as a signal or brief indicator of soft information transmission. This is 
already more intuitive than the other proxies used in the pre-existing research, e.g. a 
z-score of 22 indicators including firm size, firm’s growth, personal guarantee, 
owner’s assets, etc. (Uchida, 2011) or borrower’s acceptance or rejection of the 
counteroffer (Agarwal et al, 2011). However, communication in person is still not the 
most direct approach of measuring soft information transmission. It is one of the 
major limitations of this chapter and in the future research, if the designers of the 
surveys could ask the participants the purpose of communication in person, it would 
be more intuitive. 
Second, although the enactment of IBBEA was in 1997, there are 50 states in 
U.S. and the effective dates of IBBEA for different states vary. For instance, the 
effective date for Colorado was 6/1/1997 but the effective date for DC was 6/13/1996 
(Rice and Strahan, 2010). Such kind of inconsistency may lead to the inaccuracy of 
the analysis because for SSBF, the postal codes for the firms are kept confidential. 
SSBF only provides the Census Regions and each region contains more than a single 
state. Such type of limitation could be overcome by the disclosure of the zip code 
information in the future and it would be of great value for better accuracy of the 
analysis. 
Third, the information technology innovation has developed quickly 
(Deyoung et al, 2011). Since SSBF ceased in the year of 2003, researchers could not 
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be able to track the influence of the information technology innovation on soft 
information transmission accurately. Therefore, since the research in this chapter 
could not cover the crisis and post-crisis period, further surveys like SSBF are called 
for. 
Fourth, this chapter investigates the determinants of contact in person and its 
impact on the strength of banking relationship, bank services usage, borrowing costs 
and the probability of being self-discouraged when borrowing. Indeed, the 
investigation could be done in a wider scope. For example, covenants play an 
important role in mitigating the conflicts between the borrowers and lenders (Smith 
and Warner, 1979). Since relationship banking improves the availability of the 
external finance for small firms, it is reasonable to assume that relationship banking 
could loosen the covenant requirements. Indeed, Ivashina and Kovner (2011) 
empirically found that pre-existing banking relationship loosens the requirements on 
debt to EBITDA ratio. Therefore, it would be worthy of investigating in the future 
research the impacts of communication in person on covenants. As there are two 
major types of covenants – positive covenants and negative covenants, it would be 
also interesting to find out whether contact in person, could loosen the positive 
covenants requirements only, or negative covenants requirements only or both. Since 
SSBF does not report the covenants terms, it is restricted to use SSBF data on this 
issue and therefore, future surveys containing the information about covenants are 
called for. 
Collateral also plays a major function in the loan contracts (Han et al, 2009b). 
Indeed, collateral could effectively mitigate the adverse selection problem in the loan 
markets (Bester, 1985). Therefore, it is valuable to investigate whether relational 
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bank switching could loosen the collateral requirements or reduce the likelihood of 
pledging collaterals in the future research, and this is feasible by using SSBF data. 
The association between relationship banking and loan size has been 
investigated by Gopalan et al (2011). Therefore, it is sensible to find out how contact 
in person affects the loan size for small business borrowing. SSBF contains such data 
and it is available for future research on this issue. 
As relationship banking increases the availability of external finance for small 
businesses (Berger and Udell, 1995), in the future research, it is also valuable to 
investigate the impacts of contact in person by small firms, on the loan approval rate, 
the likelihood of switching relational banks, the maturity of the loans, firm’s growth 
(Gopalan et al, 2011), etc. All of these information, are available from SSBF. 
Last but not least, there are some common limitations as the previous chapter. 
For instance, SSBF is not available for the research on the non-linear effect of 
banking market concentration (Chong et al, 2013) because the measurements for the 
banking market in SSBF are ordinal variable with only 2 or 3 scales; the banks, are 
also hidden in the SSBF surveys, which leads to the shortage that only very limited 
information regarding the supply side of the credit could be found in the survey; etc. 
If U.S. Federal Reserve Board, or any other institutions or organizations would like to 
carry on future surveys like SSBF, it would be very beneficial to include such 
information in the survey. 
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 Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
Small businesses are important to the world economy (Spence and 
Rutherfoord, 2003), however, the difficulty to raise external finance for small 
businesses hampers the development of small businesses sector. This dissertation, 
aims to investigate the issues for relationship banking and banking market 
concentration which severely affects small business external finance. It is meaningful 
to further explore the mechanism of how banking market concentration affects small 
business as mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry happen during and after 
the financial crisis. 
To summarize the findings, Chapter 2 has examined how relationship banking 
and banking market concentration affects small business capital structure. Compared 
with large firms, to finance small businesses, the lenders suffer from a greater degree 
of asymmetric information problem (Ang, 1991). As a result, small businesses 
usually pay higher costs on loans, and therefore, small business capital structure 
should be affected by relationship banking and banking market concentrations. To 
carry out the investigation, I have employed SSBF 98 and 03, with 7801 firms 
included in the analysis. The major findings of Chapter 2 include: firstly, without 
considering banking relationship, local banking market concentration decreases the 
level of debt of a small firm as well as financial risks; secondly, for any small 
business, as the banking relationship lengthens, the level of debt decreases as well as 
the financial risks; thirdly, as the banking relationship lengthens, small firms in a 
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competitive banking market maintain the constant high level of financial risks while 
the financial risks for the firms in a concentrated banking market drops along with the 
development of the banking relationship; fourthly, the debt ratio decreases less 
dramatically for the small firms in a concentrated banking market than that in a 
competitive banking market. Such findings contributes to the existing capital 
structure theories (La Rocca et al, 2011) and relationship banking theories, where, 
firstly, it confirms the existence of reverse financial life cycle effect on small firm 
capital structures, cohabits with the beneficial effect of relationship banking; secondly, 
it also finds that reverse financial life cycle effect does not vary across different 
banking market conditions while the beneficial effect of relationship banking is found 
to work much better in a concentrated banking market than a competitive banking 
market. 
The practical value of Chapter 2 is that it shows that relationship banking, 
particularly in a concentrated banking market, works efficient for small businesses to 
obtain relatively more debt from the banks without an increase of financial risks. 
Relationship banking could significantly ameliorate the natural defects of banking 
market concentration for tightened credit supply to the small firms (Ryan et al, 2014). 
It would be meaningful for the banks to create nutritious environment for the loan 
officers to better use relationship banking technique. The limitations of Chapter 2 
could be summarized as follows: firstly, the cross-sectional nature of the dataset 
limits the accuracy of the analysis as the causal relationship could not be easily tested; 
secondly, SSBF stops by the round of year 2003 and the dataset was finally published 
at the end of 2008. It concerns with the timeline for this study. 
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Chapter 3 aims to find out the reasons why some small businesses borrow 
from a non-primary source of finance and what the impacts of such behaviour there 
are for small businesses. Firm’s primary financial institutions often issue loans based 
on relationship banking technique (Arito et al, 2014) which is assumed to be efficient 
to overcome asymmetric information problem, and relationship banking could reduce 
the borrowing costs (Bharath et al., 2011), increase the availability of borrowing 
(Chakraborty and Hu, 2006). However, on the other hand, relational banks may 
charge extra rents from the borrowers due to “hold-up” effect (von Thadden, 2004). 
Therefore, it is worthy of investigating that, the behaviour of borrowing from a non-
primary source of finance for small businesses, is attributed to either the fact that the 
good quality borrowers escape from the banking relationship to avoid the “hold-up” 
effect, or the reason that bad borrowers are observed and distinguished by 
relationship banking and they are pushed out of the banking relationship. Moreover, it 
is also worthwhile to examine the impacts of such switching behaviour on the loan 
contracts. To conduct the analysis, Chapter 3 extracts all of the 1823 most recent loan 
applications from SSBF 98 and 03. The result shows that smaller and more 
financially risky firms are more likely to borrow from a non-primary source of 
finance. It supports the view that relationship banking is a self-cleaning mechanism to 
drive the firms with poor quality out of the relationship. Moreover, the small firms 
which borrow outside the primary banking relationship suffer from a lower 
application approval rate and a higher interest rate. On the other hand, to attract new 
customers, banks may offer some flexibility on the maturity of the loans.  
There are strong practical implications for Chapter 3 as, firstly, small 
businesses suffer from severe credit rationing problem while relationship banking 
could effectively ameliorate such a problem; secondly, it also guides the small 
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businesses that, switching to a non-primary source of finance, could not effectively 
reduce the borrowing costs. Switching behaviour may benefits small businesses on 
the  maturity.  
SSBF does not provide the detailed location information for the small 
businesses which limits the analysis, as only categorical measurement on HHI index 
is available from the survey. Without a continuous proxy of HHI index, it may not be 
feasible to capture the non-linear effect of local banking market concentrations. 
Another limitation of this study is that the full information of the corresponding 
financial institution is not available from the survey. Thus, the variables on the supply 
side of the equilibrium are not able to be considered in the analysis. 
As the information technology develops fast nowadays, new lending 
techniques emerges swiftly, e.g. online banking for loan application grows rapidly 
(Han, 2008). In such a background, does the traditional communication method- 
contact in person still important between the banks and the small business borrowers? 
And it is worthwhile to know how contact in person affects the small business finance. 
With the purpose of making the answers clear, Chapter 4 employs SSBF 93, 98 and 
03 for analysis, with 12438 small businesses involved in. The major findings are: 
firstly, it shows that smaller businesses and firms in a concentrated banking market 
are more likely to communicate with their banks in person. Secondly, it is found that 
if firms choose to communicate with their banks mainly in person, the relationships 
between the firms and their primary banks are stronger, e.g. the banking relationship 
is longer; such firms maintain an exclusive banking relationship with their primary 
financial institutions; and the firms use the bank service mainly from the primary 
financial institutions. Thirdly, it is also found that communication in person could 
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reduce the loan interest rate and the probability of being discouraged for the good 
borrowers. Taking into account that contact in person is the unique media for “soft 
information” transmission (Petersen, 2004), the research findings in Chapter 4 assures 
that “soft information” plays vital role in relationship banking to mitigate the 
asymmetric information problem between the lenders and small business borrowers 
and benefits the small business borrowers. 
The study in Chapter 4 is unique as it is the unique research to empirically 
capture the key role played by “soft information” transmission in relationship banking. 
Moreover, it is also the first time to find out the empirical evidence supporting the 
benefits of “soft information” transmission. The contemporary implication of this 
study could be drawn as, firstly, for small businesses, particularly for the small firms 
in the concentrated banking markets, it would be beneficial to adopt “soft information” 
transmission with their lenders, on the external finance. Secondly, for the banks, it 
would be valuable to set sufficient channels to communicate with their small business 
borrowers as it would maintain the small business borrowers to stay within the 
banking relationship and use the bank service exclusively.  
The limitations of Chapter 4 could be summarized as follows: firstly, the 
cross-sectional nature of the surveys makes it impossible to track the follow-up 
development of the banking relationship. Secondly, the survey lacks the proxy which 
could directly represent “soft information” transmission, as contact in person is an 
indirect measure. Thirdly, the information from the supply side is missing, especially 
the information regarding the loan officers could not be considered into the analysis. 
Overall, the thesis aims to investigate the impacts of relationship banking and 
banking market concentration on the small business external finance. By delivery of 
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three independent studies on this topic, the thesis uniquely expands the area by solid 
empirical evidence. In particular, the study links the relationship banking and banking 
market concentration theories with the traditional corporate finance theories, e.g. the 
life cycle theories for firm’s capital structure (La Rocca et al, 2011). Moreover, the 
thesis provides supportive empirical evidence towards the classic modelling 
framework (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) for the first time. Due to the nature of 
SSBF survey which stopped in 2008, analysis with stronger effectiveness is called for 
in this area in future. 
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